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With a view to the more ultimate goal of providing fresh perspectives 
to address the perennial theological problem of the compatibility of divine 
sovereignty and human freedom, this thesis undertakes a critically 
constructive re-examination of fundamental orientations guiding Wolfhart 
Pannenberg’s thought, arguing that, when properly read through the far-
reaching and decisive influences of Duns Scotus and Friedrich Schelling, 
influences hitherto only scantily acknowledged, Pannenberg’s overarching 
theology, from very early in his career to his latest writings, must be 
understood throughout as a ‘theology of history,’ and that when so understood, 
can also be seen as manifesting a previously unacknowledged unity and 
consistency. The critical demonstration of the deep influences of Scotus and 
Schelling, most notably for my purposes, on Pannenberg’s understanding of 
history and contingency crucially also makes possible a re-evaluation and a 
particular modification of Pannenberg’s use of field theory, which will 
contribute significantly to the goal of showing in new ways the compatibility 
of divine sovereignty and human freedom.  
The thesis begins with an examination of Pannenberg’s earliest works 
to establish the importance of contingency, understood in Scotist terms, and 
the influence of Schelling on Pannenberg’s view of history. Building upon a 
view of history as contingent and purposed, the thesis demonstrates that 
Pannenberg’s concept of history encompasses all of cosmic history and 
dismisses any distinction between histories, such as Historie and Geschichte, 
as artificial. The thesis shows that to affirm the sovereignty of God, 
Pannenberg maintains that the end of history is so assured as to have been 
seen proleptically in the historical resurrection of Christ. Likewise, in order to 
maintain the freedom of humanity, Pannenberg argues that, in one sense, God 
is not yet fully manifest in his sovereignty, yet he continues to interact within 
and create history as a manifestation of himself within which his creation 
moves contingently and freely. However, the thesis argues that the 
simultaneous affirmation of both positions is possible only when channelled 
through vital aspects of the influence of Scotus and Schelling and through a 
crucial reframing of Pannenberg’s use of field theory, which must be 
understood in temporal rather than material terms. By presenting himself as 
the defined end of history to the present moment, God is shown to give the 
temporal field into which creatures respond ‘ecstatically’ to such an end in a 
way that affirms the present and future contingency and freedom of human 
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This thesis develops two intertwining trajectories, yielding two 
mutually supporting outcomes, one more methodological in character and the 
other more theologically constructive. First, this thesis presents Pannenberg’s 
broader corpus as a single ‘theology of history’ thereby presenting his 
theology as more unified than the usual interpretation of Pannenberg, which 
generally suggests a division between his early works as a ‘theology of 
history’ and his later works, after ‘Theological Questions to Scientists,’ as a 
shift away from that theology. Second, I argue that, by interpreting 
Pannenberg’s theology as one of history, fresh and unique insights come to 
light for addressing the perennial problem of divine sovereignty vis-à-vis 
human freedom. This is accomplished by demonstrating the centrality of the 
influence of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and John Duns Scotus upon 
Pannenberg, as well as through reframing Pannenberg’s application of ‘field 
theory’ in order to clarify it and ultimately adapt to a new understanding of the 
structure of time. 
The general consensus among those who have engaged in a systematic 
study of Pannenberg is that, while his early work is primarily concerned with 
history and the relation of theology to it, exemplified by such works of 
Revelation as History, and Jesus—God and Man, he abandoned the question 
of history later in his career, usually traced to either around the time of his 
‘Theological Questions to Scientists’ or just prior to his Systematic Theology. 
For both Stanley Grenz and Christiaan Mostert, Pannenberg had abandoned 




that of Jürgen Moltmann’s project.1 For Ted Peters, Pannenberg’s later 
theology is a ‘theology of nature’ reflecting Peters’s own concern with 
injecting theology into a physics discussion, ignoring much of Pannenberg’s 
more nuanced approach to the natural sciences, which is from an historical and 
philosophical, not scientific, perspective.
2
  
While it is the case that Pannenberg begins to apply scientific 
discoveries, to his theology, the role of science within Pannenberg’s theology 
is always secondary to the role of history. Although Pannenberg’s personal 
perspective on how science and theology interact, largely through the medium 
of philosophy of science, is addressed in chapter five, some introductory 
remarks may be helpful, especially considering the way Pannenberg dialogues 
with science is pervasive throughout much of the thesis. Ian Barbour’s 
fourfold categorization of science-religion interaction, which suggests the such 
dialogue is either understood as in conflict, as two independent realms, as in 
dialogue, or as a complete integration, is helpful on a basic level, but fails to 
grasp the nuance within which Pannenberg operates.
3
  
One might place Pannenberg within the ‘integration’ scheme that 
Barbour outlines,
4
 but Pannenberg himself rejects this notion, arguing that 
science and religion can only meet via the intermediary discipline of 
Philosophy of Science. So Pannenberg’s interest in science, we might argue, is 
a philosophical, rather than purely scientific one. Yet Pannenberg’s interest in 
the philosophical implications of scientific investigation upon his theology are 
not ones made in their own right. Rather, Pannenberg is interested in science, 
                                                 
1
 Christiaan Mostert, God and the Future: Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Eschatological Doctrine of 
God, (London: T&T Clark, 2002); Stanley Grenz, Reason for Hope: The Systematic Theology 
of Wolfhart Pannenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
 
2
 See Ted Peters, “Editor’s Introduction” in Towards a Theology of Nature: Essays on Science 
and Faith by Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed. by Ted Peters (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1993), 7-9 (hereafter TTN). 
 
3
 See Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues, a revised 
edition of Religion in an Age of Science, (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 77-105. 
 
4
 Indeed this is likely behind Ted Peters’s decision to title his collection of Pannenberg’s 
essays Towards a Theology of Nature, considering the use of term ‘Theology of Nature,’ in 
Barbour’s Gifford lectures, upon which Religion in an Age of Science is based, as epitomizing 





or rather the philosophy of science, largely because he understands scientific 
investigation, at its core, to be involved in the same pursuit as a philosophy of 
history. For Pannenberg, as will be discussed in chapters two, three, and four, 
all human investigations are, at their core, part of an overarching philosophy 
or theology of history, a view Pannenberg took from Friedrich Schelling.
5
 
Additionally, history, for Pannenberg as discussed in chapter three, 
encompasses all temporal causal occurrences, and must be properly 
understood theocentrically, rather than anthropocentrically. Scientific 
investigation, and particularly physics, is of interest to Pannenberg precisely 
where it is concerned with providing an explanation for causal occurrences, 
which he understands to fit into his broader theology of history.
6
 
Mostert engages with trinitarian themes in Pannenberg’s theology in an 
attempt to tie Pannenberg’s theology together, but it is Timothy Bradshaw 
who exemplifies the attempt to portray Pannenberg’s overarching theological 
project as a ‘theology of the Trinity’ only briefly mentioning in his 
introduction Pannenberg’s concern with history.7 In contrast, one of the major 
claims developed in this thesis is that a theology of history, which can be 
traced back as early as Pannenberg’s doctoral dissertation, a document to 
which no scholar of Pannenberg pays more than passing reference, is the 
theme that unifies Pannenberg’s theology and demonstrates a remarkable level 
of coherence. By viewing theology through an historical lens, Pannenberg 
makes an epistemic and methodological claim that all knowledge concerning 
God is derived historically, not through a text nor philosophical reflection 
alone, and that the concept of history is extended beyond human history to 
encompass all temporal events in the universe.  
                                                 
5
 See chapter 2. 
 
6
 Compared to other branches of science, Pannenberg has relatively little to say. His only 
references to biology are as they concern the evolutionary development of life and its 
increasing complexity, and he says nothing with respect to Chemistry. 
 
7






If Pannenberg’s overarching theological project is a theology of 
history, then his central goal is to give an account of the nature of divine 
action upon the world. For Pannenberg, the difficulty is describing historical 
action as sovereign while also doing so in such a way that it does not 
overwhelm the inherent contingency of his creation in general and humanity in 
particular. As will be argued in this thesis, a theology of history maintains a 
doctrine of divine sovereignty precisely because the actions of God within 
history reveal him to be sovereign. In order to speak meaningfully about God 
acting sovereignly within history, one must connect divine sovereignty with 
human freedom. In this thesis, this is done primarily via the concept of 
contingency, which finds its roots, for Pannenberg, in John Duns Scotus. 
Pannenberg then extends this application to historical investigation through 
Friedrich Schelling. 
Given that the contingency of history is a foundational component both 
to elucidating Pannenberg’s overarching theology of history and to addressing 
the tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom, the first chapter is 
concerned with defining the term in detail, particularly as utilised by John 
Duns Scotus. The concept is initially explored from the standpoint of 
Pannenberg’s doctoral dissertation.8 As Scotus defines the term, an act is 
contingent if and only if the agent performing the act could have done 
otherwise. 
The second chapter speaks more directly to the historical context 
necessary for freedom. Pannenberg’s own reason for pursuing the historical 
question likely rests in his use of Scotus’s concept of contingency, which is 
necessarily historical, that is to say, related to temporally occurring events. In 
Pannenberg’s introduction to Revelation as History, he applies Schelling’s 
later work, which was concerned with an overarching philosophy of history, as 
a criticism against Barth. Using Pannenberg’s introductory essay as an entry 
into examining his theology of history in its own right, we may begin to build 
a cohesive picture of Pannenberg’s theology through interpreting much of it in 
                                                 
8
 Pannenberg’s dissertation has considerable citation in the field of Scotist studies, but not 





light of the Schelling’s broader corpus. Understanding Pannenberg in light of 
Schelling’s broader corpus is also essential for avoiding the persistent 
misconception that Pannenberg’s theology is Hegelian.  
Pannenberg, in a 1990 interview, laments that the one area where 
theologians continue to misunderstand his theology is with respect to Hegel. 
Pannenberg states explicitly ‘I am not a Hegelian,’ before later concluding that 
he does not basis his theology on Hegel in any part, noting that ‘His [Hegel’s] 
ideas, for example, are not as good as those of Wilhelm Dilthey, to whose 
assumptions in the area of hermeneutics I am indebted.’9 The idea was once 
much more persistent among interpreters of Pannenberg, than it was later in 
his career.
10
 Early on, Merold Westphal noted that Revelation as History 
follows an argument that ‘may well be the most articulate anti-Hegelian since 
Kierkegaard.’11 This is expanded upon by Philip Clayton in his more widely 
read assessment of Pannenberg in 1988.
12
 Since then, the overwhelming 
majority of interpreters readily acknowledge the ways in which Pannenberg is 
distinct from, or critical of, Hegel.
13
 Yet the claim is still persistent, showing 
                                                 
9
 Michael Bauman, Roundtable: Conversations with European Theologians, (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker, 1990). 
 
10
 See, for instance, Alan Galloway Wolfhart Pannenberg, (London: George Allen and Unwin 
Lts, 1973), one of the earliest extended treatments of this, but also Ronald D. Pasquariello, 
‘Pannenberg’s Philosophical Foundations’ Journal of Religion, 56 (1976): 338-347. Cornelius 
Venema ‘History, Human Freedom and the Idea of God in the Theology of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg,’ Calvin Theological Journal 17 (1986): 207-223; and Roger E. Olson ‘The 
Human Self-Realization of God: Hegelian Elements in Pannenberg’s Christology,’ 
Persepctives in Religious Studies 13 (1986): 207-223. 
 
11




 Philip Clayton, ‘Anticipation and Theological Method,’ in The Theology of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg: Twelve American Critiques, ed. by Carl E Braaten and Philip Clayton 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988), pp. 122-150. 
 
13
 See as examples, F. LeRon Shults, The Postfoundational Task of Theology: Wolfhart 
Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), esp. 
152-153; Jacqui Stewart Reconstructing Science and Theology in Postmodernity: Pannenberg, 
Ethics and the Human Sciences (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), esp. 95-97; Stanley Grenz, 
Reason for Hope: The Systematic Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), esp. 58-60, 72; and Cornelius Buller, The Unity of Nature and 
History in Pannenberg’s Theology (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), esp. pp 42-45; 










 and even prompting some introductions 




According to Ian Taylor, this is attributable, in large part, to an 
assumption of Hegelianism on the part of interpreters. Pannenberg’s thought, 
then, is assessed either with the degree to which he is faithful to Hegel, or to 
which the interpreter accepts or rejects Hegel. This is understandable, he 
notes, because Pannenberg does take up Idealist themes and uses similar 
language, but he does not use them in the same way as Hegel.
17
 Yet Taylor 
does not offer an explanation for why Pannenberg utilizes the terminology 
common to idealists. Instead of looking to Hegel, or Fichte (as Taylor briefly 
does), we should instead examine Pannenberg’s intellectual relationship with 
the oft overlooked Schelling, who acts much more clearly as an interlocutor 
for Pannenberg than any other idealist or existentialist. This will be 
established in the second chapter, but discussed throughout the remainder of 
the thesis as well. By grounding Pannenberg’s use of history in the work of 
Schelling, especially the latter’s Spätphilosophie, we can continue to refine 
Pannenberg’s theology more clearly in the third chapter in opposition to 
Bultmann’s dehistoricization of revelation and theology.  
Given Schelling’s commitment to examining historical fact as an entry 
point to philosophy, paired with his commitment to the contingency of 
creation, we have a broader context for understanding Pannenberg’s critique 
of Bultmann begun in Revelation as History, but extended over a series of 
papers. Pannenberg’s own theology of history, as demonstrated in the third 
                                                 
14
 Anselm K. Min, ‘The Dialectic of Love: Pannenberg’s Hegelian Trinitarianism,’ 
International Journal of Systematic Theology, 6:3 (2004), 252-269. 
 
15
 Timothy Bradshaw, Pannenberg: A Guide for the Perplexed, (London: T&T Clark, 2009). 
Here it is so pervasive that one dust jacket review noted this work could be understood as a 
robust ‘defense of Pannenberg Hegelianism’ 
 
16
 Raymond Keith Williamson, An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion, (Albany, 
NY: SUNY, 1984) 289-292. 
 
17
 Ian Taylor, Pannenberg on the Triune God, (London: T&T Clark, 2007), pp. 19-21. He is 





chapter, is developed in opposition to Bultmann’s emphasis on de-
historicization. If the revelation of God is identical with God’s actions within 
history, as Pannenberg argues is the case, then revelation must be particular, 
such as occurs with the Christ event. Thus we may draw the following about 
Pannenberg’s theology of history: if history is God’s revelation, then theology 
is the interpretation of history as history in order to better comprehend divine 
revelation. This leads to an essentially ‘bottom up’ methodology for 
approaching doctrines as opposed to the more traditional ‘top-down’ method 
utilised in theology, something Pannenberg exemplifies in Jesus—God and 
Man. 
By defining theology in these terms, Pannenberg has made theology a 
question of hermeneutics as it pertains to history. For this reason, the chapter 
then moves to address Pannenberg’s interaction with Wilhelm Dilthey. 
Pannenberg’s own reason for engaging with Dilthey stems from his critique of 
Bultmann. Bultmann’s theological project draws heavily upon Heidegger, as is 
well known, and Heidegger also addresses the question of history, which 
includes Heidegger’s own reference to Dilthey. Rather than a footnote to 
Heidegger’s project, Pannenberg places a heavier emphasis upon Dilthey, 
seeking to rehabilitate Dilthey’s hermeneutic of history in light of the criticism 
of Hans Georg Gadamer. Gadamer’s ‘horizons’ requires that an interpreter of 
history of the sort which Dilthey advocates must be able to have knowledge 
not only all of human history, but all temporal occurrences that are causally 
connected to that history from beginning to end. Thus Pannenberg’s account 
addresses questions of eschatology and the very nature of history itself. 
Although Pannenberg is attempting to rehabilitate Dilthey’s overall 
scheme, he nevertheless finds he must abandon Dilthey on one point, the very 
point where Heidegger utilised Dilthey: his distinction between Geschichte 
and Historie.
18
 This becomes Pannenberg’s sharpest critique of not only 
                                                 
18
 The distinction between Geschichte and Historie is difficult to convey in English, especially 
as Heidegger employs the terms. In a summative, but still imprecise, way, one might say that 
Historie refers to the historical facts of history (dates, names, specific occurrences), while 
Geschichte refers to the narrative or story of history, and its link to other aspects of that story, 
particularly as it relates to and influences Dasein. Historie just is, while Geschichte is brought 




Heidegger, but the entire project of dialectical theology.
19
 For Pannenberg, the 
distinction between Historie and Geschichte is an entirely artificial distinction, 
and it is nonsense to speak of them as different histories, not to mention the 
‘super-histories,’ ‘sub-histories’ and salvation-histories that Pannenberg notes 
are characteristic of dialectical theology. Instead, all history constitutes a 
single, unified process. Set in light of Gadamer’s critique of Dilthey, then, this 
history is also much broader than the common modern meaning for history; 
history is not just the temporal element of human culture, but encompasses all 
temporal occurrences in the universe. All of nature, from its very beginning 
until its end, is historical and thus has a theological element. However, given 
that Pannenberg’s response must not only address the nature of history, but 
must also account for the end of history, if it is to be considered complete, 
Pannenberg’s theology of history must address the eschaton, or end of history. 
In chapter four, we examine Pannenberg’s shift in temporal locus of 
divine action to the end of history, as well as humanity’s relationship to that 
same end, in order to further sketch Pannenberg’s theology of history. By 
placing the primary locus of God’s action at ‘the end of history’ and arguing 
that this locus is present within the course of history, most acutely at the 
historical event of the resurrection of Jesus, Pannenberg not only offers a 
possible address to Gadamer’s critique of Dilthey, but also further develops 
his theology of history in light of divine sovereignty, approaching eschatology 
from a ‘bottom up’ perspective. As noted, Dilthey’s scheme would require that 
a comprehensive hermeneutic of history be obtainable from the end of history 
by a mind that can also comprehend the very beginning of history in order to 
give the required context for historical events. Further, since God reveals 
himself to humanity from the future, Pannenberg must also provide an 
anthropology that shows humanity’s relationship with the future in order to 
incorporate it within his theology of history. Via an examination of 
Pannenberg’s theological anthropology in this context, chapter four sharpens 
the discussion of Pannenberg’s theology of history upon the issue of human 
                                                                                                                                
 
19
 For Pannenberg, this includes not only Bultmann, but also, to some extent, Barth, and going 




freedom and divine sovereignty. In particular, this end of history is relayed to 
humanity within the course of history, claims Pannenberg, in that the 
resurrection constitutes the occurrence of the eschaton in the midst of history, 
thereby constituting the most complete revelation by God to humanity. All 
other historical occurrences are only revelatory to the extent that they are 
considered in light of the resurrection, then. In order to discuss the whole of 
history, whose end is relayed to humanity at the resurrection, Pannenberg’s 
theology of history requires the incorporation of cosmic history. 
The fifth chapter addresses the issue of cosmic history. If divine 
revelation is history, as Pannenberg states, and history necessarily includes 
cosmic history, then the manner we speak of cosmic history must be 
theological in tone. By addressing cosmic history in this way, this chapter also 
offers a way to describe divine action from the future as sovereign, without 
that action compromising the contingency, and with it freedom, of human 
agents. I do so through restoring, sharpening, and applying Pannenberg’s use 
of the ‘field’ concept. By examining field theory in light of its philosophical 
background and by expanding Pannenberg’s own use of field, the thesis gives 
an account of divine action and then places that within the context of a 
theology of history. Problematically, Pannenberg is unwilling to state that his 
use of field amounts to ‘mere metaphor,’ yet he also does not want to equate 
the field with the Spirit of God. Thus, a key task of the sixth chapter is to 
resolve this problem. 
For Pannenberg, the field represents a scientific description of non-
local and thus non-material causal action upon material objects. Pannenberg is 
not concerned with the field, but the causal action of the field. Similarly, 
Pannenberg is less concerned with describing the exact nature of the Spirit, at 
least in the context of field, as he is with describing the way in which Spirit, as 
non-material, exerts a causal influence upon the material world. The point of 
comparison is not between the ontologies of ‘Spirit’ and ‘Field’ as such, but 
between the causal influence of ‘Spirit’ and ‘Field.’ In other words, the 




material Spirit upon the physical world.
20
 Given that this is the case, it then 
becomes possible to speak about divine causal interaction on a cosmic scale, 
and thus begin to more fully develop a theology of history. Given the 
discussion of the Spirit, in relation to ‘field,’ it is also necessary to begin 
speaking of the Spirit in relation to the Trinity in its entirety.  
Since God interacts within history via the field, a type of causation 
that, irrespective of temporal placement of the cause, I will establish is 
contingent in the terms established by Scotus in chapter one, we are able to 
speak of all of theology as necessarily historical, understood in the broad sense 
of history established in chapter three. By placing the temporal locus of this 
cause at the end of history, to which humanity is oriented, as argued in the 
fourth chapter, the use of field, in the final chapter, is able to give an account 
for the mechanics of a theology of history. This final chapter takes the field 
concept and places it in the context of panentheism, a move Pannenberg was 
openly reluctant to make. The way in which this move is made, however, 
respects the reasons behind Pannenberg’s reluctance by maintaining a 
distinction between Creator and created, while still taking the necessary steps 
to describe human causal action as occurring with no distance between people 
and God. The manner of the Spirit’s manifestation, the primary form of 
causation derived from field, is in relation to temporal events. God grounds 
the present moment from the manifestation of himself out of the defined future 
that exists just beyond the horizon of our vision, yet it is a continuous creation, 
with no set end. Thus, while the end of history is defined, as described in 
chapter four, meaning that God is sovereign, it comes about as a result of the 
contingent/free actions of humans, upon whom ‘God has made himself 
dependent.’ The defined end, then, is always just beyond our temporal 
experience, but the intervening future (between now and that day) is entirely 
undefined. Time, in this pattern, is understood in a multidimensional temporal 
context, a concept introduced in chapter four, referenced throughout, and 
receiving fuller treatment in connection with theology in the concluding 
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chapter. Through all of this, God partners with humanity such God is 
sovereign only insofar as humans freely choose to see him as sovereign. 
The thesis contributes to general scholarship in a few different ways. 
First, it gives a description of Pannenberg’s theology as a single, unified 
project, understood as a theology of history, thus offering a needed corrective 
to the current literature. It does so, in part, by highlighting the long-term 
impact of Pannenberg’s work with Duns Scotus and Schelling, whose 
influence upon Pannenberg has been ignored in the literature. It also expands 
upon Pannenberg’s use of field alleviating the unresolved problems present 
within his use of the field concept in the process by sharpening Pannenberg’s 
use of it, and extending that use in light of developments in contemporary 
physics, especially as concerns the understanding of time. By providing the 
framework for Pannenberg’s theology of history in this way, in particular with 
reference to field and contingency, the thesis also provides a new potential 














CHAPTER ONE: CONTINGENCY AND HISTORY IN WOLFHART 
PANNENBERG’S THEOLOGY 
 
In developing a theology of history in line with Wolfhart Pannenberg’s 
theological writing, we must first look to the foundation of that theology of 
history. For Pannenberg, this is contingency, as defined by Scotus. Helpfully 
for our purposes, contingency is also a fundamental aspect of human freedom 
and divine sovereignty. If we are to argue that creation in general, and human 
beings in particular, are free, we must argue that humans both act contingently 
and that they exert a causal influence upon the world. God is sovereign; 
likewise, if he
21
 exerts a causal influence upon the world and acts 
contingently, with the added condition that God is able to ensure his intended 
end. Finally, contingency gives us an avenue to reframe the discussion 
regarding field theory that will occur in earnest beginning in chapter five, as a 
micro-theory as opposed to a macro-theory (one concerned with individual 
actions as opposed to the big picture), which will prove necessary to resolve 
the aforementioned tension. 
This chapter will look at contingency generally, seeking both to define 
the concept and to give some of the relevant historical background that 
accompanies it. To do so, the chapter will begin with the well-known account 
of contingency presented by Gottfried Leibniz. It will then give the earlier, 
contrasting view of contingency found in John Duns Scotus in more detail, as 
well as briefly describe Pannenberg’s earliest interaction with Scotist 
contingency. In so doing, I will show that Pannenberg’s theology of history is 
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founded upon Scotist contingency, an idea entirely neglected in the secondary 
literature concerning Pannenberg. Following that, the scientific usage of the 
concept of contingency, partly based on Scotus, will be outlined to frame our 
eventual discussion of field theory, in chapter five, before moving to a brief 
description of causal systems and the role of contingency within these 
systems. This will set up the necessary framework for a theology of history, 
examined in the rest of the thesis, and its connection to the tension between 
divine sovereignty and human freedom. 
 
1 The Leibnizian Tradition 
 The philosophical understanding of contingency is most often 
associated with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leibniz argued that there were two 
types of truth in the universe: necessary truths and contingent truths.
22
 For the 
most part, Leibniz understood necessary truths to be self-evident or analytic 
truths, like mathematical or logical truths, while contingent truths describe all 
other truth claims, which would largely be comprised of empirical claims.
23
 A 
more precise definition for contingency in Leibnizian terms would be to say 
that a statement is contingent ‘if and only if it is logically possible that it be 
true and also logically possible that it be false.’24 The term ‘contingent’ can 
then be extended to events and beings about which contingent statements are 
made.
25
 For Leibniz, the physical existence of each individual object in the 
universe as it currently is contingent in that existence, while certain truths, 
such as mathematical truths (i.e., 2+2=4) are necessary (non-contingent). 
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 Leibniz most frequently speaks about contingency by employing the 
terminology of ‘possible worlds.’ Leibniz argued that an individual’s 
continued future existence is contingent, and that the entirety of each 
individual’s existence, including past existence, is contingent since there exists 




 Leibniz went on to argue that the entire physical universe is also 
contingent. It is not necessary that God chose to create the present universe in 
the manner that he did; therefore, it is possible that there could have been a 
universe that is different from ours in which our world did not exist. It follows 
that, since our universe is contingent, its existence is dependent upon God’s 
choice to create it. As a result, contingency has often come to mean 
‘dependent upon.’27 However, it is a mistake to equate contingency with 
dependency, and as much of this thesis will demonstrate, it is possible to 
conceive of a form of contingency that does not entail dependency.
28
 Although 
God’s decision to create this particular universe is a contingent one in that it is 
possible that God could have chosen to create a different universe or none at 
all, it is conceivable that creation was, nevertheless, created by God to be 
independent from God, in some sense; thus it can be considered contingent 
without necessarily being dependent.
29
 Notwithstanding the confusion of 
contingency with dependence, contingency in philosophical discourse is most 
often spoken of in Leibniz’s terms: that a contingent event or object is 
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something for whose occurrence it is possible both to have occurred or existed 
and to not have occurred or existed. 
 Pannenberg, who freely employs the concept of contingency, questions 
the validity of understanding contingency in terms of Leibnizian ‘possible 
worlds,’ and argues that the past is non-contingent, which would necessitate 
abandoning Leibnizian concepts of ‘possible worlds.’ This is in part due to the 
nature of causation and history as understood by Pannenberg. The present 
world is a result of past events, and present reactions to those past events. The 
past, in large part, causes the present. If the present is one of many ‘possible 
worlds’ then the past, which causes it, would also be one of many ‘possible 
worlds.’ If, however, once the past occurs it is no longer contingent, then there 
does not exist a multitude of ‘possible worlds’ at present. It is, perhaps, 
conceivable to speak of ‘possible worlds’ in the sense of future possible 
worlds, on Pannenberg’s scheme, but this is clearly not the way in which 
Leibniz employs the terminology. The idea of a non-contingent past will be 
developed later in this chapter. 
It bears mentioning, as well, that Leibniz is not the first to put forth 
and develop contingency as a concept. Rather, the concept has roots reaching 
back at least to Aristotle, or even the debate between Parmenides and 
Heraclitus. Pannenberg’s own interest with contingency is grounded in the 
philosophical theology of John Duns Scotus, who modified and developed the 
concept of contingency from Aristotle.
30
 Considering Pannenberg’s doctoral 
work on Scotus featured a significant discussion on contingency, it is a small 
logical step to assume Pannenberg’s later use of contingency reflected some of 
the influence of Scotus, especially when one considers the remarkably similar 
position regarding contingency that Pannenberg has to Scotus. 
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2 John Duns Scotus on Contingency 
 2.1 Contingency as Power to Act 
 In his attempt to reconcile the concept of divine foreknowledge with a 
libertarian concept of human freedom
31
 and, subsequently, moral 
responsibility, John Duns Scotus rejected the Aristotelian notion of 
contingency, which was dominant in Scotus’s time, as inadequate. Instead, he 
put forth a new conception of contingency that allows for a broader discussion 
of volition and freedom, which, according to Antoine Vos, is currently 
considered the most basic understanding of contingency as a concept distinct 
from mutability.
32
 One of Scotus’s primary goals was to arrive at an account 
of divine foreknowledge that did not negate human freedom and took the 
reality of God’s involvement in history seriously. However, Scotus’s argument 
also yielded an ontological claim about the universe that is vital to the present 
investigation: the universe’s existence is contingent, not merely in the future, 
but at the present as well.
33
 In order to best understand how contingency 
functions as a philosophical concept from its early history, it is best to 
understand it in terms, initially, of motion. This will prove particularly useful 
in chapter five when early field theory is also discussed in terms of motion or 
action (action-at-a-distance). 
 Prior to Scotus, a form of ‘necessitarianism,’ rooted in Parmenides and 
reworked by Aristotle, had been the dominant way to conceive of motion 
(action) in the universe. Parmenides argued for a stability of existence and 
truth over time, as opposed to Heraclitus’s concept of flux. What this meant, 
for Parmenides, was that the universe was static and objects could only exist 
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necessarily. This ‘radical necessitarianism’ was modified by Aristotle who 
sought to account for the possibility of change without adopting the ‘flux’ of 
Heraclitus. As a result, Aristotle’s description of contingency became identical 
with mutability. This has been described by Antoine Vos, and many others, as 
‘diachronic contingency,’ meaning that change, evidence of the passage of 
time, was the marker of contingency, in what might be considered a 
predecessor to the second law of thermodynamics (e.g., by identifying 
change/Aristotelian contingency with time).
34
  
 In contrast to this determined mutability, Scotus presents the first 
description of contingency in line with modern definitions of the term, which 
Vos labels ‘synchronic contingency,’ and which has also been called 
‘synchronic picture of modality’ and, by Calvin Normore, the ‘doctrine of the 
contingency of the present.’35 These terms highlight the principle distinction. 
Aristotelian, or ‘diachronic contingency’ assumes that if there is a change over 
time, even one that necessarily occurs, an object is contingent. For instance, if 
we say that at one point in time, T, object x had property A (Ax), and at some 
other point in time, not T (¬T), object x does not have property A, even if this 
is a necessary transition, on the Aristotelian scheme property A is contingent 
with respect to object x. This concept of contingency requires that there be two 
different times one where x has A and one where it does not (¬A). We can 
therefore summarise Aristotelian or diachronic contingency in this way: Any 
property A is contingent with respect to object x only if conditions 1) and 2) 
are met. Or: 
1) At time T, object x has A [ T(Ax) ] 
2) At some other time ¬T, object x does not 
have A [¬T(¬Ax) ] 
3) Therefore, () A is contingent with 
respect to x [ Cont(Ax) ] Or 
Cont(Ax) ↔ T(Ax) ^ ¬T(¬Ax) 
 
 Scotus, however, introduces the terminology of possibility. Using the 
same syllogism, the Scotist concept of contingency argues that if it is possible 
                                                 
34
 Vos, ‘Introduction,’ 20-24. 
 
35





for object x to have A at time T and if it is also possible for object x to not have 
property A at the same time T, then, and only then, can we consider property A 
to be contingent with respect to x. We can also write it this way: Property A is 
contingent with respect to x only if conditions 1) and 2) are met 
 
1) At time T, it is possible for object x to have 
A [ T(x<>A) ] 
2) At time T, it is possible for object x to not have A [ 
T(x<>¬A) ] 
3) Therefore, () A is contingent with respect to x. [ 
Cont(Ax) ] Or 
 
Cont(Ax) ↔ T(x<>A ^ x<>¬A) 
 
To say something is contingent for Scotus is to argue that it could have been 




 This language of possibility is the core meaning of contingency. If 
contingency were merely indeterminacy, that would not be particularly 
helpful. We are actually looking at the power to affect the world or generate 
change. Within the domain of physics, with which this thesis will deal more 
explicitly via the field concept in chapter five, indeterminacy is fully at work 
in many theories of quantum mechanics. However, quantum indeterminacy, 
which functions at the subatomic level, fails to yield purpose or intention. For 
the later dialogue with contemporary physics to be meaningful in theological 
discussions related to personhood and freedom, the concept of indeterminacy 
must include intent or purpose if we are to speak meaningfully about God’s 
creative action without it being capricious action, and to speak of human 
action as subject to moral judgment. Scotus’s discussion of ethics and 
culpability is instructive here. 
 In his God and Creatures: The Quolibetal Questions, Scotus takes up, 
as question eighteen, whether morality is based upon external or internal 
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action. Scotus begins by noting that questions of culpability or laudability of 
an act require one to speak of power. For Scotus, ‘it is not enough that the 
agent have the ability to adjudicate the appropriateness of his acts. He must 
actually pass judgment upon the act and carry it out in accord with that 
judgment.’37 In other words, the degree to which an act is morally laudable or 
culpable is judged such by the extent to which the will is engaged. Thus a will, 
or motivation, that acts upon a determination between right and wrong as a 
result of prior conditioning is less morally praiseworthy or blameworthy than 
the will that makes the determination itself. The most perfect will, that is the 
one most laudable, for Scotus is one that acts ‘indeterminately.’ Further, 
following Scotus’s interpretation of Augustine, culpability may only truly be 
imputed to the will that acts ‘in its power indeterminately.’38  
For Scotus, in particular, an action is most laudable if an agent truly 
had the power to perform a morally blameworthy act and, as an exercise of 
truly unencumbered will chose to do the morally praiseworthy action. If the 
decision to choose a morally praiseworthy or blameworthy act was the result 
of a causal influence on the agent, then the agent is only praised or blamed to 
the extent that the agent acted under freedom and had the ability to do 
otherwise. The remaining moral value is passed up ‘the whole causal chain 
leading up to the will,’ that initially exercises the decisive contingent 
freedom.
39
 This becomes especially pertinent when we turn more explicitly to 
the question of God’s power to act. If we admit Anselm’s claim that God is 
understood to be ‘that than which no greater can be conceived,’ and setting 
aside his questionable logical leap from conception to actuality, then God who 
creates out of some internal drive performs a less praiseworthy action than 
God who creates through self-determination beyond mere adjudication. A 
classical understanding of benevolent omnipotence, then, requires that God act 
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contingently in the creation of the world. The real question becomes, then, 
whether we are able to speak of contingent action as non-random, for again it 
follows that a God who creates with intent is better than one who creates 
capriciously.  
 As demonstrated in the above discussion on moral value, for Scotus 
contingency has less to do with ontology, as it did for Leibniz, and more to do 
with causation.’40 Since it is causation with which we are concerned, and not 
only ontology, the issue of ability or power is introduced. Taking the 
syllogism we used above, if time T where in the future, then any concept of 
freedom would require that at some future point object x is capable of either 
having property A and not having property A: 
 
1) At time that has not yet occurred, <>T, it is a real possibility that x has 
property A 
2) At time that has not yet occurred, <>T, it is a real possibility that x 
does not have property A; (¬A). 
3) Therefore, () A is contingent with respect to x at time, T or 
Cont(Ax) ↔ <>T(x<>A ^ x<>¬A) 
4) We now add the condition that property A is contingent relative to x at 
time T if and only if the possession or non-possession of property A by 
object x is the result of contingent cause(s), C. Yielding the more 
robust formulation: 
 





 The result of such a line of argument for Scotus was that he could 
argue that God, who for Scotus is immutable, can nevertheless perform 
contingent causal actions since a contingent act does not require a change in 
the causal agent, so long as it produces a contingent effect.
42
 While, for 
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Scotus, this meant he could argue that an immutable God has foreknowledge 
of the contingent future, thus in his mind resolving the conflict between 
foreknowledge and human free will, Scotus’s argument allows this only if one 
assumes that the world is, in fact, contingent. In other words, he does not 
prove the contingency of the world, he only demonstrates that it is possible for 
the world to be conceived of as contingent and, if his definition of contingency 
is accepted, that God can remain immutable, knowing the future, without 
infringing upon the contingency of creation. His concept of contingency had 
further implications as well.
43
 Scotus argued that, for contingency to be 
genuine, it must include the idea of simultaneous possibility; future possibility 
alone is inadequate.
44
 In order to explain Scotus’s concept of simultaneous 
possibility, what has been labelled above the ‘contingency of the present,’ we 
must first briefly address his use of modes of being. 
 For much of the discussion of contingency in Scotus to be sensible, 
there must be a clear distinction between potential and actual as the two 
primary modes of being. The potential, despite not being actual, has a genuine 
mode of being (so, in the above, <>T is genuine if not yet actual, or is actual 
only in the sense of being possible). The Aristotelian scheme, however, denies 
that the potential mode of being can become an actual present; there is no talk 
of possibility. For Scotus, though, if a property, object or event exists only as a 
logical possibility, but cannot become actualised, then it is not genuinely a 
possible course of action and, therefore, is not free.
45
  
Scotus’s simultaneous contingency means that object x has the 
possibility of having property A or of not having property A when time T 
becomes actual, even though only one option (A or ¬A) is actualised at time T. 
The result of this is that there are two modes of being, potential and actual, 
and both have a genuine existence, though not a material existence. These two 
modes of being or ‘instances of nature’ are termed ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ by 
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Scotus. Two contradictory actions or ontologies, such as A and ~A both exist 
‘priorly,’ but, after the actualisation of a single option at time T, only one 
exists ‘posteriorly’ for object or action x. What is particularly striking about 
Scotus’s description of modes of being is that when moment T is present, both 
properties A or ¬A exist ‘priorly.’46 It is only following the moment of 
actualisation that one’s mode of being becomes posterior and the other option 
merely has the past existence as a ‘prior’ mode of being. The potential 
contradiction is solved, for Scotus, in that the present exists without duration. 
 In relation to potentiality, the pressing issue is what the implications of 
synchronic contingency are for causal action. Scotus argues that, for actions to 
be free, they must be contingent, though the converse does not necessarily 
hold.
47
 A person is free, only if the person has the power in the future and at 
the present to perform any one of two or more mutually exclusive actions. In 
Scotus’s words, contingent action is the freedom or power to actualise any 
potential prior action into a posterior action. If contingency is tied to potential, 
and thus power, then God, who is omnipotent, must act contingently. In the 
time following Scotus, this led some Christian sects to argue that all of God’s 
actions, until they have occurred, are contingent.
48
  
 There are two further implications to Scotus’s definition of 
contingency that I will introduce now, but address in more detail in subsequent 
chapters. First, since contingency is only associated with the present and 
future for Scotus, and the present reality of contingency is somewhat 
contentious, it is fair to say that the future is the primary mode of time 
associated with contingency. If this is the case and contingency is understood 
as ability to act, then the place of God’s omnipotence is in the future. Second, 
this could lead, as Pannenberg cautions in his doctoral dissertation, to the 
assertion that God, who always acts contingently, does not have an actual 
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existence, but only a potential one.
49
 It is worth noting that Pannenberg later 
accepts a modified version of this possibility, as seen in Theology and the 
Kingdom of God, to argue not only that God acts primarily from the future but 
also that, in some sense at least, ‘God does not yet exist.’ Both of these claims, 
and their implications for our understanding of contingency, will be explored 
in chapters three and four.  
 To perform a contingent act means both to have the power to do that 
act and simultaneously to have power at that time to instead do a mutually 
exclusive act, though in reality only actualising one such act. This is one 
reason Scotus can separate mutability from contingency. Scotus, still 
accepting the immutability of God, asserts that God can nevertheless act 
contingently, since contingent action is, for Scotus, connected with events or 
acts, and not with ontology . That is, contingency is a question of causal 
activity, not a question of being (or at least not only a question of being), as it 
would later be understood in Leibniz. Thus God is perfect, according to 
ancient and medieval concepts of perfection that entail immutability, and 
powerful. God and his nature can be considered necessary, while his actions 
could still be described contingently. The idea of contingent action as power 
has further implications for cause and effect, which can be derived from an 




 2.2 Cause and Effect with Scotus’s Contingency 
 While the problem of divine foreknowledge is behind Scotus’s 
engagement with contingency, one of the goals of this thesis entails exploring 
the relation of contingency to cause and effect, connecting it to history and 
freedom.
51
 As mentioned, Scotus argued convincingly that the actions of God 
are contingent, as highlighted in a discussion of God’s act of creation.  
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 According to Scotus, and in accordance with prevailing medieval 
philosophy, to say that the act of creation was necessary for God would imply 
a certain lack in God, because if God must necessarily create, then God is 
bound. On the other hand, if God creates freely, then his creative act must be 
viewed as contingent. God’s ability to perform action, his power, is not 
dependent upon the existence of the universe, but God’s contingent act is 
necessary for the universe’s existence; therefore, the universe is dependent 
upon God’s free, or contingent, creative act but not the reverse. According to 
Scotus scholar Allan Wolter, Scotus’s argument was so compelling that, 
following a series of condemnations in Paris from 1270-1277, French 
theologians found they could only speak of God’s act of creation as a 
contingent one ‘motivated only by his [God’s] goodness and liberality.’52 
Scotus would go on to argue that, not only is God’s action contingent, but the 
actions of people were also contingent. The degree to which Scotus was 
successful in demonstrating this through careful argument rather than just 
assertion, however, has been questioned.
53
 
 The primary reason Scotus gives for contingency is that the non-
contingency of creation is incompatible with his understanding of God’s 
perfection. If any aspect of creation is necessary, then all of creation 
necessarily exists given its causal interconnectedness. Such a scenario would 
entail God’s act of creation is also necessary, since his act of creating is in that 
line of causes. If that is the case, then God is neither perfect, for He requires 
something outside himself in creation, nor free, because he is obliged to do 
something, namely create. Of course, other philosophers, not least among 
them Hegel, argue that the motivation to create may be both necessary and 
arise from within God, thus seemingly resolving the tension without requiring 
that creation be contingent. We might consider this a ‘compatibilist’ notion of 
freedom, and with it come all the other concerns connected to compatibilism. 
These concerns might include the question of whether a person who acts out 
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of an essential nature could be considered to have performed a praiseworthy 
action in comparison to a person who chooses to act a certain way when that 
person could have chosen to act otherwise. This does not require that God 
divine compatibilism is not preferable, but it does cause us to consider 
whether a God who acts out of libertarian freedom, in that he could have 
chosen not to create, is preferable from a philosophical or theological position. 
Further, in speaking of the creation of the universe, Hegel’s position 
becomes particularly fraught. For Hegel, it is not that God truly creates ex 
nihilo, but that the Absolute creates out of his own being.
54
 Only in this way 
does the Absolute act as the grounding of all existence: by distinguishing the 
finite out of his own infinite being.
55
  
While Hegel, and some commentators such as Anselm Min, argue that 
creation out of God’s/the Absolute’s own being is in line with creation ex 
nihilo, such a move makes two assumptions. First, it assumes that the 
infiniteness of God means that there is nowhere that God is not. Second, it 
assumes that the Thomist idea that God is the ‘source of being (esse)’ means 
that creation emerges materially from God, rather than understanding it in the 
sense that Aquinas clearly meant it, that God is the efficient cause of finite 
existence.
56
 With respect to the first assumption, it should be noted that an 
infinite entity is not, by virtue of its infinity, present at all places and times. 
Nevertheless, one might argue that, when speaking of God, clearly he is 
understood in the biblical tradition to be all encompassing. Nevertheless, in 
addressing the question of ‘where is God?’ we might argue that, in the act of 
creation, rather than pulling finite creation directly from his being, God makes 
space for the finite creation by removing himself from parts of the universe. 
God continues to act as the source, into that nothingness, for his creation 
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without necessarily requiring that creation be taken directly from the being of 
God. This also, somewhat indirectly, addresses the second objection. Rather 
than acting as the material source of creation, by making empty space within 
the universe, there is now an area where God may create out of that same 
nothingness, rather than from his own being.
57
 As Cyril O’Regan notes, 
Hegel’s notion is not one of creatio ex nihilo, but of creatio ex deo or creation 
out of God, and so is distinct from the historic Christian position.
58
 For 
creation to truly be ‘out of nothing,’ such a creation must have been brought 
into being wholly distinct from God, rather than from the being of God. Given 
that creation would have been made, this requires that creation is not an 
unbounded, eternal entity. A creation brought forth ‘ex nihilo,’ requires at 
least one bound, God’s act of creation, which, even if an atemporal act, would 
require that creation be contingent, since it was created and did not self-exist, 
or exist eternally.
59
 The connection between the created world as contingent 
and God’s act of contingently creating is addressed below. 
In order to consider creation contingent, every part comprising the 
whole of creation must likewise be contingent. Thus the whole of creation 
should be regarded as contingent because, to use Scotus’s term, ‘every soul’ is 
contingent.
60
 We might summarise it this way: a cause (c) is contingent if and 
only if its effect (e) is contingent; and a cause is necessary (Nec) if and only if 
its effect is necessary: 
1) An effect is contingent (assume) 
2) If an effect is contingent, it cannot be necessary (a 
Tautology) 
3) If it is not necessary, the cause of the effect could have not 
occurred (definition of ‘necessary’) 
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4) If the cause of the effect could have not occurred, but did in 
fact occur, the cause is contingent (definition of 
‘contingency’) 
5) Therefore () if an effect is contingent, its cause must be 
contingent [Cont(e)→Cont(c)] (from 1-4) 
6) A cause is contingent (assume) 
7) If a cause is contingent, it could have not occurred, but did 
in fact occur (definition of ‘contingency’) 
8) If a cause does not occur, its effect does not occur 
(Tautology) 
9) Given that a cause did occur (from 6), an effect also 
occurred (Tautology) 
10) Given that an effect did occur, but could also have not 
occurred (from 7, 8 and 9), the effect is contingent (true by 
definition) 
11) Therefore (), if a cause is contingent, its effect is also 
contingent (from 6-10) [Cont(c)→Cont(e) ] 
12)  Cont(c)↔Cont(e) (from 5, 11) 
13) If we take the inverse of 1-12 and replace ‘not contingent’ 
with ‘necessary’ (true by definition) we can yield: 
Nec(c)↔Nec(e)61 
 
 Scotus forms the proof for the contingency of creation alternatively by 
examining the cause and effect relationship of the act of creation as opposed to 
the ontological argument provided above. Causes, being either necessary or 
contingent, produce effects of the same kind. Thus, a necessary cause will 
produce not only an immediate effect that is likewise necessary, but a series of 
necessary, and therefore static, causes and effects comprising a single set. 
Formed as the converse, this would mean that a contingent cause cannot 
produce a necessary effect. If an effect were necessary/determined, then no 
single cause in the series of cause and effect could be regarded as contingent 
because it would necessarily be the case that the cause initially occurred. 
Therefore, concludes Scotus, if God creates contingently, then the created 
universe must be contingent in all of its existence.
62
 It should be noted that, 
given the above discussion of modes of being, Scotus has separated the idea of 
necessity/determinism from its status as ‘fixed.’ Something can be ‘fixed’ or 
                                                 
61
 Scotus does not give a detailed proof, but his argument in Contingency and Freedom §§ 37-
40 follows this outline. 
 
62





actualised as only one real occurrence (among multiple options), but, so long 
as it was achieved contingently, it remains contingent. This will prove very 
important in chapters four, five, and six, where the concept will be revisited in 
the context of the end of history. 
 Scotus assumes that the human will is not subject to natural laws in the 
same way that physical reactions are because each act willed by a human 
stands entirely on its own. It is for this reason that he can claim every human 
act itself is contingent, or, completely free.
 63
 It is, therefore, a question of the 
nature of the human will as independent a priori, not the nature of human 
action as free a priori, as Wolter had suggested; the latter follows from the 
former. Scotus can come about this argument in a different way, as well. Since 
the act of the will originates in a being that is contingent in existence, by 
virtue of the act of creation, humanity can always make contingent, or free, 
decisions. This freedom, moving again to Scotus’s synchronic contingency, 




 Scotus not only argues that creatures act contingently, but that, since 
certain causes and their effects are contingent, the entire relation between 
cause and effect is contingent.
65
 In other words, an effect does not necessarily 
follow from a cause prior to the actualisation of either the cause or effect; 
rather, that just happens to be the case.
66
 According to Calvin Normore, once 
causal relations are no longer viewed as necessary, ‘it does not seem 
farfetched to suppose not all causal relations involve succession in time.’67 
While, for Scotus, this provides a way to explain causation on the part of God 
who acts atemporally from eternity within the created world, this can have 
much deeper implications involving causal order and, potentially. For our 
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purposes, though, this will have greater implications upon the nature of history 
in light of eternity. Indeed, for Robert John Russell’s description of 
Pannenberg’s doctrine of eternity as having ‘temporal thickness,’ introduced 
in chapter four and revisited in chapter six, to be sensible in any way, we must 
understand the contingent nature of causality, without negating its temporal 
ties. This will also prove particularly important when the discussion turns, in 
chapter six, toward the temporal application of field with a contingent time 
frame between now and the as-yet uncreated future intervening between now 
and the end of history. 
 Despite Scotus’s assertion that the present can be contingent, he 
nevertheless does not view the past as truly contingent, as elucidated below. 
Contrary to Vos, although Leibniz would later argue for the contingency of the 
past, as noted above, Scotus’s failure to argue for such a contingency should 
not be regarded as a limitation on Scotus’s thought resulting from the 
prevailing philosophical commitments of his day.
68
 Instead, Scotus had 
legitimate reasons for maintaining that, although the future and present are 
truly contingent, the past is not.  
 Scotus explicitly states that, once action moves from prior to posterior 
after actualising at the present, or nunc, it is no longer contingent, but 
necessary.
69
 This will become immensely important as we examine the 
development of Pannenberg’s theology of history in chapter three onward. The 
reason Scotus had for adopting such a view is his understanding of knowledge 
and God’s will, which, for Scotus, is intimately connected with God’s action 
and ontology, and thus relevant for contingency.
70
 After an event has become 
actualised, despite having been contingent while it was still present, its 
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posterior existence is known to have been actualised in a certain way as fact 
by God. Once God knows that such an event has occurred in a specific way, it 
is no longer known as an uncreated contingent fact, but as an already-occurred 
determined fact. Further, God’s actions, though from eternity, can only have 
causal efficacy within the context of time, since cause and effect imply change 
and change can only occur as a temporal phenomenon. 
 Scotus began his understanding of contingency, as noted above, with 
Aristotle. Aristotle argued for a distinction between logical contingency and 
‘actualized’ or ‘realized’ contingency in De Caelo. While Aristotle argued that 
things may be logically possible, for Aristotle, only the ‘actualized’ or 
‘realized’ fact exists, and it does so necessarily. The result is that, for 
Aristotle, synchronic contingency, something which can potentially be and not 
be, ‘is impossible,’ only that which is the case actually exists.71 Further, if 
something were to be truly contingent, in the sense that Scotus seeks, Aristotle 
would argue that it is unknowable, since it would never become ‘actualized’ or 
‘realized.’72 
 It is, perhaps, for this reason that Scotus, who modifies Aristotle’s 
concept on contingency to allow an actualized present contingency, still holds 
to the necessity of the past in light of God’s knowledge. Scotus is explicit in 
his description of contingent events changing their character from contingent 
into necessary, explicitly citing Aristotle to do so, stating ‘what has passed 
into the past necessary.’73 However, there may be additional reasons for this, 
especially when one considers the distinction between logical modality of 
contingency, of importance for Aristotle and later Leibniz, against that of 
actualized or realized contingency, which was substantially more important 
for Scotus than for Aristotle. According to the Scotist and more broadly 
medieval Christian view of God, God will always perform the perfect, and 
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What is distinct for Scotus was that events that are now necessary were 
previously contingent, something Aristotle could not tolerate. As noted, 
though, this is not a logical distinction, but one connected to freedom and 
action. Scotus made a distinction, significantly adapted from Aristotle, 
between ‘modal’ and ‘actual’ existence which suggests a ‘divided truth’ exists 
concerning the contingency of any statement. There is the truth concerning its 
logical contingency, its modality, and the truth concerning its relation to the 
observed world, its actuality. Scotus labelled the combination of the two a 
‘composite truth,’ which Scotus acknowledged could indicate a superficial 
contradiction that is resolved upon closer examination (with a statement that is 
modally contingent, but actually necessary).
75
 The focus for Scotus is upon the 
historical occurrence and its possibility within history. On this front, Scotus is 
much more open to the concept of freedom than Aristotle.  
If something is contingent, for Aristotle, and thus subject to change, 
then one cannot know an absolute truth about it; truth for Aristotle, following 
Plato before him, was timeless.
76
 This is why, for Scotus, it is so important 
that past events no longer be considered contingent: God knew them, and such 
knowledge requires that they be ontologically (or ‘actually’) necessary. If one 
were to allow for truth claims to be made about ‘actually’ contingent objects 
or acts, as this thesis does, one could argue that the past is technically 
contingent, but its truth claims rely upon the free and contingent action of God 
who exists in a certain way. Yet for Scotus, and indeed as must be the case for 
us, the question of the existence of God, and further the existence of God with 
a certain character, namely one that is faithful, is a separate question. Scotus 
certainly addressed this question, though this was separate from his discussion 
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of contingency. Unfortunately Scotus’s reasoning is not entirely satisfactory. 
Nevertheless, we may remedy it, at least in part, by assuming a God who is 
faithful; doing otherwise would be to introduce a question far too broad to be 
covered here, and thus the past remains as it is as a function of God’s 
faithfulness, rather than something inherent to the system. While this is 
technically a contingent past, it is, for our purposes, functionally necessary. 
Although Pannenberg never directly addresses the ontology of the past, this 
language of faithfulness on the part of God as the basis for knowledge of the 
past is certainly resonate with Pannenberg’s work.77  
This distinction between past as functionally determined and present 
and future as contingent is important for Pannenberg, who gives a significant 
amount of emphasis to the historical nature of God’s past revelation, a topic 
that will be discussed in the next chapter, and will impact Pannenberg’s 
development of a theology of history. It will also prove important as a 
foundation for scientific enquiry via Field theory that a Leibnizian model of 
contingency, which accepts a fully contingent past, would undermine, or at the 
very least neglect because, for Leibniz, contingency is not bound to 




 2.3 Contingency and Soteriology 
 Pannenberg’s primary focus at the end of his dissertation on 
contingency in the philosophical theology of John Duns Scotus was to engage 
its potential impact upon the Christian doctrine of election. Building upon 
Scotus’s attempt to reconcile foreknowledge and the contingent action of 
individuals in history, Pannenberg tries to give an account of election and 
human freedom. Specifically, in his doctoral dissertation, Pannenberg attempts 
to reconcile the Reformed understanding that God has predestined some for 
salvation prior to the beginning of time with the Scotist notion that human 
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Pannenberg concludes his study of Scotus’s philosophical theology by 
claiming that the tension between causality and contingency, and thus between 
predestination and contingency, is largely resolved in the Formula of Concord. 
The aspect of the Formula he believes most relevant he summarises in Scotist 
terms ‘Grundlose Prädestination, selbstverschuldete Verwerfung’ (gracious 
election, self-inflicted reprobation).
80
 In effect, Pannenberg concludes that any 
condemnation is a result of the free will, and that any salvation is from God’s 
grace alone. At least one other instance, where he does return to the question 
of election, sees Pannenberg make the clarification that election is unto a 
group or class or persons, and not individuals as individuals. He follows this 
up with a comment that ‘election’ itself, treated as a doctrine, requires that 
theology be in terms ‘of history’ and its ‘most important characteristic…, 
contingency.’81 From this, we can see that the concepts of contingency and 
history, remained important for Pannenberg later on his career. 
Returning to contingency, we can see that the Scotist definition of 
contingency reframed the discussion of contingent action by moving away 
from strict mutability and emphasised the language of possibility which led, in 
turn, to ability or power. Since God’s decision to create must have been 
contingent to emphasise that God is both complete in himself and omnipotent, 
and given Scotus’s assumption that human will makes decisions that, despite 
being influenced by a variety of factors, are nevertheless freely made, Scotus 
was able to claim that humans, as well as God, may perform contingent action. 
In turn, this leads to a concept of free will, and, for Scotus as well as for 
Pannenberg, this contingency allows for genuine moral action on the part of 
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humanity. Although both Scotus and Pannenberg claim that this means the end 
of history can be known, and, as will be discussed in chapter four, for 
Pannenberg already exists, without negating the freedom/contingency of the 
present and future, this needs to be explicated more. This thesis will explore 
Pannenberg’s extension of this argument, through the framework of his 
theology of history that eventually leads to a scientific engagement.  
In order to engage with scientific discourse, however, it will be helpful 
to examine the scientific understanding of contingency. In contrast to Leibniz 
after him, Scotus did not extend contingency to the past, as was noted above. 
Because of this, the impact of Scotus’s concept of synchronic contingency 
extends beyond theological concerns. Thomas Torrance claims that the 
contingency introduced by Scotus serves as the foundation for all scientific 
enquiry.
82
 Ingham and Dreyer go so far as suggest that Scotus’s assertion of 
contingent human action indicated a unique emphasis on the value of the 
human will, and subsequently the human mind. They suggest this emphasis 




3 Scientific Definition 
 3.1 Relation to Scotus 
Although the scientific understanding of contingency may vary 
somewhat from the philosophical one, the two are still related.
84
 While Scotist 
philosophical contingency emphasises the potential of contrary scenarios, 
scientific contingency is unconcerned with alternative possibilities, considered 
primarily with already-observed events. As such, one may be tempted to 
suggest that contingency in scientific terms is simply the antithesis of 
determinism, but not in the sense of a libertarian free will, however, because 
scientific investigation, and in particular physics, does not generally deal with 
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volitional subjects. Therefore, scientific contingency is best understood as 
‘indeterminism,’ which will be explicated below.85 
According to Max Jammer and James Cushing, historians and 
philosophers of science accept that scientific contingency is based upon 
Scotus.
86
 Rather than understand it as the antithesis of determinism, some have 
proposed contingency is better described in terms of ‘chance.’87 The concept 
of contingency in science is focused in the study of past events. According to 
Cushing, and like the description of contingency given by Scotus, 
contemporary physics assumes that present and future events are contingent, 
while assuming past events are necessary or determined. Specifically, most 
quantum theories, and all field theories, accept that, at the time a causal event 
occurs, the event is entirely contingent. Once it has already occurred, the 
event, having been observed, ceases to be contingent. This sense of a 
determined past, that was nevertheless contingent at the time it occurred, is the 




Another factor to consider in addressing scientific usage of 
contingency is the notion of independence. When examining an effect that is 
contingent or was contingent at the time it occurred, it is difficult to isolate a 
single immediate cause. Rather than attempting to describe the cause-effect 
relationship in terms of a single independent cause, contemporary science 
understands that there are multiple causes, particularly within an open 
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 While laboratory experimentation attempts to isolate causes, the 
result is a closed system that is non-contingent and thus determined. This is 
useful for understanding cause-effect on one level, but cannot provide a 
comprehensive description of open systems where most causal interaction 
occurs. Therefore, a different methodology is needed to examine events 
outside the laboratory. 
 
3.2 Contingent Causal Systems 
In an open system, it is often the case that multiple causes result in a 
single contingent event. To explain how this occurs, we need to discuss causal 
systems. Given the Scotist notion that contingent effects are produced by 
contingent causes, the causal systems we will examine are contingent causal 
systems. Contingent effects only occur within open systems. A closed system 
is one in which all variables are known. Since specific causes can be isolated 
and manipulated in a closed system to produce a desired effect, they are 
determined. A truly closed system will always produce a known effect. 
However, the statistical anomalies, particularly those which occur in quantum 
physics, are the result of observer influence, a phenomenon that illustrates an 
otherwise closed system is nevertheless influenced by other factors, which the 
experimenter did not or could not remove (thus the system isn’t truly closed). 
Karl Popper has gone so far as to suggest that there are no truly closed 
systems, questioning the concept of causality as defined by older scientific 
theory. Popper suggests that scientific hypotheses make tentative claims about 
plausibility of effects, taking into consideration known factors. He advocates a 
move away from constructive scientific theories, ones that are predictive in a 
positive sense, toward falsification.
90
 However falsification also requires that 
the observer has comprehensive knowledge over background forces at work 
and thus only works in relatively closed systems.  
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There may be other factors, unknown to the observer, that can result in 
a falsification that is inaccurate. For Popper, no system can be known as 
closed in the strict sense, and thus we must be content with a tenuous 
statistical likelihood or scientific corroboration.
91
 The final result of this is a 
description of the universe where its future is indeterminate (i.e., contingent in 
the Scotist sense), and the various events within the universe exist as the result 
of contingent causal systems, whose connections can only be known 
definitively when it is viewed as a whole, an idea to which we will return in 
chapter three. 
 
4 Introduction to Pannenberg’s Idea of Purposed Contingency 
 Pannenberg holds that a contingent universe does not discount the 
sense of purpose individuals, their actions and all of creation have. He draws 
an analogy between contingency and a question being asked. Although the 
answer to such a question, and even the question itself are contingent, neither 
the question nor the answer are random, but are asked and answered with a 
purpose.
92
 For Pannenberg, contingency as mere indeterminacy is inadequate; 
purpose or intent is also needed to speak of freedom. While indeterminacy is 
no doubt at work, emphasising the concept of purpose in the midst of 
contingency reveals that Pannenberg is concerned primarily with volitional 
activity.  
For Pannenberg, there must be purposeful content behind the 
contingency of the universe, or else knowledge, understanding, and revelation 
about and within the universe are impossible for finite beings. If purpose were 
not included in the concept of at least divine contingent action, the universe 
would be entirely arbitrary. This arbitrary universe would preclude any sense 
of divine interaction or self-revelation because meaningful action requires 
purpose. The difficulty is that purposed action and contingent action seem to 
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be mutually exclusive, at least if speaking of divine action, since in the act of 
purposing something the causes are determined—God’s omnipotence means 
he is able to achieve his ends, which will lead to determined effects.
93
  
While the analogy of a question may be a helpful illustrative tool, 
when it comes to causal activity, and particularly the casual activity of God, 
the tension between purpose and contingency is exacerbated. When God acts, 
Pannenberg implies, God does so with a specific goal in mind. Yet God, being 
omnipotent, can actually guarantee his goal is met. Indeed, as will be 
addressed in chapter four, the specific goal of God toward which history is 
moving is already assured. If God not only acts with a particular goal in mind, 
but has guaranteed that history will meet that goal at its end, how is it that the 
universe can be contingent? Even if it is contingent, would this form of 
contingency harmonize with the sort of freedom with which we are concerned, 
and that Scotus almost certainly accepted? Prior to answering these questions, 
let us first see how Pannenberg applies the concepts of contingency within his 
own theology. 
 
5 Creation and Contingency 
5.1 Creatio Ex Nihilo 
As noted above, after Scotus, it became commonplace in Christian 
theology to describe the creation of the world in terms of a ‘contingent’ act. In 
keeping with this tradition, Pannenberg argues that the very notion of creation 
means the universe is ontologically contingent in terms that are clearly Scotist. 
As Pannenberg explains it, if the universe were not contingent, it would be 
eternal. Contingency, for Pannenberg, only applies to things that are not 
eternal, that have a time when they are not, whether past or future.
 94
 If it is not 
eternal, and thus contingent, then either it had a beginning, or it has a defined 
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 Pannenberg argues that contingency of the universe is typically 
understood to mean that it had a beginning.  
 Robert John Russell, in his critique of Pannenberg, disputes the claim 
that contingency requires finitude, noting that some conceptions of quantum 
physics, which makes heavy use of contingency, allow for infinite duration.
96
 
Pannenberg counters that time need not be understood exclusively as duration, 
but should be taken in the sense suggested by Einstein as a fourth dimension 
of space-time. This may get around the problem of infinite duration by 
suggesting that even an infinite duration would be bounded with respect to the 
extent of its reach and could nevertheless have finite beginning.
97
 According 
to such a model, we need only apply solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, 
which are actually paradoxes of space, that can be found in contemporary 
calculus-based physics. While space may be infinite (and if time is simply 
another dimension of space-time it would apply equally to time), this does not 
mean an infinite, or an infinite division, cannot be broached. Rather it can be 
taken as one kind of infinity, but one that is nevertheless bounded, and thus 
finite with a clear start or end. While there are many treatments and solutions 
to this, perhaps the one done in most painstaking detail, and which accounts 
for the nature of temporal infinities the best, is the book-length treatment of 
the subject by Adolf Grünbaum.
98
 A bounded infinity, particularly of the kind 
Russell references, can have beginning and end. 
 Russell also misrepresents Pannenberg’s position, which does not 
argue from a strictly scientific paradigm, but suggests that understanding the 
world as contingently created is compatible with science and is required by the 
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theological concept of creatio ex nihilo.
99
 Pannenberg is not arguing primarily 
from scientific principles for proof of contingency, but attempting to argue 
that the idea of a contingent universe as used in philosophical and theological 
discourse does not conflict with scientific principles. For our purposes, let us 
assume that such a doctrine of contingent creation supports a beginning to the 
world. 
 As previously noted, if the world was not created contingently, then 
God would not be perfect as the necessity of creation implies a lack in God, 
according to Scotus. Pannenberg uses terminology similar to Scotus by 
arguing that a God who cannot create contingently would be dependent on the 
world, which would mean God is ‘a needy and dependent being.’ Inversely, 
understanding creation to be contingent and somehow dependent upon God 
means that the act of creatio ex nihilo could only have been performed as a 
completely free act not motivated from outside of God.
100
 From a theological 
perspective, we should argue that, while the creation of the world is 
contingent, it is not random. 
 In line with his earlier assertion, Pannenberg maintains that ‘the 
decision to create the world is certainly not arbitrary; the act of creation is not 
in that sense contingent.’101 If it were, then a purposeless, contingent creation 
could have resulted in ‘other effects,’ than the creation of the world ‘or even 
none at all.’102 As mentioned, Pannenberg holds the ideas of contingency and 
purpose in tension, despite their seeming exclusivity.  
 Pannenberg holds this tension by linking the concepts of purpose and 
contingency together through love. God’s love for the uncreated world 
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motivates him to actualise its priori
103
 existence. Love, as God’s motivation, 
and entirely originated from within God’s own being, necessarily produces a 
‘contingent effect as creative power.’ If love is the motivating factor for God’s 
creative act, and it produces contingent effects, then God’s entire relation to 
the world can only be characterised as loving. If this were not the case, then 




In suggesting the motivation for creating is love, Pannenberg 
characterises God’s relation to the world in certain key ways, first that ‘God’s 
creative action is oriented wholly to creatures. They are both the object and 
goal of creation.’105 Here, echoing Kant, Pannenberg extends this claim to 
mean that, as a result of God’s creative action in love ‘no creature is merely a 
means’ for God’s end.106 If this is indeed the case, then love not only describes 
God’s relation to the world at the initial act of creation, but suggests a 
continued interaction between God and creature, as well as something about 
the eschatological goal of all creation, which will be connected to field toward 
the end of this thesis.  
 As addressed in more detail below, for God to act contingently and 
purposefully, without overwhelming the freedom of creatures, God must 
continually interact with creation to bring about this purpose.
107
 To avoid 
suggesting there is a lack in God, God’s action must have as its goal a purpose 
that originates within God, as has been discussed above. In order for God’s 
actions to be both contingent and purposed the purpose cannot have been 
attained until the end of the series. For Pannenberg, this purpose is found only 
at the end of history, or the eschaton and is, as noted, his eternal self. 
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 Before progressing too much further, a note should be said concerning 
Hegel, especially considering the close association many draw between Hegel 
and Pannenberg, as mentioned in the introduction. It is true that Hegel also 
posits that creation comes out of love. In line with most philosophical 
interpretations creatio ex nihilo for Hegel means, essentially, creatio ex 
Deo.
108
 This, in and of itself, does not exclude Hegel from the conversation. 
Indeed some of the statements regarding the necessity of creation, understood 
in proper context, likewise do not exclude Hegel.
109
 Rather, it is the way in 
which Hegel employs an ex Deo creation that becomes problematic for our 
purposes. In short, while God certainly has existence beyond that of finite 
creation, for Hegel creation is necessarily wholly contained and identical with 
the Absolute; even while it is differentiated, creation is an internal self-
differentiation that remains wholly contained within the Absolute.
110
 This 
together with Hegel’s more complicated relationship with history, understood 
as already complete within the Absolute, are enough to distinguish Hegel’s 
understanding from the of Scotus, Schelling and Pannenberg.
111
 Given that 
numerous other philosophers and theologians have looked to ‘love’ as a 
motivation for God’s creation, and Pannenberg’s other disagreements with 
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Hegel, it would be prudent to look to these other thinkers, in particular Scotus 
and Schelling, and to a lesser degree Kant (as noted above), in our discussion. 
 Second, to say God creates out of love also says something about the 
freedom of creation. For Pannenberg, since God creates freely in love, his 
creation will also be capable of contingent and purposed action. Pannenberg 
argues this on the basis of what he understands creation in love to mean. In 
particular, he claims that, by creating in love, and subsequently viewing his 
creation as the object and goal of his loving creative act, the expression of 
God’s love can be observed in the presence of creation’s free actions.112 In 
different terms, creation exists contingently because God loves it priorly.  
 Because creation is an expression of God’s love, and creatures are not 
merely a means for God’s ends, created beings must exist as capable of 
contingent action themselves. In order for creatures to exist as something other 
than merely a means, rational creatures must be able to move toward their own 
ends. The ability to actualise a distinct end requires contingency and freedom. 
Creation is only an expression of God’s love, then, so far as it is free.113 In this 
way, Pannenberg argues that creaturely freedom naturally flows out from 
God’s act of a contingent creation done in love.114 
 Third, if God creates from a position of love to allow a free creation 
that moves toward a goal, then the doctrine of creatio continua follows.
115
 For 
Pannenberg, the doctrine of continuous creation declares that ‘the freedom of 
divine origin of the world on the one hand and God’s holding fast to his 
creation on the other belong together.’ Pannenberg understands these two 
actions of God, creatio ex nihilo and creatio continua, to be linked by that 
same motivation of love.
116
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 5.2 Creatio Continua 
‘Continuous creation’ for Pannenberg should be understood primarily 
in terms of faithfulness: ‘Faithfulness connects the preservation and overruling 
of the creaturely world and includes the contingent freedom of God’s creative 
action.’117 God, as creator, does not end his relationship with creatures at the 
initial creative act, but continues to act in relation to those creatures as ‘the 
creator who acts freely and unrestrictedly’ throughout history.118 Pannenberg 
states that God’s act of continuous creation, or faithfulness to creation, is 
observable primarily in two ways. 
First, he argues that God’s faithfulness to creation is expressed through 
the contemporary definitions of natural law.
119
 Pannenberg gives a brief 
overview of the history of physics to illustrate his point. He argues that natural 
laws were, in the time surrounding Newton, understood as fixed or 
necessary.
120
 Specifically, he notes that inertia, and in particular Cartesian 
inertia, entails a deterministic universe eventually leading to Deism.
121
 
Descartes argued for a form of inertia where all ‘motions’ were eternal; that is 
to say that once they began, contemporaneously with the creation of the world, 
they were, and will always be, in perpetual existence.
122
 
Descartes goes on to argue that, while God is ultimately responsible 
for the preservation of continued ‘motion,’ because God is immutable, this 
preservation is the result of the initial creative act setting about this motion, 
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and not a continued interaction with the world.
123
 To confirm his rejection of 
any form of continued divine interaction, Descartes adds the corollary ‘that 
God will never perform any miracle in the…world, and that in the 
intelligences, or the rational souls…, will not disrupt in any way the ordinary 
course of nature.’124 Under Descartes’s influence, Pannenberg argues, 
discussion of creatio continua was precluded from subsequent theological and 
philosophical discourse while natural laws, and in particular inertia, were 
predominantly understood as necessary and fixed.
 125
 
In the nineteenth century, the British scientist Michael Faraday began 
examining the nature of magnetism and electricity. This culminated in the 
introduction of field theory as an alternative to strict Newtonian mechanics—
that employed the idea of aether through which causal influence occurred—
arguing instead for ‘action-at-a-distance’ without recourse to some intervening 
medium. Once this alternative paradigm to Newtonian/Cartesian physics was 
introduced, the idea that natural laws were necessary, or non-contingent, 
began to be displaced, since each cause could be considered in its own right if 
it was not required that there was a physical medium between two objects 
interacting causally. The situation reached an apex once broader cosmology 
began to take shape in the twentieth century. It could no longer be held that 
natural laws were eternal once new cosmology, and in particular ‘big bang’ 
cosmology, gained wide acceptance as a result of field theory and quantum 
physics.
126
 The decision to incorporate field theory here is an intentional one 
as it will be shown to be paradigmatic, though in modified form, of God’s 
causal interaction with the world as we seek to resolve the tension between 
divine sovereignty and human freedom. 
Pannenberg notes that the contingency of natural laws should be 
understood to mean that natural laws are descriptive of statistical regularities 
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that occur over time, rather than deterministic realities.
127
 In other words, 
while each event can be considered entirely contingent, over long periods of 
time, regularities can be observed, which we term natural laws. They are 
epistemic models of the real existence and activity of the universe, but have no 
discrete ontological existence; they are perceptual regularities that do not exist 
independent of the matter and material interactions they describe. Pannenberg 




The second way God’s continuous act of creation can be seen is 
through the lens of God’s direct historical action. While the evidence of 
natural laws may provide one way to understand the act of continuous 
creation, a better example may be found through examining other freely 
committed actions of God in history, specifically those that express ‘the 
freedom of the Creator, whose actions...aim at the consummation of his 
creation.’129 His aim is not merely in the upholding of creation, such as in 
natural laws, but in more direct causal interaction with it. In Pannenberg’s 
theology, nowhere is this clearer than in God’s self-revelation, which is where 
the next chapter begins. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has set Pannenberg’s use of contingency within its 
broader philosophical context and shown some of Pannenberg’s early 
applications of the concept through his development of the doctrine of 
creation. Pannenberg’s use of the concept suggests that he is in agreement 
with the foundational description of contingency made by John Duns Scotus. 
It was also noted how Scotus’s philosophical theology may have provided the 
foundation for contingency in the sciences, and especially within 
contemporary physics.  
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The Scotist description of contingency requires contingent causes 
always produce effects that are likewise contingent. For Pannenberg, this 
means that the created world is not only contingent in the entirety of its 
existence, but in its various particularities as well.
130
 This can be extended to 
indicate that humans are also fully capable of contingent, yet purposed, action 
independent of God’s action.131 However, this final point assumes something 
about the relation of God to humanity: namely that both the continuous 
creative actions of God are contingent and are characterised by love. 
Specifically, Pannenberg argues that God sustains the universe out of love for 
humanity.
132
 Ultimately, this relationship can only be comprehended, 
however, through God’s self-revelation, which, as stated above, takes place 
within contingent history and is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONTINGENT HISTORY 
 
In the previous chapter, the philosophical and scientific definitions of 
contingency were explored, particularly in light of the driving questions of 
divine sovereignty in relation to human freedom, and of history as the 
framework for understanding theology. By framing our discussion of 
contingency in relation to action within time, we may ask what additional 
insight is gained for our question of divine sovereignty in tension with human 
freedom. As will be demonstrated, the question of divine sovereignty and 
human freedom connects with the second of our driving concerns, that 
Pannenberg’s theology is best understood as one of history. As will become 
clear in chapters three and four, the concepts of history and time will become 
indistinguishable from one another. For the present chapter, however, we will 
examine the aspect of time traditionally understood as history as we outline 
Pannenberg’s explicit theology of history in light of our prior discussion of 
contingency and the relation of the former to philosopher Friedrich W. J. 
Schelling. This use of Schelling, though, is brought about initially by 
Pannenberg’s early engagement with the views of history found primarily in 
Barth, addressed at first in this chapter, and developed by Bultmann, as 
addressed in the next chapter.  
  
1 Contingent History and Revelation 
 Pannenberg understands God’s self-revelation within history as 
revelation that is contingent, in the Scotist sense discussed in the previous 




about contingent action, Pannenberg states that the concept of God’s self-
revelation in contingent history merits further exploration.
133
 Pannenberg 
begins this exploration in Revelation as History, countering the then prevailing 
Barthian notion of revelation as direct, instead suggesting that God self-




 1.1 The Barthian Perspective of Revelation 
 In Revelation as History, Pannenberg focuses on God’s revelation, 
described as historical, indirect, and universal in appearance. Specifically, 
Pannenberg lays out seven ‘dogmatic theses’ that run counter to the then 
prevalent Bultmannian/Barthian perspective of revelation. It will be helpful 
first to examine the salient points of Barth’s understanding of revelation that 
Pannenberg reacts against before exploring Pannenberg’s ‘dogmatic theses’ in 
detail. Given the depth of treatment Bultmann’s position has in relation to the 
‘dogmatic theses,’ Bultmann will be addressed more directly in the next 
chapter, while this chapter will focus primarily upon Barth and Pannenberg’s 
response to Barth given in the ‘Introduction’ to Revelation as History. 
 There is a generally accepted distinction among Barthian scholars 
between the ‘early Barth’ and the ‘later Barth,’ noting the major shift in 
Barth’s theology that occurred over the course of a decade from 1922, when 
he rewrote his commentary on Romans, to 1931, when his volume on Anselm 
emerged. From 1932 onward, when Barth shifted from Christian Dogmatics 
to Church Dogmatics, his views remained fairly consistent. Pannenberg 
responds to this later Barth and, in light of Pannenberg’s study under Barth in 
1949, and Pannenberg’s subsequent correspondence with Barth, we may 
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surmise that Pannenberg’s response from one who understood Barth’s 
theology, giving us reason to examine Barth’s later view of revelation.135 
 Not too long after Barth’s shift of 1931, Barth published his work on 
the ‘Apostles’ Creed,’ entitled Credo, with an appendix on his doctrine of 
revelation. Shortly before publishing this work, Barth also had given a series 
of lectures in Paris on the doctrine of revelation, now translated and collected 
as God in Action. In Credo, Barth begins by asserting that ‘Scripture’ 
functions ‘as witness of God’s revelation, that is, as pointer to an actual event 
taking place in space and time.’136 Yet Barth qualifies this notion by stating 
that studying history, instead of the biblical text, is both impossible and 
decidedly not theology, thereby undermining any link between revelation to 
history.
137
 For Barth, objective historical analysis would lead to a 
mischaracterisation of biblical revelation as ‘myth.’138 While he says little else 
about the topic in this work, the concept of myth, and in particular removing 
‘mythic’ elements from the biblical text becomes a key issue for Bultmann.139 
 In the Paris lectures, given just prior to the publication of Credo, Barth 
asserts that when one speaks of revelation, one must assume ‘certitude. Either 
God has spoken or he has not spoken. If he has spoken, he has done so in a 
manner that it is impossible not to heed him.’140 This is a powerful claim, and 
not necessarily at odds with Pannenberg’s idea of revelation, but it lacks the 
‘philosophical rigor’ that Pannenberg demands of his theological project; this 
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sort of unsupported declarative statement is the root of Pannenberg’s 
disappointment with much Barthian theology.
141
 
Also in his Paris lectures, Barth makes two seemingly contradictory 
claims, at least prima facie, that are instructive for Barth’s understanding of 
revelation. First, Barth declares that revelation is always of a ‘far away’ God, 
such that revelation is a miracle primarily of ‘reason’ based first upon 
‘knowledge’ not observation.142 God does not come down and speak with his 
own voice to us. However, this would mean that revelation is not in any way 
by God’s historical action on earth. God is removed, or ‘hidden’ as 
Pannenberg would later suggest, in Barth’s account of revelation. Second, 
Barth states that ‘revelation is God himself,’143 as opposed to the historical 
action of God, which is how Pannenberg describes the revelation of God. For 
Barth, God reveals from his existence and from a removed and distinct 
eternity directly to the minds of his messenger. For Pannenberg, God himself 
is an actor within history. 
  While Barth’s assertion that the bible is authoritative because it ‘bears 
witness to past revelation,’144 might seem amenable to Pannenberg’s 
contention in Revelation as History that God’s revelation is inherently 
historical, Barth makes additional assertions in his Dogmatics, which are then 
developed by Bultmann, that Pannenberg challenges. For Barth, revelation is 
primarily direct and cannot be historical because, for Barth, much scepticism 
about the past is insurmountable,
145
 while, as noted above, revelation must 
result in certitude. Barth extends this in his discussion of the ‘problem of 
revelation and history’ by arguing that all revelation should be considered not 
                                                 
141
 Pannenberg, ‘Autobiographical Sketch,’ 14. 
 
142
 Barth, God in Action, 11-12. 
 
143
 Ibid., 13-15. 
 
144
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 5 volumes in 14 books ed. and trans. T. F. Torrance and 









only direct, but also ahistorical.
146
 Among other things, this means that the 
biblical text is revelatory not as a result of historical-critical analysis, which 
Barth claims would turn it into a ‘paper Pope,’ but because it is revealed as 
divine by the Holy Spirit to the faithful one, thus making the revelatory 
experience direct.
147
 Pannenberg begins Revelation as History with a critique 
of Barth’s account of revelation, that describes revelation as somehow 
divorced from history. 
 
 1.2 ‘Introduction’ to Revelation as History and the Move toward 
Later Idealism 
 In the introduction, Pannenberg states explicitly that Revelation as 
History is a direct challenge to Barth’s concept of revelation. While 
Pannenberg accepts Barth’s description of revelation as ‘the self-disclosure of 
God,’ he maintains that this description is grounded in the mid-nineteenth 
century Hegelian theologian Philipp Marheinke who, prior to Barth, but in 
terms that Barth clearly echoed, speaks of revelation as occurring through 
‘veiled forms.’ However, this is incompatible with Barth’s description of 
revelation as direct.
148
 Since a ‘veiled’ form is incomplete, it cannot be direct 
in the sense that Barth maintains revelation must be. Directness, for Barth, 
requires completeness. This is behind his assertion, first made in the Paris 
lectures, that direct revelation, of the sort which Barth claims is endemic to the 
Christian doctrine of revelation, leads to certitude. This certitude is grounded 
in the completeness of revelation. This reading is confirmed near the 
beginning of Church Dogmatics, when Barth declares that the ‘true content’ of 
God ‘can be known by man’ as revelation, which ‘is complete.’149 
 Despite the connection that Pannenberg makes between Barth and 
Marheineke, Barth heavily qualifies his utilization of Marheineke. In 
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analysing the second version of Marheineke’s Dogmatics, focused largely 
upon the concept of revelation, Barth seems ready to commend Marheineke.
150
 
However, Barth believes Marheineke unwisely chose to apply the 
predominant philosophy of Hegel to his theology, which led to Marheineke 
viewing divine revelation in historical terms, which Barth rejected.
151
 Rather 
than an outright link between the two, Pannenberg advances a subtle critique 
of Barth, through Barth’s treatment of Marheineke, to set up Pannenberg’s 
own position. 
 Barth claims that Hegel’s philosophy was an unfortunate and 
peripheral addition to Marheineke’s theology.152 However, John Edward 
Toews’s detailed analysis of later Hegelian writers demonstrates that, rather 
than an unnecessary addition, Hegel was central to Marheineke’s 
understanding of revelation.
153
 In the same work of Barth where he praises 
certain aspects of Marheineke’s description of revelation, Barth also addresses 
the work of Hegel.  
Among Barth’s criticisms of Hegel, two primary stances can be 
identified as most relevant for our discussion. The first is Barth’s view that, 
for Hegel a revelatory ‘word…cannot pass between’ God and man.154 For 
Barth, Hegel’s position is untenable, especially in relation to the sense of 
revelation that Barth’s outlines in the first volume of his Church Dogmatics. 
The second is Hegel’s view, as Barth understands it, that God’s being must be 
‘as we see him in revelation,’ a position Barth claims turns God into ‘his own 
prisoner.’155 
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Pannenberg notes that the strong association with German idealism, 
such as is present in Marheineke’s theology of revelation, does not necessitate 
that such a theology be rejected.
156
 This is amplified in light of Pannenberg’s 
suggestion that Barth’s theology has the same association.157 Pannenberg 
notes that Barth describes God’s self-revelation as occurring through ‘veiled 
forms,’ which Pannenberg claims would make revelation incomplete as well 
as being incompatible with direct revelation. Barth’s use of ‘veiling’ 
terminology demonstrates that Barth’s concept of revelation is more in 
agreement with the Hegelian concept of revelation, and its attendant 




While Hegel does not use the term ‘veiling’ (Verschleierung) 
specifically in the context of religious knowledge or revelation, the concept is 
an apt description of Hegel’s position. Hegel speaks of religious truth as the 
revealed ‘representation’ (Vorstellung) of the world that is only truly present 
to the ‘world spirit.’159 Hegel is clear that there is an objective truth 
concerning the world, and it is known by the world spirit, but it is not directly 
observable by finite beings, who must approach it via ‘representation’ or 
‘concept.’160 For Hegel, ‘every spiritual content and all relationships 
generally’ as they relate to the religious, ‘are representations.’161 
Barth clearly echoes the concept of Hegelian representation when he 
uses the terminology of ‘veiled forms.’162 Despite his lip service to direct 
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account of revelation through the Spirit, Barth maintains that knowledge of 
God, though given directly, is nevertheless veiled in the act of revelation 
itself.
163
 For Barth, this must be the case because God is, necessarily, veiled or 
‘hidden’ in his very nature.164 For Barth, revelation must necessarily be hidden 
because history is flawed and God cannot be confined to human analysis. 
Revelation occurs to individuals, then, solely at the discretion of God’s grace. 
He reveals himself fully to some, but in so doing is more completely veiled to 
others, which we might understand as a distinction between election and non-
election.
165
 But it is at this point, by claiming the fullness of direct revelation 
to some and hiddenness to others in such a way that revelation is particular 
and not general, that Pannenberg gives his primary objection. 
Pannenberg’s disagreement with Barth is that if Barth bases his 
theology of revelation, at least in part, upon Hegel, as is the case vis a vis his 
use of the term ‘veiling’ and appeal to Marheineke, then Barth’s claim of a 
unity of God with and in Christ, particularly as it concerns the revelation 
found in the historic Christ, is incompatible with the rest of his theology of 
revelation, that demands a direct and perfect revelation. Barth attempts to side-
step the issue, according to Pannenberg, by claiming that the nature of history 
is fundamentally flawed, necessitating a ‘veiling,’ which can be overcome, 
and in fact is overcome in the person of Jesus through miracle. By contrast, for 
Pannenberg, any ‘veiling’ in knowledge of the ultimate reality is the result of 
man’s finitude, not anything inherent to the nature of that reality.166  
For Barth, God must remain the ‘Subject’ of revelation and never its 
‘Object.’ To be sure, Barth acknowledges that, in the Son, God becomes 
manifest to us, but ‘never…does He become the predicate or object of our 
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existence or action.’167 Yet the particularity of Christ, that he was an historical 
person, would seem to contradict the notion that the Son cannot ‘become the 
predicate or object of our…action,’ since, as historical event, his life is subject 
to, and thus potentially the object of, historical investigation. This complicates 
Barth’s theological project all the more given that the historical occasions of 
the death and resurrection of Jesus constitute the apex of God’s self-
revelation. Yet Barth would argue that there remains a veiling to this, 
precisely because it is history. It seems Barth wishes to have it both ways, 
maintaining that the simultaneous veiling and unveiling in the revelatory event 
of Jesus within history is simply a ‘paradox.’ Rather than explain the tension, 
Barth declares it an incomprehensible ‘mystery,’ warning that the concept of 
non-direct revelation turns our theology into a ‘non-Christian’ one.168  
Pannenberg contends that Barth’s qualification of revelation as both 
veiled and direct is not possible in light of the incarnation. If God can reveal 
himself directly, claims Pannenberg, then he reveals himself perfectly, which 
Barth would, in a highly qualified sense, accept.
169
 If self-revelation is 
somehow ‘veiled’ then it requires interpretation and thus must be a reflection 
upon the action of God, and not the type of ‘direct’ revelation that Barth’s 
concept of revelation requires for the ‘Word of God’ to have authoritative and 
revelatory power.
170
 The implication, for Pannenberg, is that if God is hidden 
in the historical actions of Jesus Christ, then direct revelation is not possible 
through these same actions. Barth maintains both his denial that revelation can 
be given to the non-elect alongside his affirmation that the incarnation is the 
height of revelation. Yet, to move away from the particular historical person 
of Jesus is to diminish the importance of the incarnation at best. The appeal to 
the miraculous does not avoid the complete identification of God with man in 
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the historical person of Jesus and the problem this presents for a denial of 
revelation within history. 
Pannenberg continues his critique of Barth by disputing Barth’s 
fundamental example of divine self-revelation as a form of ‘direct’ revelation. 
Barth proposes that the giving of the divine name to Moses is the instance of 
direct self-revelation par excellence in the Hebrew bible, since God directly 
gives Moses his name, which, according to Barth, reveals the essential nature 
of God’s identity.171 Pannenberg contests this because if such a revelation 
were direct in the sense that Barth argues it is direct, then revelation would be 
complete. Since it is clear from the biblical witness that revelation of God was 
not yet complete, in that Moses still did not fully comprehend the nature of 
God, it cannot be direct, at least not in the sense that Barth contends.
172
 
Pannenberg argues we would do better to understand the revelation at Mount 
Sinai as part of the progression of revelation that proceeds in a necessarily 
incomplete fashion.  
Pannenberg also contests the very use of ‘Word of God’ by Barth and 
other theologians. For Barth, the Word of God is only and entirely the 
presence of God given directly to those to whom he reveals himself as the 
direct presence of God.
173
 In contrast to this, Pannenberg argues that 
historically, the Word was understood to be distinct from God, as something 
that emanates out from God. Pannenberg notes that in the Ancient Near East 
only the Gnostics identify the Word of God with God’s direct presence in the 
way that Barth proposes. Contrary to this Gnostic notion, Pannenberg cites 
Ignatius who considered Jesus to function as the Word of God through which 
God ‘breaks his silence’ and not as the direct self-revelatory person of God.174 
That is, Jesus is God not because Jesus is the Word of God, but in spite of that 
fact.  
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We may summarise Pannenberg’s criticism of Barth as containing two 
primary components. First, if God’s revelation is the direct and particular 
revelation of himself unveiled, as Barth explicitly claims it is,
175
 through the 
miraculous, then the idea of progressive revelation, clearly adopted among the 
Israelites, is lost.
176
 Second, if the height of divine revelation is found in the 
historical person of Jesus Christ, then revelation either cannot be direct or it 
cannot be veiled to anyone, since it is the act of his historical resurrection that 
is the climax of revelation. 
 Pannenberg proposes that, as an alternative to Barthian direct 
revelation, Christian theology should understand revelation as occurring 
indirectly, which also removes the problem of immediacy. Much work in the 




 centuries has sought to engage with 
revelation in terms of God’s immediacy to individuals. This can be traced to 
Hegel, who understood revelation to be the immediate presence of God to the 
mind, and Schleiermacher, who understood religion as a form of the 
immediacy of experience, itself a problematic claim.
177
  
Barth attempts to overcome this issue of immediacy, where Jesus was 
not immediately present to his disciples as God, yet was still revealing, by 
positing that at the resurrection, and only then by those who saw the 
resurrected Christ, that true revelation occurred.
178
 The impartation of the 
Holy Spirit, continues Barth acts as a ‘mediated immediacy’ by mediating the 
Parousia of Christ at his second coming.
179
 Revelation, for Barth, is not only 
given by the immediate presence of God, but has God as its content. It cannot, 
then, make reference to historical events that are subject to human scrutiny, for 
this would be to make God an object, as noted above. It is here that we may 
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note that Pannenberg has been, at best, imprecise in his description of Barth. It 
is true that in his commentary on Romans Barth utilizes fairly forceful 
language to separate revelation from finite human historical or temporal 
experience.
180
 However, Barth later expressly rejects this view in Church 
Dogmatics.
181
 Pannenberg’s comments against Barth seem to ignore Barth’s 
later reversal, though Barth does not fully embrace the idea of revelation as 
historical. Still, we might say that Pannenberg’s criticism of Barth overstates 
his case, and we should therefore proceed with caution.
182
 
Yet Barth’s still retains a dogmatic view of revelation, wherein history 
may be a factor in revelation, but remains distinct from the direct 
veiling/unveiling of revelation, thereby downplaying the fact that history is 
important for the biblical witness. The message of God through the prophets is 
not only a mediated immediacy of revelation, since God is revealed to the 
prophets who mediate it to us, but has layers upon layers of mediation. We do 
not hear the voice of the prophets any more than we hear the voice of God. 
Rather, we have the historical record of the account of the prophet’s message 
of God’s immediate presence as it has been handed down through the ages. 
Barth might argue that these layers of mediation are themselves each attended 
by the direct experience of the Holy Spirit, yet this still leaves us in the 
problematic situation of having a revelation that is entirely subjective; indeed 
this is the direction adopted by Bultmann.  
While one might agree that the Holy Spirit is necessary for revelation, 
there is a sense in which we want to have an objective perspective upon the 
revelation of God. Doctrinal unity, it seems, would require it. For Pannenberg, 
if there is an objective truth concerning the person of God, then it should be 
accessible via objective means. The shift from non-faith to faith requires some 
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amount of objectivity to revelation, meaning it must be open to a degree of 
historical verification. Pannenberg’s argument here does not even take into 
account the importance of history found within the biblical text itself, where 
the Psalmist, for instance, is concerned with the historical acts of God, and not 
only his direct self-revelation. Thus, Pannenberg advocates abandoning the 
idea of immediacy with respect to revelation.  
Instead, Pannenberg distinguishes direct and indirect revelation on the 
basis of their content. Direct revelation has God as its content, while indirect 
revelation has God as its originator, but only points to God indirectly.
183
 In 
both instances, direct and indirect, for Pannenberg revelation acts solely as an 
unveiling and never as a veiling. For this reason, rather than a shift toward a 
Hegelian concept of revelation this should be seen as a shift away from the 
underlying Hegelian concept of revelation in Barth and toward the later 
idealism of Schelling, as explained below.  
 The idea of revelation as an indirect historical act, notes Pannenberg, 
has its roots in Schleiermacher and was developed briefly by Schelling in an 
early lecture. This concept was systematized to a degree by Hegel, but it was 
the further development of the concept by Schelling’s Spätphilosophie that 
provided a strong validation to this way of thinking.
184
 As noted in the 
introduction, this emphasis upon Schelling is particularly important for 
Pannenberg. Rather than understanding his theology as built upon ‘Hegelian 
Innovations,’ as do Anselm Min among others, Pannenberg is properly read as 
a faithful extension of the final work of Schelling, whose own philosophy was 
left incomplete.
185
 Prior to examining Pannenberg’s direct critique of 
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Bultmann, it will be helpful to explore further the grounding of Pannenberg’s 
theses on the concept of revelation as history, which relies considerably upon 
the work of Schelling. 
 
2 Connecting Revelation and History in the Work of F. W. J. Schelling  
 2.1 The Early Schelling to his Spätphilosophie 
 While Schelling first approaches the idea of revelation in an historical 
context through a reference to Schleiermacher in the ninth of his ‘Lectures on 
Methods of Academic Study,’ delivered in 1802, he does not pursue it in 
further detail at the time.
186
 The theme is revisited first in Hegel’s analysis of 
Schelling. Hegel remarks that, at the time of his Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy in 1806, Schelling had advanced the concept of revelation as 
something available to human perception or empirical observation in the 
natural world.
187
 The result of such a way of thinking, notes Hegel, is that 
knowledge of God would be entirely contingent because it requires an 
observer who is external to the revelatory event.
188
 Hegel finds such a position 
untenable and reinterprets Schelling, placing him within the transcendental 
idealism of Fichte. At the time of his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
Hegel argued that Schelling had abandoned all discussion of contingent 
revelation and abandoned his position with regard to empirically observable 
phenomena. While Hegel maintained that Schelling regarded natural 
phenomena, whether historical actions or the fields of electricity and 
magnetism, as indirect expressions of ‘the Absolute,’ they do not constitute 
                                                                                                                                
beginning and will do so intermittently throughout this thesis, is one of the biggest 
misconceptions regarding Pannenberg’s theology. 
 
186
 Friedrich W. J. Schelling, ‘Neunte Vorlesung. Ueber das Studium der Theologie’ in 
‘Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiems (1802)’ in Schellings Werke, 3rd 
ed., vol. 3 Schriften zur Identitätphilosophie (1801-1806) (Munich: T. H. Beck und K. 
Oldenbourg, 1927), 296-297. 
 
187
 Georg Wilhelm Fredrick Hegel, Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. 
Hildane and Frances H. Simson, vol. 3 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), 540-541. 
 
188









According to Hegel, Schelling’s position grounds the ‘concrete,’ which 
is analogous to Hegel’s ‘Absolute,’ as a ‘unity’ present only within God, 
which develops into Schelling’s identity philosophy.190 In Schelling’s identity 
philosophy, knowledge is only possible once identity has been established. 
This is in opposition to Descartes’s cogito, which presumes knowledge prior 
to establishing identity. If identity is the foundation for knowledge, however, 
then identity can only be arrived at if it is established in an ontological manner 
(e.g., it cannot be denied).
191
  
For this reason, Schelling grounds all identity in God’s revelation to 
himself as himself, which he labels the fundamental identity property. God 
does not require some prior established identity because God’s actions can be 
seen as the unity and grounding of himself within the concrete world. Either 
there is existence or there is not, and if there is any existence, it is only 
knowable because the Absolute has a concrete existence and ‘knows’ all 
things to exist.
 192
 According to Schelling, knowledge and existence are 
intimately connected. Existence, to be genuine, must be ‘concrete’ such that it 
is empirically observable, and not idealist, or else there cannot be a ‘knower’ 
external to the knowledge.
193
  
This conception of God, which Schelling would term the ‘Identity,’ 
despite its similarities to Hegel’s term the ‘Absolute,’ cannot be static, but 
must be dynamic since the Identity knows through history, which is also 
dynamic.
194
 This introduction of dynamism, and therefore contingency, is a 
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key step in Schelling’s development away from Hegel and toward his distinct 
philosophy. Through an appeal to history, Schelling also hoped to transition 
his conception of knowledge from the ideal toward the ‘real.’ 
The early friendship between Schelling and Hegel eventually became 
strained as Schelling’s intellectual position shifted drastically away from 
Fichte and, consequently, from Hegel. Schelling had, by 1807, broken more 
strongly from Fichte while pursuing his ‘Identity philosophy,’ which Hegel 
proceeded to ridicule in the forward to his Phenomenology of Spirit. Arguably, 
the resulting break in friendship left Schelling unrestrained to pursue his own 
philosophy to its logical conclusion.
195
 The initial motivating factor away from 
idealism, which had prompted Hegel’s prior critique, was Schelling’s shift in 
focus upon a freedom which was not subverted to the freedom of the 
‘Absolute’ but is, while derived from God’s freedom, independent.196 This 
culminated in Schelling’s essay on freedom. 
Schelling states at the outset of his ‘Freedom Essay’ that the work is 
attempting to reconcile human freedom with divine omnipotence without 
lapsing into pantheism.
197
 Rather than fall back into the idealism of Fichte, as 
Hegel had suggested earlier, Schelling repudiates such idealism as 
inadequate.
198
 Schelling, who by this point had begun to refer explicitly to a 
God who ‘is not a god of the dead but of the living,’ focused on how nature 
and freedom are related to the Christian concept of God.
199
  
The Fichtean and, even more so, Hegelian descriptions of nature 
seemed, for Schelling, to fall into a sort of determinism and Spinozan 
pantheism. According to Robert Stern, for Hegel, reality is fundamentally 
                                                                                                                                
 
195
 John Laughland, Schelling versus Hegel: From German Idealism to Christian Metaphysics 
(Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007), 59. 
 
196
 Ibid., 38-39. 
 
197
 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. 
Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt (Albany, NY: SUNY, 2006), 10-12. 
 
198
 Ibid., 18, 22. 
 
199





understood as resulting from diverse thoughts, not actions, that are rooted in 
the Absolute, and this is something that Schelling finds wholly untenable:
200
 
However one may conceive of the way in which 
beings proceed from God, the way can never be 
mechanical, not mere production or installation 
whereby the product is nothing for itself; just as 
little can it be emanation where what flows out 
remains the same as that from which it flows, 
therefore nothing individual, nothing 
independent. The procession [Folge] of things 
from God is a self-revelation of God. But God 
can only reveal himself to himself in what is like 
him, in free beings acting on their own, for 
whose Being there is no ground other than God 
but who God is. He speaks and they are there. 
Were all beings in the world but thoughts in the 
divine mind, they would have to be living 




Schelling’s argument, at its heart, is simple. If the universe exists as the 
idealism of Fichte and Hegel maintain it must, then there would be no instant 
of creation, or beginning, because, as logical necessities, all things would 
simply exist as ‘thoughts in the divine mind.’ Schelling, however, maintains 
that there is a beginning to history, and history is not mechanical, but is 
contingent. 
 In order to maintain an independent freedom, which Schelling argues 
nature must have in order to be a self-revelatory act of God, the universe must 
also not be viewed pantheistically, and thus what Schelling perceived to be 
Hegel’s pantheistic ‘Absolute’ must be abandoned.202 Instead, Schelling 
proposes that the reality of the universe as God perceives it, in its own 
independence, cannot be conceived of in either strictly idealist nor exclusively 
realist terms, but should instead be comprehended via a medium between both 
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 Thus Schelling attempts to unite the two philosophies, arguing 
that ‘Idealism is the soul of philosophy; realism is the body; only both together 
can constitute a living whole.’204 At the conclusion of the freedom essay, 
Schelling advocated that God’s creation of the world be understood as a 
contingent ex nihilo event beginning history, which acts as the self-revelation 
of God. All of God’s historical actions, in order to have occurred freely, must 
be understood as a dynamic interaction with the natural world, comprehended 
in a manner that incorporates both realist and idealist perspectives. As 
Schelling states it, ‘the second [beginning for the creation] is the will of love, 
whereby the word is spoken out into nature, and through which God first 
makes himself personal.’205 
 For Schelling, the investigation into human freedom meant essentially 
that humanity’s freedom, in order to truly be free, must be grounded entirely 
upon God’s absolute freedom to act within nature.206 It follows that if 
Schelling is to hold that humans are free, and this freedom is grounded in 
some way in God’s act of creation as a contingent act, then all of God’s 
further interaction with the created world must likewise have a contingent and 
dynamic character to it. 
While Paul Tillich was correct in his assessment that, for Schelling, the 
totality of history is intimately connected to God’s revelation, the latter being 
incomplete until the former is also complete,
207
 Tillich was mistaken in his 
assumption that Schelling’s idea of revelation is opposed to 
rationality.
208
Schelling objected to what he saw as the overly rationalistic 
approach of the idealism found in Fichte and Hegel, wherein there was a shift 
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away from historical revelation understood in terms of public, observable 
historical actions, Schelling considered this shift to be toward a private 
subjectivity that compromised an objective rationality that is maintained if 
revelation retains a public historical grounding.
209
 For Schelling, rationality 
requires objectivity, which in turn requires it at least be grounded in public 
(observable) history.  
Schelling argued for an objective principle that would be a grounding 
for a ‘positive philosophy’ to act as a counterbalance to Cartesian scepticism, 
on the one hand, and the private or internal rationality of Fichte, on the other, 
which he considered too subjective.
210
 Thus Schelling sought to maintain both 
the ‘negative’ philosophy, which was more closely associated with idealism 
and describes the world in terms of what it is not, and a new ‘positive’ 
philosophy that would allow for individual freedom. In grounding this new 
philosophy in the historical action of God at creation, however, Schelling 
increasingly began to focus not upon human freedom, but instead upon God’s 
activity and its free and contingent character. This would lead him to build his 
Spätphilosophie, this positive philosophy, almost entirely upon the revelatory 
actions of God within history. 
2.2 Schelling’s Spätphilosophie 
Ultimately Schelling’s focus on human freedom as grounded in God’s 
action led him to focus on the dynamic interaction of the divine with the 
world. The most decisive break with the idealism of Fichte and Hegel came 
with Schelling’s understanding of Christ as the actualisation of freedom within 
history in his Spätphilosophie.
211
 Schelling’s Spätphilosophie is primarily 
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composed of two works consisting of lectures given from 1841-1854: A 
Philosophy of Mythology and A Philosophy of Revelation.
212
  
He had addressed mythology in his prior work, On the History of 
Modern Philosophy, but Schelling determined that mythology only provided 
an incomplete description of God because it was a ‘negative’ philosophy of 
human reason, which on its own was inadequate.
213
 In contrast to this earlier 
foray, Schelling wanted to combine realism with his prior idealism to create an 
‘a priori empiricism’214 or a ‘speculative a posteriori methodology.’215 In 
other words, Schelling sought to bring together the negative philosophy, 
characterised as ‘a priori’ or ‘speculative,’ with the positive philosophy, 
characterised as ‘a posteriori’ or ‘empirical,’ in order to be able to make 
constructive claims, while remaining self-critical.  
By doing so, Schelling hoped that it would convey something beyond 
what either of the systems, could convey on their own. God’s actions, and thus 
revelation, could only be understood historically or post factum, and as a result 
would rely more heavily upon the a posteriori understanding of these events. 
Nevertheless, while the philosophy of revelation would be grounded in 
historical action, a necessary reflective element more closely associated with 
the rationality of idealism was still needed for Schelling, who still operated 
under some of his earlier idealist assumptions.
216
 Thus it was not either 
idealism or realism, but both combined into the new philosophies of 
mythology and revelation. 
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Schelling’s reason for shifting toward an a posteriori methodology 
without fully abandoning his prior (speculative) idealism is to uphold the 
possibility of divine freedom that God must exhibit for human freedom to find 
grounding.
217
 If God acts freely, then he is not a mere concept, and as such 
cannot be known a priori, but is only known as he relates to the ‘other’ in the 
world through historical acts.
218
 In pursuing this line of reasoning, Schelling 
provides the framework that Pannenberg later employs in Revelation as 
History. 
The basis for Schelling’s understanding of God’s actions as historical 
revelation can be traced back to his ‘Identity Philosophy.’ Schelling had 
previously argued that an objective grounding for intellectual investigation 
was necessary.
219
 At the time of Schelling’s Spätphilosophie, this outside 
grounding is God. However, for it to truly be an outside grounding it cannot 
be knowable through speculation alone, for this would be an internal 
grounding. Rather, God must be known as a result of God’s external actions. 
Additionally, for God’s actions to be revelatory, they must of necessity not 
only be free, but must also be historical because human observers, to whom 
God is revealing himself, can only observe external actions as part of 
history.
220
 History cannot mean the idealist notion of history, but contingent 
and observed history because ‘philosophy must deal with reality as it is.’.221 
In order to ground knowledge in history outside of oneself, a freedom 
within the history must be assumed not only for God’s actions, but also for the 
potential knower’s actions, or else it cannot be said to be knowledge of one 
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 The freedom of the knower has an external 
grounding in God’s free acts. Therefore, according to Schelling, if there is to 
be a genuine knowledge about anything, it must be grounded in history. This 
would mean that a genuine and, thus, free history also must be grounded 
outside of itself.
223
 Otherwise, there is no object to know as it would be known 
only within my own mind; this problem of internal versus external grounding 
can be traced back to Cartesian scepticism, where all things could be doubted 
until they were grounded in their own being. For Schelling, as well as many 
others, Descartes’s solution was inadequate because he still found the 
grounding for his beliefs within his own existence. Rather, there must be some 
external, objective grounding for beliefs, else they might be internally 
consistent, but still otherwise illusory.  
In this way Schelling arrives at the same conclusion with which he had 
begun his ‘identity philosophy’: God is the ground of all reality.224 In his 
Identity Philosophy, Schelling states that ‘The cogito ergo sum of Descartes is 
the foundational mistake of all knowledge; thinking is not my thinking, and 
being is not my being, for everything is only of God or the Absolute.’225 For 
Schelling, knowledge of the truth can only be obtained as a result of 
‘revelatory event [Sache].’226 Said differently, knowledge of the truth must 
have a grounding in the free actions of God within contingent history, and 
these actions are what Schelling calls ‘revelation.’227  
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 In lecture thirteen of Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation, he begins to 
address directly the process of creation as historical occurrence grounded in 
God. He had previously argued that the act of creation is itself characterised in 
terms of Potenzen or potentialities. Schelling had been arguing that both 
creation and revelation must be entirely contingent.
228
 Schelling’s use of the 
term Potenzen is important because it clearly distinguishes him from the 
earlier German idealist tradition, which would not speak in terms of Potenzen, 
and suggests a connection to the scholastic tradition, for which Potenzen was a 
key term.  
 The difficulty Schelling encounters when speaking of contingency in 
terms of the pre-Thomist Scholastics is the same issue that Scotus, and 
Pannenberg with him, had encountered: God’s sovereignty is in tension with 
the idea of human freedom.
229
 Schelling’s response begins by grounding the 
concept of contingency, or Schelling’s term potentia,230 and subsequently 
human freedom, in the action of God at creation, labelling this the ‘potentia 
prima.’231 The freedom or contingency of created things, and particularly of 




Rather than try to resolve the tension between God’s sovereignty and 
humanity’s freedom, Schelling argues that ‘the tension caused by the 
voluntary law,’ or between God’s sovereign action and humanity’s freedom, 
‘is the process of creation.’233 Said differently, given that there is an inherent 
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tension between God’s ability, as all-powerful, to act freely and humanity’s 
ability to act both freely and independently of God, Schelling proposes that 
God chooses to limit his freedom through the act of creation. Schelling 
clarifies that these potencies are only found in the ‘Absolute’ of the Spirit.234 It 
should be noted that this aspect of Potenzen in both Creator and created is 
knowable, argues Schelling, only indirectly through the observation of God’s 




Having claimed that God acts as his own grounding, Schelling 
elaborates this point in his fourteenth lecture. Schelling begins his fourteenth 
lecture by affirming that God is only ‘God so far as he is God through the 
world.’236 He elaborates his point by stating ‘God is only God as Lord, and he 
is not Lord without something over which he is Lord.’237 He allows that the 
creation of the world is not necessary for God since creation must be 
contingent.
238
 Instead, as the other German idealists had argued, God is God in 
light of his potential to create. But, Schelling continues, the position of the 
idealists leads to determinism, because if God were not to actualise his Potenz 
in creation, then He would not genuinely be God; the identification of God as 
God is only possible if it is necessary that he creates in the idealist scheme.
239
 
To resolve this tension between the necessity of creation for God’s identity, 
and the desire to keep creation a contingent act, Schelling seeks to provide a 
                                                                                                                                
 
234
 Ibid., 263. 
 
235
 Ibid., 273, 284-287, 290. 
 
236
 Schelling, ‘Lecture 14,’ 291; as noted in a footnote of the last chapter this may be the 
source of the later spurious quote attributed to a footnote in Hegel’s Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion, vol I. 
 
237




 This is in part because God was nevertheless Lord, and God, before the world was created: 









middle ground between the world as ‘fact’ and the Potenz/potency of God’s 
ability to make the world.
240
 In doing so, Schelling argues that creation occurs 
as an ‘emanation of pure divine nature,’ in terms strikingly similar to 
Pannenberg’s later use of field theory discussed in chapters five and six, 
between these two poles of the fact of creation and the Potenzen of creation.
241
 
He attempts to find a middle ground that affirms the freedom of God, that is 
his independence, while still suggesting God interacts with his creatures. 
 Schelling argues that this middle ground is only possible if creation 
exists as an act in the world’s history, which is to say that creation does not 
occur outside of time or prior to time, but as part of the ‘world-process’ as the 
first act of history.
242
 The reason we know God is God is because God has, in 
history, created. By making the act of creation part of contingent history, 
which it must be if we are to claim that the created world is itself contingent, 
knowledge of creation, then, cannot be an a priori assumption, but is an a 
posteriori fact. Thus, God creates historically by actualising the potential 
existence of the world out of its non-existence.
243
 
 Schelling continues that, if the act of creation is contingent, the 
continued existence of the created world is also contingent. Therefore, God 
acts contingently both in creation and in his continued governance.
244
 
Schelling insists that his claim that creation is part of the ‘world process’ and 
not external to it can be found in ‘older theologians.’245 He then extends this to 
argue that the act of creation, freely committed by God, results in a ‘tension of 
possibilities,’246 between the freedom or power (Potenzen) of God and the 
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freedom (Potenzen) of humans, which is dependent upon God’s sustained 
creative activity.
247
 Schelling attempts to describe the nature of creaturely 
freedom despite the fact that creatures are dependent on God for that freedom. 
For Schelling, in order for it to be a genuine freedom, it must be a freedom of 
autonomous things to choose good or evil independent of external pressures, 




 In order to address this tension, Schelling examines the nature of 
history. Genuine freedom would require that the free agent be able to choose 
action independent of immediate constraint. In other words, the free agent 
must have the ability to both perform or not perform one action at the time the 
action is performed or not performed. However, God’s actions of creation and 
continuous creation have been defined by Schelling as occurring historically. 
In order for God’s actions to be free, which they must be if we are not to 
consider God as world-dependent, they must have been performed for some 
purpose. While this would seem to function as an external constraint upon 
created beings, the seeming determinism might be avoidable through an 
appeal to the future. It could be the case, argues Schelling, that God’s actions 
are purposed for some non-immediate future goal. Thus there could be some 
future purpose that, while determined, does not make prior actions leading to 
that goal necessary (or determined). Schelling must demonstrate that history 
may have a goal, but nevertheless can exist as something neither determined in 
the immediate nor brought about by happenstance.
249
 Schelling thus argues 
that while history is ‘contingent, it can [still] be purposed.’250 If this future 
goal truly exists, then the sustained existence of creation can be generally 
affirmed up until the attainment of that future end. 
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 Schelling must explain how God can perform purposed contingent 
action that allows for a contingently acting creation to also move toward a 
goal. In order to avoid describing contingent action as arbitrary, and instead as 
purposed, which Schelling maintains is needed for the action to be intelligible 
and thus revelatory, the action examined cannot be ‘true in itself, but…only in 
connection with the whole.’251 Schelling suggests that a contingent, yet 
purposed action, might be possible if the purpose of creation, and 
subsequently history, is understood in terms of love.
252
 While the idea of 
linking the act of creation to love can be traced back at least to as early as 
Augustine, if we consider that Schelling’s later philosophy demonstrates a 
familiarity with Scholastic philosophy, we may do better to ground this point 
in the work of Scotus to help us approach this idea of dual goals.
253
  
 Scotus argued that God created as part of time, or as the first temporal 
event, and not outside of time.
254
 He lays out his logic for God’s creation most 
clearly in the third book of his Ordinatio. In discussion 32, he traces a line of 
argument related to God’s temporal actions and ultimately creation. God will 
always and only perform perfect action. Every divine action has some purpose 
the action is intended to achieve. God, being perfect, will achieve that 
purpose. The most perfect action is love. Therefore, God’s action must be 
characterised as one of love. Love is always directed toward some object and 
the most perfect expression of love would be directed toward the most perfect 
object: God. Therefore, God loves himself with a perfect love. This perfect 
love is also one that involves a community, though Scotus does not, from this, 
deduce a Trinity.  
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Rather he reflects this back upon creation. For Scotus, God 
incorporates, or creates, other ‘lovers’ who are able to perfectly love God. It is 
important to note that by tying this love to the creation of the world, Scotus is 
not claiming that finite humans on earth do love God perfectly. Scotus 
maintains this love is only perfected in heaven once these lovers, whom he 
identifies as ‘the elect,’ have been fully regenerated. God, in loving the elect, 
ultimately loves himself perfectly. This love is extended to things that exist in 
reality and that exist in potentiality. To the extent that persons direct their love 
toward God, God’s love toward them conceives of them as existent and they 
therefore exist. To the extent that persons neither direct love toward God, nor 
facilitate the love of God by the elect, they are known by God in their non-
existence and thus do not exist in reality. In this way creation occurs as a 
result of divine love and knowledge according to Scotus.
255
 
 In De primo principio, Scotus restates the argument in shortened form, 
arguing that God’s primary action is love, and that love is directed toward 
himself as a final end. Given that the world exists, it moves toward that final 
end of love in God. Therefore, the efficient cause for the world’s existence is 
also its final cause in moving toward God as an object of love and adoration. 
However, Scotus adds the qualification that God performs this action 
contingently, since God is fully sufficient within himself.
256
 This leaves 
Scotus with an apparent paradox: God wills to know and love, and thus create, 
but does so both necessarily and contingently. The world is contingent 
because God is self-sufficient without the world, yet it is necessary because 
God’s love, which is intrinsic to the nature of God, will, by virtue of its 
existence, act as the final cause for creation. Love must be directed outside of 
itself and then back toward the perfect. In other words, if God is love, then 
creation is a natural progression of that. 
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 In a later work, the Quaestiones quodlibetales, Scotus directly 
addresses this tension by claiming that it is possible for contingency and 
necessity ‘to coexist in the will.’257 He then states that only the end result, the 
final cause, is necessary while the intermediary causes may be contingent.
258
 
Unable to advance his argument beyond appeals to Augustine and others, 
Scotus cannot consider the creation by God as occurring in any terms other 
than necessary ones given his attachment to immutability as a doctrine, despite 
his stated desire to describe creation in contingent terms.
259
 
 Scotus sought to link the end of creation with its beginning, 
simultaneously affirming an intent, purpose, or end with the contingency of 
the act. While Scotus could not provide a suitable resolution for the tension, he 
did, nevertheless, lay some groundwork that could be developed in the manner 
which Pannenberg utilised Schelling. One way Schelling addresses the tension 
between the end of history
260
 and the contingency of that same history is by 
relating the contingency of creation to the act of the incarnation.
261
 This will 
be examined in more detail in the next chapter, but some introductory remarks 
can be made here. 
For Schelling, ‘the resurrection of Christ is the decisive fact of the 
whole of…history, which is certainly incomprehensible from the ordinary 
point of view.’ Schelling argues that historical occurrences ‘like the 
resurrection of Christ are like flashes of lightening in which the 
higher…history pierces through and steps into’ our observable history.262 This 
language is remarkably similar to the language Pannenberg uses to describe 
the incarnation and resurrection of Christ, particularly in Jesus, God and Man 
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and Theology and the Kingdom of God, both of which will be addressed more 
directly in later chapters.
263
 In essence, Pannenberg advances his 
understanding that in the resurrection, the end of history is breaking into the 
course of human history. Schelling’s argument follows almost the same 
course, though, for Schelling, the breaking into history of the Son, as the 
eschatological resurrected Son, is seen clearly at creation as well. 
Schelling states that the incarnate Son is the goal of creation.
264
 Having 
already implied that the resurrection of the Son and the role of the Son in 
creation are connected, Schelling goes on in his next lecture to make the 
connection explicit by arguing that not only is the end of history found in the 
resurrection, but it is in fact present in creation as well. This is possible, 
Schelling argues, because the end of history is always found in Christ, and 
Christ is in creation. If creation has the Son as its goal, and the Son as Christ is 
the end of history, as seen in the resurrection, then the end is an historical fact 
by virtue of Christ’s presence in the creation of the world as well as his 
incarnation within history.
265
 Ultimately, Schelling admits that his argument is 
incomplete and perhaps circular, but that a ‘divine philosophy,’ can make 
sense of it. Nevertheless, he states a hope that a scientific philosophy
266
 may 
yet make his argument more sensible; though how this would be the case, 
again, he does not say.
267
 It is here, however, where Pannenberg’s argument 
may continue to expand upon and modify Schelling’s work to provide some of 
the much-needed detail, and will prove particularly important when we 
examine the philosophical application of field theory in chapters five and six. 
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Although Schelling ultimately leaves his final argument somewhat 
ambiguous, he was clear in his assertion that revelation is both historical and 
indirect. Subsequently, this also meant for Schelling that both divine and 
human actions are contingent, yet should be considered purposed. Likewise, 
Pannenberg’s description of divine and human action is one of purposed 
contingency, something that sets the tone for much of his subsequent theology. 
Pannenberg’s position, it seems, is first seen clearly in his early critique of 
Barth’s theology, addressed at the start of the chapter. With respect to 
Schelling, Barth’s theology of revelation had, according to Pannenberg, 
missed the point of Schelling’s Spätphilosophie and, subsequently, was 
fundamentally flawed.  
The result of understanding revelation as history is twofold. First, it 
yields an understanding of divine action and revelation as not just based in 
history, but as history itself, open to observation, and also indirect, which, as 
noted above, contradicts Barth, Bultmann and kerygmatic theology. Second, 
and perhaps even more relevant for this study, given Schelling’s other 
presuppositions about God and God’s character as characterised by love, 
historical action on the part of God is only possible if it is both purposed and, 
somehow, contingent. Schelling’s argument necessitates that there is an ‘inner 
cohesion’ to the events of history and that Christ, who exists both as the 
purpose, and therefore end, of divine action and the ultimate form of divine 
self-revelation, is present throughout history.  
 
Conclusion 
 After laying out the foundations of contingency and their connection to 
history via the acts of creation in chapter one, this chapter began the task of 
building Pannenberg’s theology of history at the same starting point 
Pannenberg had for his engagement with history: revelation. The chapter 
began with a discussion of Barth’s view of revelation that Pannenberg reacts 
against. Specifically, Pannenberg rejects the ahistorical nature of Barth’s 




through public, historic events, not in a private and direct manner. Pannenberg 
further buttresses his argument through an appeal to Friedrich W. J. Schelling. 
 The appeal to Schelling also reveals the deep influence that Schelling’s 
philosophy has had upon Pannenberg’s theology, particularly with regard to 
Pannenberg’s view of history. By establishing the connection between 
Schelling and Pannenberg, and a consonance between Schelling and Scotus, 
we can see that Schelling’s Spätphilosophie will prove to be particularly 
important in elucidating and expanding Pannenberg’s own understanding of 
history. In particular, Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation offers a foundation 
for describing contingent action that is also purposed in a way that extends the 
work of Scotus. Schelling’s final appeal for to a ‘divine philosophy,’ rooted in 
science, will set the stage for our treatment of field theory in chapters five and 
six. In order to continue the development of Pannenberg’s theology of history, 
the very nature of history within Pannenberg’s theology will need to be 









CHAPTER THREE: FOUNDATIONS FOR PANNENBERG’S THEOLOGY 
OF HISTORY 
 
In the previous two chapters, the nature of contingency and its relation 
to historical events has been defined for Pannenberg’s theology according the 
Scotist use of the term and as it was applied to history through Schelling’s 
Spätphilosophie. In light of Schelling’s call to find a ‘divine philosophy’ that 
connects his arguments with respect to freedom and history, we should take it 
as a natural starting point for Pannenberg’s own theology of history to begin 
with the connection of divine revelation to history, as he does in his main 
essay of Revelation as History.  
 This chapter will begin to develop the foundational elements of 
Pannenberg’s theology of history that will be expanded throughout the 
remainder of the thesis. To this end, this chapter opens with Pannenberg’s 
criticism of Bultmann and the kerygmatic school via Pannenberg’s emphasis 
on the importance of revelation within historical action. This emphasis upon 
history leads Pannenberg to a dialogue with the hermeneutical philosophies of 
Wilhelm Dilthey, Hans Georg Gadamer and, to a lesser extent, Martin 
Heidegger. In contrast to Dilthey whose understanding of history is limited to 
human or social domains, Pannenberg’s account of history is considerably 
broader, encompassing what he refers to as a single ‘universal’ history, also in 
opposition to kerygmatic theology. By placing Pannenberg in opposition to 
kerygmatic theology, two things are accomplished. First, the importance of 
history in Pannenberg’s theology is more firmly established, and, more 
critically, Pannenberg’s account of divine interaction with creation in history 




history as it pertains to the end of history are introduced which chapter four 
will extend. 
 
1 Pannenberg’s Theology of History in Contrast to Kerygmatic Theology 
 While Barth is the focus in the introductory essay of Revelation as 
History, Pannenberg’s second essay, ‘Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of 
Revelation,’ focuses on Rudolf Bultmann. Pannenberg’s earlier decision to 
engage with Schelling as a response to Barth will continue to be useful in his 
challenge to Bultmann. It is not disputed that Bultmann’s theological position 
is heavily influenced by Heideggerian existentialism. It should also be noted, 
though, that Heidegger considered Schelling, especially Schelling’s essay on 
freedom, to be fundamental to his own development of existentialism.
268
 
Despite the influence that Schelling may have had upon Heidegger, 
Bultmann’s theology is significantly removed from the position of Schelling. 
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, Schelling’s emphasis on 
freedom led him to argue that God’s revelatory action was primarily historical 
and that this history is contingent. It is this point that Pannenberg also 
emphasises, against Bultmann, in ‘Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of 
Revelation.’ 
 
 1.1 A Redefinition of Revelation as Divine Historical Action 
 Pannenberg’s second essay in Revelation as History comprises seven 
theses, some of which directly address Bultmann’s thought, and some of 
which instead seem to be affirmations of Schelling’s position, although 
developed in Pannenberg’s own unique direction. This section will follow the 
order laid out by Pannenberg, in part because the theses build upon each other 
to a certain extent. By examining all seven theses together, a reasonably 
comprehensive picture can be given of Pannenberg’s view of history, and how 
God relates to it. Briefly, the seven theses may be summarised as follows: (a) 
revelation is indirect, not direct; (b) revelation must be understood from its 
end (i.e., the end of history); (c) revelation is public, never private; (d) the 
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height of revelation is in the history of Israel and in the history of Jesus of 
Nazareth; (e) even though the Christ event, as revelation, includes the end of 
history, it is still part of history (from b) and d)); (f) the cohesive picture of 
history and its relation to revelation held by the early church precludes any 
notion that the early church was gnostic or had gnostic tendencies; and (g) a 
reaffirmation, and redefinition, of the importance of kerygma (the central term 
for Bultmann and kerygmatic theology). 
 The first two theses in Pannenberg’s ‘Dogmatic Theses on the 
Doctrine of Revelation’ may be taken as extensions of Schelling’s line of 
thought. As noted in these theses, Pannenberg states that God’s revelation is 
‘not of a direct type’ but instead ‘is indirect and brought about by means of the 
historical acts of God.’269 This is the same argument that Schelling had made 
in his own account of revelation, but Pannenberg bases his argument here on 
other factors as well. He argues that this is the understanding of revelation 
within Israel’s own history and that of the early church,270 making note of the 
prior two essays in Revelation as History by Rolf Rendtorff
271




Pannenberg affirms the kerygmatic argument that there is a future 
element to salvation which the believer participates in presently, but, contrary 
to kerygmatic theology, claims that this is grounded primarily in the historical 
appearance of Jesus and not the faith of the believer or the early Church. The 
character of history, argues Pannenberg, ‘ought not be dissolved into a mere 
“that”, but should also have the substance of a “what”.’273 In other words, the 
content of faith is necessarily grounded in the reality of history, and not 
merely the idea of history. Nevertheless, the future element is not lost by this 
focus on the past. Instead, argues Pannenberg, it leads to his second thesis, that 
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‘revelation is not comprehended completely in the beginning, but at the end of 
revealing history.’274 
This move by Pannenberg must be read in light of Schelling’s point, 
noted in the last chapter, in Lecture fifteen of his Philosophy of Revelation. 
Schelling states that Christ is not only the height of God’s self-revelation, but 
that the end and goal of history is located within Christ during the life of the 
historical Jesus. Therefore, the ultimate height of revelation, its fullest 
expression, has already occurred within history. Moreover, Pannenberg 
contends that as history is continuing in a contingent manner, revelation ‘is 
continually revising itself’ despite having its fulfilment in the historical Jesus, 
and is only complete at the end of history, present proleptically in Christ, 
viewed in ‘cohesion’ with the entire historical process.275 If revelation 
concerns the whole of history, then the God who acts universally, rather than 
just locally, and was described as such in Israel’s record of God’s actions, thus 
reveals himself most completely at this united end of history; subsequently 
‘broadening the Heilsgeschichte to a universal history’ as well.276 This means 
that, for Pannenberg, revelation, like history, has a universal character. If we 
accept Pannenberg’s claim that the end of history has a universal character, 
and that this end is integral to revelation, then it leads to his next thesis. 
Pannenberg’s third thesis states that revelation, being historical and 
indirect, is entirely public. It ‘is open to anyone who has eyes to see. It has a 
universal character.’277 Contrary to the claim of the kerygmatic theologians, 
revelation cannot be part of ‘imagination,’ nor is there a need for some further 
‘perfection of man’ or direct ‘supernatural’ intervention for revelation to be 
understood. Such concepts of revelation in kerygmatic theology limit the 
scope of the efficacy of revelation; imagination is entirely private, and the 
perfection of man as a requirement for understanding revelation implies its 
                                                 
274
 RAH, 131. 
 
275
 RAH, 131; this prolepsis will be discussed in chapter four. 
 
276
 RAH, 131-133. 
 
277





comprehensibility is severely limited. Accepting that revelation is comprised 
of public acts of God in history, along with the emphasis on the end of history 
and, subsequently, the whole of history for revelation, means that to truly 
comprehend revelation one must arrive at a comprehensive understanding of 
history as well. 
To demonstrate that the bible itself understands revelation in terms of 
public events wherein God acts, Pannenberg offers a strong critique of 
Bultmann. Pannenberg cites Bultmann’s Theology of the New Testament 
stating that ‘Bultmann has rightly insisted that Paul never describes faith as a 
gift of the Spirit, but rather that the Spirit is described as the gift received by 
means of faith.’278 Pannenberg claims faith should be understood as a response 
to the historical act of revelation rather than the reverse, which Bultmann’s 
position would require. Unwilling to abandon his position on revelation that 
requires it be direct, private, necessarily perfect, while also seeking to define 
faith as an existential responsibility laid upon the individual through freedom, 
Bultmann argues that ‘faith is God-wrought to the extent that prevenient grace 
first made the human decision possible, with the result that he who made the 
decision can only understand it as God’s gift.’279 Pannenberg is subtly noting 
that Bultmann’s claim involves certain problematic elisions, such as ignoring 
Paul’s description of the relationship between faith and the Holy Spirit, that 
Bultmann, given this awareness of Paul’s description of faith as cited above, 
should have avoided. 
Pannenberg’s response is that such a reading of scripture seems 
unnecessarily complicated. A better explanation would be to take Paul’s 
argument in its plainest sense: faith is simply the response to indirect historical 
revelation. As Pannenberg continues, 
the paradox that there are persons who will not 
see this most evident truth [of revelation] does 
not absolve theology and proclamation from the 
task of stressing and showing the ordinary, and 
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in no way supernatural, truth of God’s revelation 
in the fate of Jesus. Theology has no reason or 
excuse to cheapen the character and value of a 




Pannenberg questions the validity of Bultmann’s methodology since it can 
only be maintained through significantly complicating the most basic 
understanding of faith (and revelation) and must explain the apparent lack of 
support for such an understanding in Pauline literature through an appeal to 
the extra-biblical concept of prevenient grace.  
 The fact that some people see these historical acts and do not respond 
in faith does not mean that revelation is somehow removed from history. 
Rather, revelation finds its highest point ‘in the fate of Jesus.’ If it is the case 
that revelation elicits a response of faith, rather than faith making revelation 
possible, then if revelation occurs, it does so by the intervention of God into 
human history. 
 In light of the previous three theses, Pannenberg moves to his fourth 
thesis, which declares that the ‘universal revelation’ of God, despite being 
known completely only at the end of history, is nevertheless revealed 
completely ‘in the history of Israel…in the fate of Jesus of Nazareth, insofar 
as the end of all events is anticipated in his fate.’281 For Pannenberg, while the 
future has not yet occurred, and is ‘something beyond calculation,’ 
Pannenberg nevertheless claims in a ‘sense that the perfection of history has 
already been inaugurated in Jesus Christ…. With the resurrection of Jesus, the 
end of history has already occurred.’282 Despite Pannenberg’s failure in this 
essay to mention the presence of the end in Christ at the world’s creation, it 
later becomes clear that this also is true of Pannenberg’s theology generally as 
it developed.
 283
 This will prove important for the connection this makes with 
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Dilthey and the discussion of the scope of history, both of which will be 
explored toward the of this chapter.  
 The coupling of thesis four, that God’s revelation is perfected in 
Christ, especially in his resurrection, together with thesis two, that revelation 
can only be comprehended from the end of history, would indicate not only 
that the end of history is revealed in the resurrection, as will be examined in 
chapter four, but that this Christ event is somehow removed from history. This 
would call into question the extent to which the resurrection is public (thesis 
three), in the sense that anyone can grasp it as historical fact, and that it is 
indirect, which would require that it be public (thesis one). Yet Pannenberg 
will begin to counter this in his next thesis. 
The Christ event, despite being the end of history within history, 
should nevertheless be understood as part of the whole of history, according to 
Pannenberg’s fifth thesis.284 This allows revelatory action understood in this 
scheme to maintain the unity or cohesion of God’s revelation, as is addressed 
in the sixth thesis. In order to understand the fifth thesis, we must examine the 
implicit questions Pannenberg is addressing. In this essay, Pannenberg is 
primarily concerned with the nature of revelation, which implies that the 
theses Pannenberg lays out must also address epistemological concerns. He 
must give an account not of knowledge generally, but specifically of 
knowledge about the divine.  
As will be seen in the next section, Pannenberg frames his 
epistemology in an historical hermeneutic. The ‘end of history’ will prove 
vital for this historical hermeneutic, but, as noted above, if in Christ the end of 
history is found, Pannenberg must give an account for how this avoids 
determinism, and is one of the primary purposes of this thesis. If we link this 
idea back to Pannenberg’s suggestion in the second thesis, above, that 
history’s end ‘is continually revising itself,’ then the beginning of a solution 
might begin to emerge.
285
 Even while the resurrection occurred historically, 
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not only is the meaning of the resurrection still being determined by the course 
of history, but the very content as well. Again, the fuller implications of this, 
and how such a thing is even possible will be addressed in chapter six in 
relation to God as a temporal field.  
The sixth thesis builds on this idea of the historic Christ event as part 
of the greater whole of revelation by suggesting that the first century gentile 
Christians understood revelation to be historical in the manner outlined by the 
prior five theses.
286
 By arguing that the early gentile Christian understanding 
of God was an outright rejection of gnosticism,
287
 Pannenberg further 
undermines Bultmann’s claim that the early church understood revelation to 
be private and individual, rather than public and indirect. Bultmann’s claims 
regarding revelation would fit the kerygma of the early church if and only if it 
was gnostic or had strong gnostic tendencies, something that the historical 
records seem to counter. Rather than something peripheral to the question of 
history and God’s actions within it, the early church’s rejection of anything 
remotely gnostic, at least in the first century, is integral to demonstrating that 
if there is any revelation from God, such revelation could only be the result of 
God’s historic, public actions, and not something ahistoric as alleged by 
kerygmatic theology, as explained below. 
 Bultmann had asserted that the early gentile Christian church was 
essentially gnostic.
288
 Yet, while gnostic revelation argues that revelation 
occurs as the divine enters into a human mind, Pannenberg argues that 
revelation is not the revealer within humans, but the ‘entrance of the revealer’ 
as a human.
289
 This means that historic revelation is not, as Bultmann’s 
argues, merely what the past church took to be revelation (i.e., kerygma), but 
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that the kerygma is the record of the historical encounter with revelation. By 
blurring the distinction between revelation and history, Pannenberg is 
suggesting that the actions of the economic trinity are the primary, if not 
exclusive, means for understanding God.
290
 
 Here we can see that Pannenberg’s thought conforms well with 
Schelling’s assertion that revelatory knowledge is superior to mythological 
knowledge, particularly in light of Schelling’s insistence that the superiority of 
Christianity to prior myths and religions is precisely found in the experiential 
occurrence of God’s actions. In other words, what makes Christianity unique 
among religions and myths, and ultimately capable of leading to an 




While Schelling does not mention gnosticism specifically, the gnostic 
preoccupation with what Schelling calls ‘speculative knowledge’ would 
suggest that Pannenberg’s critique of Bultmann and Schelling’s understanding 
of the uniqueness of Christianity share much in common. This connection, 
while indirect, is further supported by the rise of gnostic studies in 1818 with 
the publication of August Neander’s gnostic studies, followed by F. C. Baur’s 
well received 1827 dissertation, later expanded upon in 1835 as Die 
Christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie in ihrer 
geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Bauer’s work, in particular, demonstrates a 
strong Hegelian influence. This makes it possible, if not altogether likely, that 
Schelling’s emphasis upon history and critique of the shortcomings of 
‘mythology’ is responding to gnosticism in at least some of his comments 
present in his Philosophy of Mythology. There, it is probable that, like 
Pannenberg, Schelling attempted to demonstrate that Christianity cannot be 
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 The way in which Schelling contrasts mythology with 
revelation in his Spätphilosophie needs some further elaboration. 
 For Schelling, the distinction between mythology and revelation is 
more than mere semantics. Knowledge from mythology is arrived at through 
the exercise of reason primarily as a response to the phenomenon of present 
existence. For Schelling, this means that it is an entirely negative philosophy; 
it is incapable of telling us what the world actually is, but can only give a 
glimpse of what it is not. Reason alone is incapable of describing the world as 
it truly is.
293
 Yet even mythology, while being based primarily upon reason, 
was still in response to the observation of the present world.
294
 
 Positive philosophy, for Schelling, is based primarily upon experience 
and has a greater emphasis on genuine historical event than negative 
philosophies. Thus, if one is to understand anything about the reality of the 
universe, it must necessarily have an historical element which is observable. 
From this one may move toward the ‘a priori empiricism’ knowledge that is 
the goal of his philosophy as described in the previous chapter.
295
 While 
reason is essential to interpreting the historical event (Sache) of God’s 
revelation, the event itself is indirect. This connection with Schelling is 
important for understanding Pannenberg’s overarching view of epistemology 
and history as will be elucidated below.  
 Concluding his initial critique of Bultmann and kerygmatic theology, 
Pannenberg’s final thesis affirms the validity of the use of the term kerygma, 
but not in the sense of the kerygmatic theologians. Kerygma, argues 
Pannenberg, is the word of God as report as opposed to revelation itself. For 
kerygmatic theologians, such as Bultmann, the historical fact of what occurred 
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is secondary to the kerygma of the early church. For Pannenberg kerygma is 
important, but primarily insofar as it accurately reflects the historical event. It 
is also useful, and acts as the word of God in the sense that kerygma is itself 
an historical event. While both Barth and Bultmann agree that the word of 
God is kerygma, for Pannenberg, it remains that when the kerygma is 
proclaimed or preached it ‘does not in this respect have the character of a 
special revelatory word. The sermon as an event by itself is not revelation, but 
the report of revealing history and an explication of the language of fact, 
which is implicit in this history.’296 By distancing his use of kerygma from 
Bultmann, Pannenberg also makes a clear distinction between the revelation 
of God and kerygma of God. The revelation of God consists of the historical 
actions of God in history, for Pannenberg, while the kerygma of God is the 
witness to those events as recorded in the bible and proclaimed in the church. 
 The commonality in both Bultmann and Barth with respect to 
kerygma, and what Pannenberg is rejecting, is that neither Bultmann nor Barth 
sees revelation as time bound. Revelation is not tied to the specific events of 
God’s actions and history, but is accessible today through direct revelation.297 
Pannenberg’s distinction, then, between revelation and kerygma is that 
kerygma may be preached or read today, but it cannot have the same 
revelatory power as the historical action to which it bears witness. It is 
revelatory only to the extent that it is historical.
298
 
 This final point introduces a complication for Pannenberg’s theology, 
though. By setting up such a contrast between Bultmann as ahistorical and his 
own theology as entirely historical, we encounter a few key counterexamples. 
It remains true that the overwhelming majority of revelation could be 
described as public and indirect, but there are occasions when this is violated. 
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One might argue about the extent to which the prophets did or did not 
experience direct revelation that was only, then, indirect insofar as they 
relayed it to the people, however, the clearest counterexample comes from the 
New Testament. After Jesus asks the apostles who they understand him to be, 
Peter declares ‘You are the Christ, the Son of the Living God.’ To this, Jesus 
directly responds that Peter understood this ‘not by flesh and blood, but by my 
Father in heaven.’299  
It would be incredibly difficult to argue that Jesus is not referring to a 
direct sort of revelation that, until the moment Peter spoke it, was private. 
Even if one were, this would throw into doubt the kerygmatic aspect of the 
Gospel, and would seem a rather strange argument to make. Indeed, the very 
idea of the incarnation, where the apostles directly apprehend Jesus, would 
seem to resist a strong delineation between direct and indirect revelation. 
Indeed Jesus himself declares that to look on him is to look upon the Father.
300
 
Again, one could argue that theirs is an experience mediated through the 
senses, but then, given that all experiences are mediated in this way, the force 
of Pannenberg’s thesis is lost. Rather, we might do better to qualify 
Pannenberg’s theses by noting that God primarily self-reveals indirectly and 
publicly. Even further, we might argue that one must have strongly compelling 
reason to assume contemporary revelation about God is anything but indirect 
and public (or perhaps impossible altogether at present). Regardless, though, 
one might still claim that revelation is necessarily historical—even the direct 
and private revelatory experiences being part of a broader historical narrative. 
This contrast, of Pannenberg understanding revelation as history, while 
Bultmann is far less concerned with the historicity of it, is certainly one we 
can maintain without difficulty. 
 By setting his view of revelation in contrast to Bultmann’s, 
Pannenberg gives a clearer picture of his theology of history, which should 
certainly be seen in light of Schelling’s own call for such a project. 
Pannenberg’s ‘Dogmatic Theses’ serve to demonstrate several things. First it 
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demonstrates a closer connection between Pannenberg and Schelling, with 
respect to a theology of history, than had previously been established. Second, 
it shows that, while Pannenberg argues that the eschatological element is 
vitally important to understanding reality and God, this does not mean that we 
lose the contingent character of history. This also affirms that the end of 
history is not an unrelated addition to the rest of history, but, as part of that 
history, arises from this same history affirming and redeeming that same 
history. Of the utmost importance for our purposes, Revelation as History 
gives more insight into the character of Pannenberg’s understanding of 
history, something that will be expanded in the next section. 
 
 1.2 The Meaning of ‘History’ for Pannenberg 
 In a collection of essays forming the first volume of Basic Questions in 
Theology, Pannenberg extends his critique of kerygmatic theology and, in so 
doing, gives additional insight into his understanding of what ‘history’ is. In 
the second essay of the volume, translated as ‘Redemptive Event and History,’ 
Pannenberg seeks to find an alternative to the ahistoricity of Bultmann, on the 
one hand, and the suprahistoricity, understood as a separate redemptive history 
(Heilsgeschichte), of Kähler or the prehistory (Urgeschichte) of Barth on the 
other hand.
301
 While Revelation as History is arguably a more systematic 
critique of the prevailing kerygmatic theology, particularly of its expression in 
Bultmann, Pannenberg’s ‘Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte’302 constitutes his 
first published critique of it. 
 At the outset, Pannenberg argues that ‘all theological questions and 
answers are meaningful only within the framework of the history which God 
has with humanity.’303 Pannenberg notes that ancient Israel’s understanding of 
the world and its own identity is intimately tied with history and its relation to 
God. In contrast to what Pannenberg labels the ‘Greek view,’ the God of Israel 
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‘can break into the course of his creation and initiate new events in it in an 
unpredictable way.’ God’s interaction in this manner ‘forms the basis for 
Israel’s understanding of reality as a linear history moving toward a goal.’304 
 Pannenberg then moves to describe the structure of this history as 
Israel understood it: 
Within the reality characterized by the 
constantly creative work of God, history arises 
because God makes promises and fulfils these 
promises. History is event so suspended in 
tension between promise and fulfilment that 
through the promise it is irreversibly pointed 




For Pannenberg, revelation is the goal of Yahweh’s activity, motivated by 
love, expressed as a vow that is fulfilled. In this manner ‘the tension between 
promise and fulfilment makes history.’306 Even though Schelling is not 
directly referenced in the essay, the idea that God’s creative, historic action in 
the world is characterised by the tension between human freedom and God’s 
sovereignty is a clear echo of Schelling and the Stoics.
307
 The exact manner of 
this creation through tension, as has already been indicated above, can be 
expressed as God manifesting himself in the midst of creative history, and will 
be explored in detail in chapter six. 
 In order to make clear what type of history Pannenberg argues was 
characteristic of the ancient Israelite mind-set, Pannenberg defines two types 
of history. The history of Herodotus, or Historie, Pannenberg takes to be a 
focus on the factual and linear view of history divided into regular temporal 
intervals primarily from the perspective of human society. Contrasting this, 
Pannenberg describes the Israelite understanding of history in terms of the 
much more comprehensive Geschichte, which Pannenberg describes as not 
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only incorporating interpretation and valuation of events, but also extending to 
include in history temporal events that are not exclusively tied to a human 
culture. For Pannenberg, Geschichte provides ‘an understanding of the reality 
of all existence’ and remains the prevailing means of the understanding of 
covenant for both Israel and the early church.
308
  
A different view was offered by Bultmann, in his 1955 Gifford 
Lectures, who argued that the historical identity of Israel was distinct from the 
understanding of covenant for the early church, the former having been 
‘swallowed up’ in the eschatological kerygma of Jesus and the early church.309 
The result for Bultmann is that it is fallacious to assume ‘that the early 
Christian community understood itself as a real phenomenon in history, or that 
the relation to the Israelite people was understood as real historical 
continuity.’310 Bultmann concludes one lecture by declaring that  
The New Covenant is not grounded on an event 
of the history of the people as was the Old 
Covenant. For the death of Christ on which it is 
founded is not a “historical event” to which one 
may look back as one may to the story of Moses. 
The new people of God has no real history, for it 





Unsurprisingly, this leads to an existentialist view of the New 
Testament faith, as distinct from the history of ancient Israel’s faith. 
Specifically, Bultmann argues that New Testament faith, being eschatological, 
is experienced as eschatological event in Jesus Christ in the church’s 
preaching where the end is made present in history. Such preaching, at 
present, demands a present decision with regard to the ultimate eschatological 
fate. History, therefore, is irrelevant except where it provides meaning to the 
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present proclamation of the future.
312
 Pannenberg understands Bultmann to 
mean that ancient Israel had not developed a concept of universal history and 
that such a concept of history is only possible in light of the eschatological 
kerygma of the early church. 
 In ‘Redemptive Event and History,’ Pannenberg critiques Bultmann’s 
assertion that the New Testament view of history is distinct from that of 
ancient Israel.
313
 Pannenberg first argues that the earliest Old Testament 
source, J, already exhibits an universal sense of history as Israel is placed 
among the nations, not in isolation; as part of global history. Second, 
Pannenberg argues that apocalyptic thought in the Old Testament, such as the 
book of Daniel, contains as strong an eschatological element as is present in 
New Testament eschatological kerygma. Finally, Pannenberg notes that 
Bultmann had failed to notice the connection between promise and fulfilment 
in terms of history, which can be characterised as sharing a common element 
of eschatological fulfilment, not one primarily found in immediate history, 
and that this connection is observable throughout the Old Testament. 
Pannenberg concludes this portion of his critique by noting that the only 
material difference between Jewish apocalypticism and New Testament 
eschatology is the shift from adherence to the law in the former to adherence 
to the person of Jesus in the latter.
314
 
 Pannenberg continues his refutation of Bultmann’s view of biblical 
history by noting ‘that the confession of Israel and that of the community of 
the new covenant consistently hold fast to the one history of God which binds 
them together.’315 The strongest evidence for this is the New Testament use of 
the Old Testament, particularly in reference to Jesus. The New Testament 
community viewed their history in continuity with the history of Israel 
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described in the Old Testament.
316
 If Pannenberg’s critique is correct, then it 
impacts the way a ‘Christian theology of history’ is constructed and 
understood. 
 The theology of history, the picture of which is being developed in this 
chapter, must be asserted against the Bultmannian concept of history, which 
Pannenberg regards as a modern Western understanding of history completely 
alien to the ‘biblical faith…to which [our Christian] consciousness remains 
essentially bound.’ Bultmann’s centring of history upon the individual leads to 
an understanding of the world where ‘the unity of history is necessarily 
dissolved’ until it is so relativized that Christian faith forfeits both the 
uniqueness of history, that is that each historical event cannot be duplicated, as 




 This loss of history in Bultmann, as well as the reason for maintaining 
a strong focus on history is addressed by Pannenberg in the essay ‘Kerygma 
and History,’ which shifts its focus from Bultmann exclusively toward Kähler 
providing some of the foundational elements that lead into Pannenberg’s 
overarching view of history. Here, Pannenberg recognises that, while Kähler 
does not himself advocate a complete loss of history, as Bultmann does, many 
of Kähler’s emphases lead to such a denial.318 In particular, Pannenberg notes 
that, with Kähler, the ‘revelatory value’ is distinguished from the historical 
‘fact.’ Pannenberg maintains that this emphasis of the kerygmatic theologians 
came about when they accepted ‘all too uncritically the neo-Kantian 
distinction between being and value.’319 It seems clear that Pannenberg has in 
mind here the critique of the historical school, and in particular of Wilhelm 
Dilthey, that was offered by Ernst Troeltsch.  
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Troeltsch suggests that the empirical methodology for arriving at a 
suitable valuation of history is impossible because cultural values cannot be 
established via relative history. Instead cultural values should have an a priori 
nature to them, distinct from historical fact.
320
 It is this interpretation of 
Troeltsch by the kerygmatic and dialectical theologians that Pannenberg 
claims has mischaracterised Troeltsch.
321
 While it is true that Troeltsch 
initially noted that value is something that occurs ‘beyond history,’ (which is 
certainly problematic for Pannenberg), Pannenberg claims that Troeltsch 
eventually affirms that value is found in the eschatological Kingdom of God, 
which may have an historical element.
322
 Nevertheless, the eschatological 
focus of value in the later Troeltsch, while not exactly in line with the 
historical emphasis of Dilthey (see below), minimises the distinction between 
the a priori derived value of the Kingdom of God and the value derived from 
empirically observable history; a distinction which is not only maintained by 
kerygmatic theologians, but one in which they favour the former.  
 Once this loss of historically derived value was paired with 
existentialist philosophy in Bultmann, argues Pannenberg, the early church’s 
interpretation of the kerygma became the sole means for understanding 
revelation today, and the historical fact to which the kerygma potentially 
referred became superfluous at best. In other words, kerygmatic theology 
shifted focus from the ‘what’ of ‘primitive Christian Easter-faith’ to the ‘that’ 
of present faith.
323
 For Bultmann, then, the historicity of the resurrection 
became secondary to the acceptance of the resurrection message. 
Pannenberg’s argument here, in contradiction to Bultmann, is that the message 
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of the resurrection is indistinguishable from its historicity. The ‘what’ of the 
resurrection is the ‘that’ of the Easter faith. 
 Pannenberg admits that, while it may be possible to present a 
dehistoricized theology with respect to the New Testament, ‘in Old Testament 
studies, on the other hand, it is in no way possible to eliminate the reference of 
Israel’s testimonies of faith back to a continuous, Yahweh-effected history.’324 
Therefore an examination of the Hebrew Bible’s understanding of revelatory 
history is a helpful counterpoint to Bultmann’s assertion, particularly if its 
view of history is linked to the New Testament one. To understand the force of 
Pannenberg’s argument, we must examine how he utilises the work of others 
to buttress his argument here. 
 Pannenberg’s primary interlocutor for his examination of Old 
Testament studies, particularly with respect to Bultmann, is Gerhard von Rad, 
from whom Pannenberg initially drew the connection between the ancient 
Israelite conception of history and the New Testament church.
325
 Von Rad’s 
Old Testament Theology is an appropriate choice to combat kerygmatic 
theology, claims Pannenberg, because it exhibits the tendencies of kerygmatic 
theology, such as greater emphasis on the message of revelation than on the 
historic accuracy of the events described.
326
 This is not to say that historical 
accuracy is unimportant for von Rad, only that von Rad is concerned with 
Israel’s perspective on historic events first, which nears the position of 
kerygmatic theology. It is ‘precisely for this reason this book [von Rad’s Old 
Testament Theology] can prepare the way for a genuine corrective’ to 
kerygmatic theology. This corrective is possible since its methodology must 
accept some historical grounding of Israel’s faith due to the fact that the Old 
Testament concerns and was written over a much broader historical period 
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than the New Testament.
327
 For this reason, the Old Testament must draw on 
the history established in early books to make sense of its later claims, seen 
especially in the post-exilic prophets’ concern with the Torah. Von Rad makes 
it clear that any present examination of faith, especially its expression through 
Old Testament intellectual concepts like covenant, ‘is initially to be 
understood as standing in the space between a quite particular past in the 
divine action and a quite particular future.’328  
 According to von Rad’s account, the genuine history of Israel is 
fundamental to understanding the faith of the Old Testament.
329
 Rather than 
exhibiting a bias toward Israel’s account of its Historie, Pannenberg argues 
that von Rad’s approach is unique in that it avoids the categories of ‘inner’ 
and ‘outer’ history, which might be used to describe the competing particular 
perspectives of Historie by attempting to construct a narrative history of Israel 
from the surrounding nations. Instead, continues Pannenberg, the history of 
Israel is tied to the process of tradition and its transmission.
330
 The tradition of 
Israel, as it is recorded in the Old Testament, is itself the most foundational 
aspect of Israel’s history; that is, the written text as historical document, is 
history, but only in relation to the broader Geschichte of the world. It is in this 
way, and not through history divorced from its historical record, that the 
revelatory action of God is the foundation for Israelite history in relation to 
Geschichte. 
 Bultmann counters Pannenberg’s emphasis on Geschichte, and 
Pannenberg’s corresponding criticism of his dehistoricization, first by noting 
that since exact objectivity with respect to historical fact is not possible, the 
interpreter of the biblical text may still cover the hermeneutical distance 
between himself and the biblical author by appealing to non-historical aspects 
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of the biblical text. The distance may be covered, argues Bultmann, because 
both the present day interpreter and biblical author are interested in the same 
subject, e.g., God, and, by virtue of their shared humanity, they have the same 
relation to that subject as investigator.
331
 Bultmann concludes that the bible 
cannot utilise the interpretive techniques of other kinds of literature since it is 
concerned with the action of God as its subject, with which man has ‘no 
previous relationship.’ Instead of connecting to the past author, as Bultmann 
argues is valid for other forms of interpretation, biblical interpretation is 
concerned with the present encounter with God who interrogates the 
interpreter, rather than the reverse.
332
 
 Pannenberg notes that this leads to such a pronounced subjectivity that 
the plain meaning of a biblical text can be obscured by the purely subjective 
interpretation of kerygma.
333
 In contrast to Bultmann’s rejection of an 
historical reading of the biblical text, Pannenberg states that an existentialist 
reading is not genuinely possible because, in losing the historical character of 
the text, any link with the text or its subject is ultimately lost: 
Texts coming from a past epoch demand, 
nevertheless, an interpretation that links the 
historically past as such with the time of the 
interpreter. What happened then cannot be 
stripped of its ‘then-ness’ and in such a way 
construed as a contemporary possibility; for in 
that case its ‘then-ness’ would be missing. On 
the contrary, it must be related to the present 
precisely in its character as having happened 
then. This undertaking is meaningful, to be sure, 
only so long as the present age does not regard 
itself as self-sufficient, but asks about its 
historical heritage for the sake of giving shape to 




                                                 
331
 Rudolf Bultmann, ‘The Problem of Hermeneutics,’ in Essays: Philosophical and 
Theological, trans. James C. G. Geig (London: SCM Press, 1955), 241. 
 
332
 Ibid., 256-257. 
 
333
 BQT1, 109. 
 
334





Bultmann’s emphasis on the present and future only is inadequate. Instead, 
Pannenberg emphasises the fundamental nature of setting the biblical text in 
its historic context for any understanding of the text to occur.  
At its root, Pannenberg notes, one is dealing with a ‘transmitted text’ 
over a ‘historical distance.’ In order for the text to ‘make a claim upon the 
interpreter…the interpreter must expose himself utterly to the particularity of 
what happened then.’335 The interpreter must understand the past situation ‘in 
its disparity from his own present.’ By attempting to interpret a text through 
an examination of the disparate historical situations between the interpreter 
and the situation which produced the text, the ‘hermeneutical formulation of 
the question would thus expand into the question of universal history.’336 It 
becomes evident, then, that the only way that one can speak of an 
‘existentialist claim’ the biblical kerygma makes on the present interpreter is if 
this claim is made in light of the broader context of universal history. Yet, as 
Pannenberg notes, ‘Bultmann… did not take this step’ toward universal 
history, nor could he, as it would defeat the basic claim of the timelessness of 
the kerygma at the root of Bultmann’s hermeneutic. As a result, Bultmann’s 
hermeneutical method is built on an incomplete premise; that is, it neglects the 
centrality and importance of history.
337
 In other words, not only is Bultmann’s 
rejection of history for revelation inconsistent with the foundations of his 
existentialist interpretation, it is logically inconsistent with the scheme as 
Bultmann himself developed it. 
Pannenberg thus affirms, in distinction from kerygmatic theology in 
general and Bultmann in particular, his emphasis on the essential historical 
element of both the biblical witness to revelation and, along the same lines, 
God’s present relationship with the believer as a relationship marked by an 
essentially historical character. The historical witness of God’s actions in the 
world finds its fulfilment at history’s end, but is seen proleptically in Christ, a 
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concept that will also be developed in the next chapter. At this point, though, 
we can affirm Pannenberg’s description of Israel’s essentially historical self-
understanding of God’s actions shifted in the Christ event, especially the 
resurrection, from the narrow Historie to the broader Geschichte. 
 Pannenberg has shown that, not only does revelation occur through 
history, but also that this history became distinct and broader in ancient Israel, 
and even more so in the Christian faith, from the now-dominant Greek 
conception of history. Accepting this distinctive understanding of history 
against that of the more common Greek understanding of history also affects 
our understanding of the revelation and meaning of history. The relation of 
history to meaning places Pannenberg in dialogue with Wilhelm Dilthey, Hans 
Georg Gadamer, and to a certain extent Heidegger, which, in turn, causes 
Pannenberg to consider the importance of history as a whole. This also raises 
some interesting epistemological questions that will need further investigation 
if we are to explain how the divine can be understood to act within history 
without overwhelming the human will. 
 
2 Dilthey and Historical Meaning 
 In order to help expand upon the meaning of universal history and 
develop Pannenberg’s theology of history, I will now examine the way in 
which Pannenberg’s dialogue with Dilthey, introduced in the prior section, 
influenced his own theology. In doing so, we will see that Pannenberg also 
engages with the critique of Dilthey by Hans Georg Gadamer. As will be seen, 
this exploration leads Pannenberg to speak of history in broader terms than 
either Dilthey or Gadamer, and to an emphasis upon the ‘end of history,’ 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 Pannenberg will be able to modify Dilthey’s view of history and the 
hermeneutic of history in a way that answers some of Gadamer’s objections 
such that, through an appeal to driving action in history, meaning may not 
only be derived from the end of history, but can be found in the midst of 




Gadamer, however, it will be helpful to briefly outline Dilthey’s view of 
history, the hermeneutics of history, and Gadamer’s critique of this view. 
 
 2.1 Dilthey’s Hermeneutics of History 
Since we are primarily concerned with the tension between divine 
sovereignty and human freedom through a theology of history, the current 
discussion will be focused upon the later period of Dilthey’s philosophy where 
history has more prominence than in other periods. After giving an overview 
of Dilthey, we will explore Gadamer’s critique of Dilthey prior to examining 
Pannenberg’s engagement with both Dilthey and Gadamer. All of this 
ultimately moves Pannenberg toward the development of his own theology of 
history, which he understands in both broader and more concrete terms than 
Dilthey, Gadamer or Heidegger. 
 Dilthey himself exhibits an awareness of Schelling’s philosophy when 
he describes Schelling as the first idealist philosopher to seriously engage the 
genuine nature of history and philosophy of science.
338
 Further, Dilthey notes 
that much of Schelling’s philosophy just prior to the Spätphilosophie 
contained a focus not only on history, but also on the actions of the Absolute, 
which Schelling later identified with God, in history.
339
 Dilthey’s view of 
history allows for a dialogue with Schelling. Prior to such an engagement, let 
us examine Dilthey’s view of history on its own. 
 Dilthey states explicitly his view that human persons are necessarily 
historical in nature having rejected Schleiermacher’s interpretive method 
because Schleiermacher’s ‘category of “feeling”’ failed ‘to do justice to the 
inner, historical character of human subjectivity.’340 Dilthey’s hermeneutic of 
history focuses upon the individual in relation to the ‘other’ outside itself. He 
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clarifies, though, that the meaning of a human life is not solely found in the 
‘other,’ but that ‘experience in its concrete reality is made coherent’ by the 
connections between the self and the ‘other,’ understood to comprise a 
‘system of connections.’341 While these various connections are by no means 
static, but instead are ‘constantly relating and interacting,’ Dilthey 
nevertheless argues that they can be understood and interpreted.
342
 Dilthey 
insists that the meaning of an individual’s life is not found through 
introspection, giving evidence of a shift away from his early work on 
Schleiermacher, but fundamentally through external sensory observation, 
either performed directly by the interpreter or, more frequently, indirectly 




 In order to arrive at a hermeneutic for the human life, the dynamic 
interactions of the various connections that comprise a human life need to be 
seen as comprising a greater unity. This unity is possible, argues Dilthey, 
because life is demonstrably goal oriented.
344
 The various events of this 
system of historical connections, then, ‘acquire significance through their 
relation to the whole which sustains values and purposes.’ In other words, 
‘historical events become significant through being links in a system of 
interactions in which they cooperate with other parts to bring about values and 
purposes in the whole.’345 
 Meaning for the individual, then, can be found through the system of 
interactions and the significance that the various historical parts gain from 
their interaction with the whole.
346
 The historian must, therefore, examine  
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the whole life of an individual as it expresses 
itself at a particular time and place. It is the 
whole web of connections which stretches from 
individuals concerned with their own existence 
to the cultural systems and communities and, 
finally, to the whole of mankind, which makes 




Despite this requirement for interpreting an individual’s life, or the whole of 
history, Dilthey suggests that it is possible for the individual to gain such an 
understanding of the significance of her or his own life ‘in the hour of 
death.’348 The outside observer may only arrive at the meaning of an 
individual’s life once they ‘retrace’ the whole of that life following this final 
moment of possible self-awareness.
349
 In anticipation of Pannenberg, we 
might summarise Dilthey’s hermeneutic of history by extending what he says 
about individuals to history itself. History, then, can only be known once the 
end of that history has been reached. Thus, history is only known as a whole 
system of interconnected events and subjects from the end or goal of that 
history. 
 
 2.2. Gadamer’s Scepticism about a Hermeneutics of History 
 A primary concern in Gadamer’s Truth and Method is to give an 
account of human understanding, which he approaches in terms of arriving at 
an appropriate hermeneutical method. Gadamer is sceptical about the viability 
of Dilthey’s method, particularly given Dilthey’s suggestion that meaning may 
be attained through objective empirical observation, primarily in terms of a 
hermeneutic of history. In particular, Gadamer argues that, in order to arrive at 
a viable or useful hermeneutical method, especially when dealing with 
historical texts or persons, we must ‘free ourselves from the dominant 
influence of Dilthey’s approach to the question, and the prejudices of the 
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discipline that he founded: namely Geistesgeschichte (cultural history).’350 
Gadamer argues that the historian must distance himself from Dilthey because 
the methodology Dilthey advocated is unfeasible. 
 Gadamer notes that Dilthey had moved away from the hermeneutic 
advocated by Schleiermacher through attempting to find a more objective 
methodology than the subjective nature of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic. 
However, in doing so, Gadamer argues that Dilthey failed to also distance 
himself sufficiently from the methodology of the natural sciences—his 




 This failure, as Gadamer perceives it, calls into question the validity of 
Dilthey’s entire methodology, such as Dilthey’s suggestion that a text not be 
approached in isolation, but should instead be interpreted in light of the author 
and authorial intent as influenced by his historical surrounding. By bringing in 
the human element, Gadamer argues that Dilthey’s hermeneutic suggests that 
the meaning of a text could only be obtained through an understanding of the 
whole individual.
352
 However, Gadamer argues that since the individual can 
only be understood in light of the connections the self has with the ‘other,’ the 
scope of investigation is broadened to the point that all of human existence 
would have to be understood in order to arrive at a satisfactory meaning for 
any aspect of it. 
 By focusing on the authorial intent rather than on the texts in 
themselves, as Gadamer summarises Dilthey, ‘it falls to the historian to 
understand the history of mankind as a whole.’353 If the historian cannot 
understand the text in itself, but only as a fragment of a larger whole of the life 
of the author, the text as a fragment is not genuinely comprehensible apart 
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from the whole of human existence. It follows that this ‘universal framework 
of history lacks the self-containedness’ that might have been available were 
the text to be taken as a whole in itself.
354
 Crucially, for our purposes, 
Gadamer argues that Dilthey’s idea of a universally attainable ‘objective’ 
knowledge is actually unobtainable. Richard Palmer, who conducted 
postdoctoral research at Heidelberg under Gerhard Ebeling during which he 
had considerable contact with Gadamer, notes that, for Dilthey’s hermeneutic 
to be valid, one must obtain a perspective ‘above history from which history 
can be looked upon.’ Gadamer argues that finite subjects cannot rise above 
their time and place to arrive at an objective knowledge: ‘Such a standpoint 
presupposes an absolute philosophical knowledge—an invalid assumption.’355  
 The end of history, which Dilthey claims is a prerequisite for meaning 
since history must be taken as a completed whole that connects to its historical 
end, is, according to Gadamer, unobtainable; history has no end from which 
finite human observers can survey it in its entirety. The task of the historian 
‘to understand history of mankind as a whole’ is an impossible one.356 
Gadamer summarises his critique of Dilthey’s universal history by stating that, 
for Dilthey, ‘the ontological structure of history itself, then, is teleological, 
although without a telos.’357 The trouble is that any historical event can only 
be understood at the conclusion (its telos), since prior to that point the 
historical importance, including its connection to all future events can only be 
assumed based upon that portion of history that is known. Thus the meaning 
of history, according to Gadamer’s critique of Dilthey, is oriented toward this 
end. But if history can only be understood in reference to each event’s final 
impact, all historical interpretations are meaningless until that end is reached. 
 Even if the purview of history is limited to an individual’s life, 
Gadamer concludes that, by Dilthey’s criteria, it is impossible to know the 
                                                 
354
 Ibid., 175. 
 
355
 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 178. 
 
356
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 173, 178. 
 
357





meaning of one’s own life while still living.358 In the end, Gadamer rejects 
Dilthey’s method primarily because it is impossible to examine history as 
whole. Instead, history is primarily composed of internal fragments loosely 
connected to each other, but from which no greater unity can be established.
359
 
 Nevertheless, Gadamer does remain open to the idea of a universal 
history that is required for Dilthey’s hermeneutic to work. However, he 
heavily qualifies such an openness to the point of near impossibility. Any 
possible unity to history is only observable from the perspective that ‘appears 
to an infinite spirit,’ although Gadamer does not immediately explain what he 
means by an ‘infinite spirit.’360 He continues by admitting that, were it 
perceivable, such a unity could explain ‘human affairs’ as part of a greater 
cycle of nature and thus give meaning according to Dilthey’s criteria.  
 Gadamer suggests an appeal be made to Löwith, who describes history 
as part of an ‘eternal cycle of nature,’ not limited to human domain.361 In other 
words, while Gadamer is doubtful that history can be understood as a 
universal whole, he allows that such a perspective might be possible, but only 
if the view of history is expanded beyond a narrow focus on humanity to 
encompass a much broader focus, including, for instance, the natural world. 
By expanding the view of history beyond mere human history, it is 
conceivable that an infinite perspective would be obtainable by an infinite 
agent. Gadamer speaks of this through the possibility of a ‘spirit’ (Geist) that 
encompasses all of history, clearly demonstrating the influence of Hegel, 
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 Ultimately, Gadamer dismisses the idea as too impractical. Rather, the 
‘spirit’ which might encompass all of history is a construct and not an agent, 
certainly not something capable of knowing or perceiving in the traditional 
sense. It is here that we may move back to Pannenberg’s response to both 
Dilthey and Gadamer.  
 
 2.3 Pannenberg’s Retrieval of Dilthey in light of Gadamer’s 
Critique 
 Positively, Pannenberg affirms Dilthey’s emphasis on the whole of 
history as essential to understanding the various parts of history and their 
relations to each other as essential for a suitable hermeneutic.
363
 However, 
Pannenberg criticises Dilthey’s explanation for how an individual may ‘grasp’ 
the meaning of his or her own life at the final hour of death. This fails to take 
into account the impact of an individual’s actions upon a society or other 
individuals. In other words, even after the death of an individual, the meaning 
of the life of that individual may continue to be revealed through continued 
interactions and connections that the individual’s life had with his or her 
surrounding society.
364
 Because of this, Pannenberg agrees to a certain extent 
with Gadamer that Dilthey’s emphasis on the individual human person is far 
too narrow.  
 By Dilthey’s own admission, one would have to wait until the end of 
history itself in order to fully determine the meaning of an individual’s life.365 
Dilthey sought to overcome this problem of the presently incomplete history, 
notes Pannenberg, by attempting to relate the parts of history that have already 
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occurred to the projected whole of history in an effort to predict the nature of 
history’s end. However, Dilthey failed to give a satisfactory criterion by which 
to evaluate the importance of the various events of history relative to the 
whole. The result of this shortcoming is that ‘the [historical] parts themselves 
cannot attain any firm footing without knowledge of the whole… [because] 
only knowledge of the whole can make clear what significance the parts really 
deserve.’366 Despite these shortcomings, Pannenberg attempts to redeem 
Dilthey’s methodology. Pannenberg acknowledges the advancement on 
historical hermeneutics made by Gadamer’s description of the interaction of 
the historical text or person with the present as occurring via a ‘fusion of 
horizons.’367  
 The ‘horizon’ to which Gadamer refers is the finite historical situation 
in which a person lives or a text is created. For Gadamer, ‘every finite present 
has its limitations.’368 Thus, by virtue of being time-bound, the horizon of an 
individual or of an historical message is limited. This horizon encompasses 
not only what is immediately accessible at the particular historical event, but 
also what can clearly be seen as part of the horizon more generally; the time 
and culture immediately preceding and following a particular historical event, 
which might constitute a broader period of time, are part of the horizon of that 
historical event. The relative importance of these various factors is determined 
by how they are viewed from a particular point.
369
  
 Despite insisting that the ‘horizon’ indicates a distinct limit to vision, 
Gadamer nevertheless fails to define precisely the limits of a horizon. Can 
someone in the present interpret something or ‘grasp’ the meaning of an 
individual from a discrete horizon? Though they may be examining the same 
‘point’ their perspectives of that point (their horizon) is different. Therefore, 
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 For Gadamer, though, the process of understanding does not stop after 
a single such fusion, but is ongoing. Understanding history and historical 
messages requires the continual fusion of horizons as our purview is 
continually expanded.
371
 Gadamer, fully aware of Hegel’s influence upon him, 
freely employs the terminology of the ‘dialectic’ of history to describe the 
process of the fusion of horizons.
372
 Nevertheless, he is also critical of Hegel’s 
dialectic because, as Gadamer reads Hegel, the process of dialectic can 
eventually arrive at a completion, something that Gadamer argues is not 
possible, at least not for finite human beings.
373
 This is due to Gadamer’s 
claim that any finite, temporal present, and correspondingly any related 
message or text arising from it, can only be understood via a ‘fusion of 
horizons,’ and that a complete understanding of any such event would 
necessarily encompass the whole of history, or the horizon would need to be 




 Despite Gadamer’s objections and scepticism regarding a complete 
understanding of any particular historical event, Pannenberg attempts to 
rehabilitate Dilthey in light of Gadamer’s critique. Pannenberg finds in 
Gadamer’s interaction with Dilthey a position that still places a preference of 
the whole over the parts, and that acknowledges the task of humanity as 
‘understanding reality as a whole.’375 According to Pannenberg, this means 
that, for Gadamer, the ‘reality of history is exhibited in the process of 
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understanding itself,’ even if, for Gadamer, this process is incomplete.376 
Since the impossibility of understanding the whole of reality, or even a single 
historical event to its fullest extent, is due to the finitude and temporally bound 
nature of human interpreters, if a perspective which was neither finite nor 
temporally bound could be attained, then the incomplete process of the 
‘fusion’ of historical horizons would no longer be problematic. Gadamer 
suggests that such a position might be obtainable if one could take seriously 
Hegel’s notion of a ‘spirit’ that encompasses the whole of history.377  
 Nevertheless, as has been briefly mentioned above, Gadamer explicitly 
rejects the Hegelian methodology, claiming his fusion of horizons is distinct 
from Hegel’s ‘total mediation of the present by means of history.’378 Gadamer 
finds Hegel’s dialectic of history to be deficient, and what Gadamer 
understands to be the determinism of the Hegelian ‘spirit’ to be untenable.379 
As noted above, according to Gadamer, any interpretation of historically 
bound persons or texts in the present must overcome an infinite ‘background 
of meaning,’ in order to be total in its interpretation, which inevitably makes 
Gadamer sceptical about the possibility of ever understanding the ‘fusion of 
horizons’ that is necessary for a complete hermeneutic of history.380 
 Despite this scepticism, Pannenberg notes that ‘strangely enough, the 
[observed, historical] phenomena, which Gadamer describes, move time and 
again in the direction of a universal conception of history, something which he 
would like to avoid in view of the Hegelian system.’381 That, is, Gadamer’s 
‘fusion of horizons’ is still a system that moves in the direction of a universal 
concept of history, even though Gadamer acknowledges that the process is 
necessarily incomplete.  
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Pannenberg suggests that a unity to history might be possible, even if 
such a unity is only possible from an infinite perspective. If a unity for all of 
history could be observed, then meaning can be found as Dilthey suggested, 
though with considerable expansion upon what ‘history’ means. Such a unity 
would include the future, though, as well as the past and present, and thus any 
knowledge of the meaning of history currently would be, at best, ‘a 
provisional knowledge.’382 Still, such a knowledge and comprehensive 
perspective could be obtained only by a non-temporally bound observer. As an 
alternative to the Hegelian spirit, we could propose that the observer of history 
could be identified as God, who could be both the subject of history and an 
agent interacting with it. Because God could be an agent, he is able to 
communicate the content and meaning of history to other agents within 
history. Instead of the deterministic spirit, the ‘spirit’ here would be free and 
would respect the unique contingency of historical beings and events.  
 Despite Gadamer’s concerns, Pannenberg argues that it is still possible 
to arrive at a comprehensive ‘philosophy or a theology of world history.’383 
For Pannenberg, the development of such a philosophy or theology is aided, 
rather than hindered, by Gadamer in that he broadens Dilthey’s focus on a 
single individual life to include society, societal connections of an individual 
post-mortem, the historical progression of societies, and eventually moves 
‘beyond all of them to the totality of mankind and universal history.’ In this 
way, Gadamer indirectly affirms Dilthey’s position that universal history is the 
only true history; that is, there is no peculiar or personal history that is distinct 
from universal history—the horizons are all focused on the same end and thus 
comprise different perspectives of the same ‘what’ of history.384  
Gadamer’s engagement with Dilthey, then, is necessary for arriving at 
a comprehensive theology of history and the interpretation of that history. 
Indeed, Gadamer himself would later go on to praise Pannenberg’s analysis of 
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Truth and Method, going so far as to say ‘I think there is really no dispute 
between Pannenberg and myself, so far as I understand him…. There is only 
the difference that for the Christian theologian that “practical purpose” of all 
universal historical conceptions has its fixed point in the absolute historicity of 
the Incarnation.’385 
 In order to help sharpen our understanding of what is meant by history, 
we should examine Pannenberg’s subsequent engagement with the underlying 
assumptions in his engagement with Gadamer: namely, Heidegger’s 
‘appropriation’ of Dilthey.386 Of course, Gadamer himself had engaged with 
Heidegger’s perspective on history and meaning prior to the writing of Truth 
and Method.
387
 Indeed, the source of much of Gadamer’s critique of Dilthey 
can be traced to Gadamer’s acceptance of a Heideggerian method of 
interpretation.
388
 This examination on our part of Pannenberg’s work will aid 
us in developing Pannenberg’s theology of history and understanding the 
manner in which it responds to the driving problem of this thesis: the tension 
between divine sovereignty and human freedom. 
 
 2.4 Pannenberg on Heidegger’s ‘Appropriation’ of Dilthey toward 
Vogriff 
 We will see that, though Pannenberg ultimately rejects Heidegger’s 
use of Dilthey because it results in too narrow a hermeneutical viewpoint by 
focusing almost exclusively on individuals, a fault Pannenberg also finds in 
Dilthey, Pannenberg nevertheless believes that Heidegger makes an important, 
positive contribution to the dialogue.
389
 For Pannenberg, Heidegger shifts the 
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focus from actual wholeness to the language of ‘possible’ wholeness. By 
doing so, arguably, Heidegger has suggested that wholeness comes from an 
orientation toward the future completeness of life, rather than being something 
attainable in the present, where it is incomplete.
390
 
 One reason for this shift from actuality to possibility may be 
Heidegger’s attempt to move away from Husserl’s phenomenological 
subjectivity.
391
 While Husserl tried to ground his phenomenology in the 
individual experiences of human subjects throughout history of the world, 
Heidegger argues, citing Scheler against Husserl, that it is precisely because of 
its subjectivity that we can never gain genuine insight into the perspective of 
these subjects. As other persons who possess their own experience that shapes 
their worldview, they are distinct from us, and thus their perspective is not 
entirely accessible. In order to establish an objectivity for myself and any text, 




Instead, Heidegger argues that the present ‘human existence [should 
act] as its [own] ultimate point of reference.’393 In particular, Heidegger cites 
theological concepts, such as the imago Dei, as early evidence of an attempt to 
ground what he labels the ‘ontology’ of Dasein, but what we are referring to 
as hermeneutical meaning (to maintain consistency with Dilthey and 
Bultmann).
394
 These fail, for Heidegger, as do most other attempts to arrive at 
a concept of meaning, in part because the present experience of Dasein, and 
Dasein’s orientation to the future, has precedence over the past for Heidegger 
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as he develops a grounding for his ontology of Dasein.
395
 This focus on the 
present and future, while minimizing the importance of the past was later 
adopted by Bultmann, relying heavily upon Heidegger. By doing so Bultmann 
arrives at a hermeneutical position marked by a de-emphasis on history, in 
favour of present existence, and, even more so than Heidegger, an increased 
focus on the future and our relationship to the coming future. For Bultmann, 
this meant a rejection of history as the primary means for understanding the 
kerygma of the early church, as has been noted above.
396
 While this does not 
necessitate a total rejection of the role of history in interpretation, it remains 
that both the early Heidegger and Bultmann de-emphasise the past in order to 
focus on the present to the point of a functional irrelevance of the past, in a 
clear move away from Dilthey.
397
 
 While Pannenberg criticises Bultmann for not taking history seriously 
enough, he does acknowledge the positive emphasis upon the future found in 
Bultmann, something that Pannenberg believes Heidegger did not act upon as 
forcefully as he could have. Pannenberg understands Heidegger to argue that 
the meaning of Dasein’s self-relation and being-to-the-world is accessible in 
relation to the constant approach of death, as Dilthey had argued, with the key 
difference being that Heidegger claims that this meaning might be attainable at 
the present via anticipation of one’s death.398 Pannenberg rejects this line of 
argument because anticipation is not concrete enough and such a move 
assumes, similar to Dilthey, that death is the end of both the individual as 
Dasein and of the potential impact that an individual may have.
399
 Even purely 
                                                 
395
 Ibid., 76-77 (German 50-52). 
 
396
 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 48-51. 
 
397
 See Being and Time, 188-192 (German 148-151) for Heidegger’s uninterpreted position. 
Obviously, as with many other thinkers, there is considerable debate as to what, exactly, 
Heidegger meant. For our purposes, though, we are concerned with how Bultmann, who 




 BQT1, 166; to be sure, Dasein is complicated and, while not directly corresponding to the 
common notion of identity, is nevertheless connected to it, particularly s concerns authentic 
versus inauthentic exitence. 
 
399




atheistic hermeneutics allow for a person’s overall impact to extend beyond 
the individual’s life, particularly in light of the strong interconnectedness of 
society.
400
 The impact of a life beyond an individual’s life is important, not 
only for historical studies, but is foundational for a theology concerned with 
history, considering the importance of eschatology and eternity for Christian 
theology. 
 To address this perceived shortfall in Heidegger’s concept of 
anticipation, Pannenberg suggests first that rather than consider anticipation in 
terms of anticipation of the end of life, one consider anticipation to be based 
upon the ultimate future wholeness, that is the ‘end of history,’ a concept that 
will have in depth examination in the next chapter.
401
 Second, Pannenberg 
argues that the concept of anticipation, as used by Bultmann is not powerful 
enough to make an existential or interpretive claim in large part because it 
would seem to devolve into an abstract and subjective state of mind.
402
 
Instead, Pannenberg suggests that instead of speaking in terms of 
‘anticipation,’ as Bultmann does, we make use of the category ‘fore-
conception’ or ‘Vorgriff,’ which is itself a Heideggerian term.  
Arguably, for Heidegger, Vorgriff is an essential element in any 
interpretive event. Before an individual text or event may be interpreted, a 
conception of the future wholeness as Vorgriff, must be in the interpreter’s 
mind.
403
 This Vorgriff, which can be both more concrete and more objective, 
is grounded in the unity of Dasein which finds its primary expression in the 
future; or, as Heidegger states it, ‘The primary meaning of existentiality is the 
future.’404 
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 Pannenberg extends his understanding of the application of 
Heidegger’s Vorgriff to hermeneutics of history by stating that ‘the category of 
fore-conception [Vorgriff] makes it possible to conceive the history of 
mankind as ordered toward a final destination without skipping over the 
unfinished character of the factual course of events.’ In other words, the 
Vorgriff of Dasein can function as a presently comprehensible goal or whole 
toward which the various parts of history are ordered and moving.
405
 Still, the 
difficulty with Vorgriff is that it is not fully known in the present and thus our 




 In order to resolve this problem, something more definitive is needed. 
What is required is the actual or genuine presence of the future goal within the 
midst of history, for the whole of history afterward to be interpreted 
comprehensively. A genuine and complete hermeneutic of history, along the 
lines suggested by Dilthey, requires a ‘pre-appearance’ within history of 
history’s end. Even with such an arrival, however, Pannenberg acknowledges  
this statement is again an anticipation whose 
validity can only be proven in the future. Until 
then, the difference between a pre-appearance 
and the ultimate, which is inherent in the fact 
that the former is the appearance of the latter, 
will be mirrored by the anticipation of that 
which appears in a pre-appearance, in such a 
way that such anticipations will anticipate the 
ultimate truth of events as the definitive arrival-
in-pre-appearance [Zum-




In other words, for history to be comprehensible, as described by Dilthey and 
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 This definitive Vorgriff has been given, argues Pannenberg, in the 
actions of God, who is both infinite and not historically bound, yet has been 
encountered historically, at the resurrection of Christ.
409
 The absolute proof of 
this event as the end ‘arrival’ of the future in the midst of history, however, 
will not be attained until the end of history is reached. Thus, it may be the case 
that history is comprehensible through the event of the resurrection as the 
future breaking into the midst of history, but only at history’s end will the 
revelation of God be made complete and the resurrection fully seen for what it 
is. Then history and its meaning will be known to have been comprehensible 
all along through the resurrection event.  
To be sure, this means that history can have meaning now, but this 
meaning will not be vindicated as such until the end of history, meaning it 
must be taken on faith until then.
410
 Relatedly, we might also be a bit more 
precise in our description of Pannenberg’s view of revelation. It seems that, 
for Pannenberg, revelation must be observable historical events, and is 
distinguished from non-revelatory events only in that revelatory events have 
God as their immediate source.  
Given Pannenberg’s predilection for objectivity, we might ask by what 
criteria an event can be known to have God as its immediate source, and thus 
be revelatory. Unfortunately, we are left only to argue that, for Pannenberg, 
the identification of an event as revelatory can only be confirmed at the end of 
history when our experience of God is no longer indirect. Thus events that 
truly revealed the nature of God, as God is then experienced, can be known, at 
this end, to have been revelatory. This appears to be a very unsatisfactory 
conclusion, only making a mild improvement on Barth’s and Bultmann’s own 
position. While technically it remains more objective than Bultmann’s view of 
revelation, it is practically indistinguishable in many instances, utilizing the 
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concept of faith to avoid the problem of discerning objectivity.
411
 Pannenberg 
will attempt to resolve this disparity, to some degree, in his discussion of the 
‘end of history’ connected to the resurrection of Jesus, as will be discussed in 
the next chapter, but it ultimately is not known to be true until the full 
experience of that end occurs. 
 Pannenberg’s intentional distinction between what he calls the 
mythological attempts to obtain the Vorgriff, present in German idealism, and 
the potential for its actual arrival as the end of history through the historical 
Christ bears the marks of Schelling’s Spätphilosophie, which distinguished 
between the speculation of mythology and the more definitive nature of 
historical revelation.
 412
 In light of this, it becomes clear that Schelling’s call 
for a comprehensive philosophy or theology of history is needed in order to 
arrive at comprehensive meaning for any event, text, or person. In order to 
comprehend fully anything, we must first have a concrete Vorgriff, and to 
recognise the Vorgriff as such, we must first develop an overarching 
philosophy or theology of history. 
 Pannenberg continues his argument by asserting that the resurrection 
of Jesus was not only a ‘prophetic announcement’ of the arrival of the 
eschaton, but that the ‘final destiny of each man is decided by their 
relationship to him and his message’ in the resurrection.413 The resurrection is 
central to Pannenberg’s theology because, in it, the end of history is found, 
and therefore it is ‘the ultimate revelation of God in Jesus.’414Again, this focus 
on the end of history being present in Christ as the climax of history also 
sounds like the Schelling of Philosophie der Offenbarung.
415
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 While in the previous chapter it was noted that Schelling’s focus on the 
end of history is in the Christ at creation, Pannenberg has instead located this 
end in the Jesus of the resurrection. In so doing, Pannenberg agrees with 
Schelling’s assessment that history is comprehensible only from the end which 
is already present in Christ, and through whom humanity is given the 
revelation concerning the meaning of history. In addition to this, Pannenberg 
has also advanced Schelling’s view that revelation, and thus constructive 
meaning, is only comprehensible within the context of the ‘philosophy of 
history’ that Schelling himself failed to develop fully, but which began to find 
a more complete expression in Dilthey as modified here.  
Pannenberg states that such a focus on the presence of the end of 
history in the historically raised Jesus helps us to get past the ‘post-Hegelian 
problem we live in.’416 That is, by focusing on the end of history present 
within history, Pannenberg is able to use the hermeneutical method of Dilthey 
and overcome the critique of Gadamer, without appealing to the deterministic 
spirit of Hegel. God as Spirit who is neither time-bound nor finite can provide 
the understanding of history that comes from perceiving history as a whole 
from the end of history without necessarily impinging on human freedom. The 
task remains, then, to define the relationship between the end of history and 
present human experience, as will be done in chapter four, as well as to 
describe the way in which the Spirit functions presently to provide this 
understanding that is linked to the end of history, as will be done in chapters 
five and six. 
 For now, we might note that, by refocusing Dilthey’s hermeneutical 
framework for history,  
it is possible to find in the history of Jesus an 
answer to the question of how “the whole” of 
reality and its meaning can be conceived without 
compromising the provisionality and historical 
relativity of all thought, as well as openness to 
the future on the part of the thinker who knows 
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The nature of this goal, the end of history, and its arrival in the midst of 
history will be explored in more detail in the next chapter, but it is necessary 
now to define the scope of history that Pannenberg has in mind in order to 
better understand what sort of ‘end’ and to which ‘history’ we are relating this 
end. As has been intimated throughout this discussion, Pannenberg argues that 
to focus solely on human history is too narrow. One of Pannenberg’s primary 
critiques of Dilthey is that he did not take seriously enough the historical 
character ‘of understanding something handed down from the past.’418 That is, 
human civilisation did not spring up from nothing, but was the result of a 
previous temporal process, one which involved non-human creatures at some 
point. These prior temporal events, while not generally considered part of 
human culture, are nevertheless linked to it, impacting that culture and cannot 
therefore be ignored if one is to present a holistic view of history. To address 
this reality, Pannenberg argues for a modification of Gadamer’s postulated 
infinite spirit, itself adapted from Hegel. As noted, Pannenberg wishes to 
avoid the determinism that accompanies a Hegelian Spirit, seeking to instead 
ground the language of Spirit in the Christian God. Such a move must 
consider this God as the one who ‘in the beginning…created the heavens and 
the earth.’419 If taken from the perspective of such a spirit, and acknowledging 
that human history must be understood in light of what precedes human 
culture, History, then, is broader than the perspective of human persons. It 
should instead be understood from the perspective of God as God observes 
temporal occurrences, from its creation until its end. As has been argued, 
Gadamer’s critique of Dilthey’s position, and the inadequacy of Heidegger’s 
perspective on history (and by extension Bultmann’s perspective) thus leads 
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Pannenberg to suggest history is not defined by a purely human perspective. 
Pannenberg, therefore, offers a different definition of Historie and Geschichte.  
 
3 Redefining Terms: Historie and Geschichte 
 In Anthropology in Theological Perspective, Pannenberg expands upon 
his distinction from Hegel and even from Herder who both hold ‘that the 
understanding of the human person as subject [of history] originated in 
Christianity.’ In the supposedly new philosophy of history offered by Hegel 
and Herder, it remained that their ‘unity of history… presupposed human 
beings to be the active subjects of history,’420 something that has already been 
shown to be inadequate—it does not reach back far enough. What Pannenberg 
labels the ‘post-Hegelian problem,’ that philosophical treatments of history 
were heavily influenced, positively or negatively, by Hegel, resulted in 
humanity being considered the subject of history, and the only valid 
perspective for history. While it is true that Hegel hypothesized an ambivalent 
spirit of history, he nevertheless presumed human actors were still the primary 
focus of history; the Spirit that gave the supposed unity to history was not an 
active agent and was thus inaccessible. Pannenberg continues to explain that  
in the period after Hegel the philosophy of 
history again took a general anthropology as its 
basis. This was the case with Feuerbach and 
even Marx, with Nietzsche and even the early 
Dilthey. In his critique of historical reason 
Dilthey originally aimed at reducing the 





Even Dilthey’s later work, as noted above, took ‘human sciences’ as the basis 
for his ‘hermeneutic’ of history.422 Rather than abandon the concrete structure 
of history, as Pannenberg argues Heidegger and Bultmann did by reducing this 
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history to mere ‘possibilities,’ Pannenberg suggests a return to the older 
Christian concept of history that was not focused on anthropology.
 423
 
 The idea of focusing history upon humans and human action dates 
back at least to Herodotus. However, the revelation of God to the Hebrew 
people suggested the possibility that history should be understood primarily 
from a divine, rather than a human, perspective.
424
 This different perspective 
of history was expanded in early Christianity in light of salvation history. 
Pannenberg notes, for example that, for Irenaeus, ‘Salvation history was not 
tacked on to the concept of the human being but, rather, replaced it.’425 In 
other words, once Christ became incarnate in the person of Jesus, the Christian 
was able to understand history in a way that replaced the human perspective of 
history with the divine perspective of history as God’s redemption of creation. 
 Augustine acknowledges Herodotus’s description of history, but 
nevertheless rejects it. Although history is concerned with ‘human institutions 
of the past…it should not for that reason be counted among human 
institutions.’426 Instead ‘history itself (ipsa historia)’ has God as its author and 
controller.
427
 For Augustine, history relates past temporal events ‘in a faithful 
and useful way’ not limited in scope to human past temporal events.428 This 
Augustinian perspective, notes Pannenberg, was lost entirely in the ‘humanist 
period’ which preceded the German idealists.429 
 In the beginning of the discussion of history in his theological 
anthropology, he asks, 
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Can history be considered part of the shared 
world in which individuals live their lives? Does 
it not have to do, rather, with the coming into 
being and passing away of this shared world, 
and do these processes not take place despite all 
the efforts that human beings make to preserve 
the order of their world against its slow erosion 





Rather than an anthropocentric phenomenon, Pannenberg suggests that history 
is ‘ambivalent’ to the ‘successes and failures’ of human society.431 
 This is not to say, though, that Pannenberg is claiming that we focus on 
Geschichte over Historie or some similar distinction. Rather, in his 
redefinition of history, Pannenberg also seeks to acknowledge the somewhat 
artificial nature of these distinctions in order to speak only of a single history, 
understood in different terms, as the one in which God reveals himself and of 
which we are concerned. In Being and Time, Heidegger locates the initial 
source of the distinction between Historie and Geschichte in the 
correspondence of Wilhelm Dilthey and Count Yorck.
432
 This distinction is 
between the facts or study of history (Historie) and the lived experience, or 
impact, of history (Geschichte).
433
 
 However, as Alejandro Vallega notes, the distinction between 
Geschichte and Historie was made earlier by Martin Kähler.
434
 Of course, 
Kähler was concerned with the distinction between the Historie of the first 
quest for the historical Jesus, and the Geschichte of the Christ of faith, seeking 
to place emphasis on the latter over the former.  
                                                 
430
 ATP, 485. 
 
431
 Ibid., 486. 
 
432
 Being and Time, 449 (German 397). 
 
433
 Ibid., 449-455 (German 397-404). 
 
434
 Alejandro Vallega, ‘“Beyond Historical Thinking”, in Contributions to Philosophy,’ in 
Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, ed. Charles E. Scott, et al. in Studies 





 Pannenberg argues that Historie is limited in its scope to past recorded 
history, and thus only to past events from a human, and therefore finite, 
perspective. In contrast, Geschichte  
has an impetus that takes it beyond the present 
and will in the future reveal the facts of the past 
in a new light, disclose new semantic 
relationships in them. Because of its exclusive 
concern with the past, history [Historie] leaves 
the question of the final meaning or essence of 




In order to arrive at a suitable hermeneutic for history, Geschichte must be 
taken as the primary perspective, in part because Historie alone, can never be 
fully comprehensible because it is limited solely to a finite human’s 
perspective. Meaning ‘can be discovered only with reference to the totality of 
reality,’ which includes, but stretches beyond ‘the total context of human 
experience.’436 Again, Geschichte refers not to a fundamentally different kind 
of history than Historie, but to a different primary perspective of history: that 
of God because only God is capable of comprehending all temporal events as 
a whole. 
 Because of this, Pannenberg concludes that ‘history is not made up, 
therefore, solely of human actions.’437 Instead, ‘every serious theology of 
history refers to God as the determinative power active in historical reality.’438 
The biblical witness as report, mentioned in Pannenberg’s Revelation as 
History,
439
 is a report not of the human interaction with the divine necessarily, 
but of a foundational witness to God’s activity in history.440 
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 God not only possesses the primary perspective from which history is 
understood in Pannenberg’s theology, but also conveys personally the 
unifying factor of creation in a way that humanity is incapable of doing due to 
its finitude. ‘The divine subject which in the Christian theology of history 
guarantees the unity of history cannot be replaced by a human subject—not by 
hypostatized collective subjects nor by the “collective singular” of history 
itself.’441 Ultimately, then, Gadamer’s critique of Dilthey was correct, in that 
Dilthey’s focus was far too narrow, but Gadamer did not move the philosophy 
of history in a distinctly theological direction and was therefore left with 
scepticism about the hermeneutic of history and its ability to grant meaning to 
the whole of history. Divine sovereignty, by giving unity to the flow of 
history, also directs and ‘guides the course of history’ toward its goal. 
Ultimately, such an ‘invasion’ by God is too problematic for ‘the modern 
mind’ which is likely the reason behind its rejection, claims Pannenberg.442 
This is why Dilthey, Gadamer, and Heidegger’s historical hermeneutics failed 
to give a comprehensive account of all of history as a grounding for the 
objective truth that Pannenberg seeks, and the grounding God’s revelation in 
that history would require for Pannenberg. Indeed, Gadamer and Heidegger 
both explicitly reject the idea that there can be a comprehensive account for 
history, suggesting that there is no infinite perspective from which to view all 
of history, one that could only be provided by an infinite figure. Gadamer’s 
and Heidegger’s rejections of a comprehensive view of history, continues 
Pannenberg, is due to the apparent contradiction between human freedom, 
which both philosophies require, and absolute divine sovereignty that a 
comprehensive perspective of history would seem to entail, thus excluding, for 
them, any sense of human freedom.
443
 
 Although Pannenberg argues that the primary locus of God’s presence 
is in the future, he nevertheless claims that the future which ‘is final and 
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definitive is thus present in the relativity and flow of history, [yet] not indeed 
in the mode of finality but in the form of anticipation.’ It should be noted, 
‘anticipation’ here is distinct from Heidegger’s Vorgriff. While Heidegger 
argued that Vorgriff was the closest observable presentation of the future in 
the present, Pannenberg argues that ‘anticipation’ is the result of the actual 
presence of the future within history. Thus Heidegger’s Vogriff is primarily 
the result of speculation, while Pannenberg’s ‘anticipation’ is the human 
response of longing for the future as a result of an empirically observable 




Thus a unity is given between the not-yet-occurred but already-present 
future and the initial divine act: creation. One result of this unity is that history 
is essentially the whole of ‘cosmic time,’ for Pannenberg.445 The nature of this 
future focus, along with the greater implications of the aforementioned unity 
to history and the general theology of history are the subject of the next 
chapter. This not to suggest that the problem of human freedom in connection 
with divine sovereignty, noted by Gadamer and Heidegger, is resolved, only to 
provide us with a direction forward. By incorporating this robust vision of the 
end of history as the unity of all history, which will be described in terms of 
dimensions of time over the next three chapters, we may begin to describe the 
way in which an already complete end to history, which reveals the absolute 
sovereignty of God, does not, by that same token, overwhelm the freedom of 
creation, though this will require a considerable exploration of the nature of 
the goal or end of history. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a critique of Bultmann’s theology of 
revelation and, in doing so, demonstrated a couple of things. First, it showed 
Pannenberg’s close connection with Schelling. Second, it not only solidified 
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the assessment of Pannenberg’s theology as committed to history, but 
highlighted this by defining God’s revelatory actions as historical. This is 
important for our purposes because it means that God’s actions are understood 
in Pannenberg’s theology in such a way that they do not overwhelm the will of 
creation, but rather invite a response, and only in this way constitute 
revelation. Considering the focus on meaning and history, the chapter then 
went on to address the hermeneutical history of Wilhelm Dilthey, and 
rehabilitate his system in light of Gadamer’s critique. In the course of doing 
so, three further arguments were made.  
First, the scope of what constitutes history must be considerably 
expanded, and this will continue to be addressed in the next chapter. Second, 
the idea of a unity to history that occurs at the ‘end of history,’ first alluded to 
with respect to Schelling in the second chapter, was reintroduced, via Dilthey, 
and will continue to be addressed in chapters four and six. Third, Heidegger’s 
sense of Vorgriff was introduced that will also require further explanation in 














CHAPTER FOUR: A THEOLOGY OF HISTORY: THE GOAL OF 
HISTORY 
 
 The concept of the ‘end of history,’ discussed at length in the previous 
chapter, is a difficult one to grasp in Pannenberg’s theology, and it will 
continue to be addressed throughout chapters five and six as well. Moreover, 
we do not need to merely define the end of history, but also to describe our 
relationship, as humans, to that end. We will need to explore the manner in 
which we can speak of the end of history as ‘definite,’ which it must be if we 
are have any hope of labelling certain historical events as divine revelation, 
but nevertheless avoiding a determinism that would fly in the face of our 
driving question: how can we consider God sovereign and humanity free? 
 In order to accomplish this, the present chapter will begin with an 
exploration of theological anthropology as it functions within Pannenberg’s 
theology. Particular attention will be given to humanity’s relationship with the 
end of history, or ‘eschaton.’ After this, the discussion will turn to 
Christology. The reason for this is because of the unique position the historical 
person Jesus has in Christian theology as both a human person and the infinite 
God, who, for this very reason, is the apex of revelation. This revelation is 
found in its most tangible form, for Pannenberg, in the resurrection of Jesus, 
which Pannenberg labels an ‘eschatological event.’ Pannenberg goes so far as 
to declare that, in the resurrection of Jesus, the end of history has been 
revealed in the midst of history. This necessarily leads us to a discussion of the 
end of history, its relationship to eternity, and the extent to which we can 
speak of the end of history as already occurring while still maintaining that 




pick up the conversation where the previous one ended, with a discussion of 
humanity’s relationship to the end of history which means that we begin this 
chapter with anthropology. 
 
1 Anthropology 
 Pannenberg has two primary works related to theological 
anthropology. The first, published initially in 1962, is based largely upon a 
series of lectures delivered between 1959 and 1961, entitled Was ist Der 
Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie. The 
second, Anthropologie in Theologischer Perspektive, was first published in 
1983. Despite the considerable distance between the two, they are in 
remarkable agreement; there is no dramatic shift, as one finds between the 
earlier and later Barth. Indeed, as Ted Peters has noted, Pannenberg is very 
consistent throughout his theological career, and Pannenberg himself notes, in 
the introduction to the latter work, that his later anthropology is an extension 
of the themes first raised in his earlier anthropology.
446
 
 For Pannenberg, anthropology is approached from a perspective of 
‘fundamental theology.’ While fundamental theology has been defined in 
various ways, it is perhaps best to understand it as a philosophical response to 
the historic human condition, particularly as it finds expression through the 
incarnation of Christ, through whom the Church, and thus all subsequent 
theological pursuits, finds validity.
447
 In particular, Pannenberg is likely 
considering fundamental theology of the sort that is explored by Karl Rahner 
who framed it as theology that is concerned primarily with the historical and, 
particularly, the anthropological.
448
 This is distinguished from the dogmatic 
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theology, which is concerned with propositional truths already affirmed by an 
ecclesial body, is less concerned with theology arising a posteriori, and is 
particularly prevalent among the dialectical theologians, by a more explicit 
connection with philosophical approaches to anthropology. Rather than a 
superfluous topic, Pannenberg considers fundamental theology to be essential 
for the development of his greater theological project, especially as it concerns 
the building of a theology of history.
449
 Therefore, it should not go unnoticed 
that the earlier anthropological work was derived from lectures delivered 
during the time of Pannenberg’s work on his ground-breaking Offenbarung als 
Geschichte
450
 or shortly thereafter. 
Anthropology for Pannenberg, like revelation, is understood best in 
historical terms. This is not to say, however, that anthropology has no relation 
to the divine, or is found exclusively in the human experience understood in 
secular terms, as a recent commentator on Pannenberg’s anthropology has 
claimed.
451
 Instead, while Pannenberg takes as his starting point humanity’s 
relation to the world, following not only Dilthey and Heidegger, but also Max 
Scheler, Johann Gottfried Herder, Helmuth Plessner, and Arnold Gehlen. 
Pannenberg claims that humanity cannot find its meaning, its essential 
anthropology, in the finitude of itself or humanity’s experience of the world, 
as discussed in the prior chapter. Instead a proper anthropology is grounded in 
God’s actions within history and from the end of history, exemplified in the 
person and message of Jesus. This is not to suggest that anthropology is 
entirely removed from the current existence of mankind. Rather an interesting 
dynamic emerges between human action and that of the divine, with the result 
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that, for Pannenberg, to speak of anthropology one must also speak of 
salvation. 
 
 1.1 Revisiting Heidegger: Dasein and Authentic Existence 
 Pannenberg opens both of his primary works on anthropology with an 
assessment of the impact that existentialism has had upon philosophical and 
theological anthropology.
452
 Foremost among these influences is Martin 
Heidegger, who exerted considerable influence not only upon Bultmann, but 
also upon Karl Rahner. As noted in the previous chapter, for Heidegger the 
meaning of Dasein,
453
 is found through Vorgriff, yet this term is best 
understood in the context of the related terms Vorhabe and Vorsicht, 
comprising the whole of Dasein. Heidegger argues that Dasein understands 
the world in its ready-to-handedness, that is, present to Dasein ready to be 
utilised and understood by Dasein through Dasein’s being confronted by the 
ready-to-hand world while recognizing the distinction between Dasein and the 
world. This is a result of preconditioning from fore-having (Vorhabe), and 
foreseeing (Vorsicht), which together allow Dasein to have a fore-conception 
(Vorgriff), of the ready-to-hand world.
454
 In other words, in order for Dasein 
to comprehend the world, Dasein is first prepared for it through preparatory 
knowledge of the world gained from prior experiences of the world and 
speculation, or ‘throwness’ of the world as it will be. Dasein makes 
predictions, or is granted future knowledge, concerning the world based upon 
other experiences. These experiences inform the understanding of the world, 
and the events or objects within the world, prior to meeting or confronting 
these objects.  
For Heidegger, interpretation, and thus meaning, of ‘something as 
something’ relies upon the object being grasped via Vorgriff.455 However, 
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because all interpretation, particularly interpretation indicative of Historie has 
presuppositional ready-to-handedness (fore-conception and fore-seeing), it 
lacks sufficient rigor to give meaning to Dasein, unless Vorgriff can somehow 
be made authentic, something neither he, Heidegger, nor Pannenberg 
genuinely thought possible.
456
 That is, Dasein does not encounter the world 
fresh without the presuppositions of interpretation marked by culture that are 
imparted to Dasein, but encounters the world, and in particular when 
encountering the world through the framework of Historie, through these 
cultural presuppositions. Thus an authentic Vorgriff that encounters the world 
only as it is, and not through cultural presuppositions, may not be possible. 
 Nevertheless, Heidegger offers that this inauthenticity of Vorgriff may 
be overcome for Dasein so long as Dasein confronts itself as a whole. This 
‘authentic Being-a-whole of Dasein [is] possible with regard to the unity of its 
articulate structural whole’ via ‘anticipatory resoluteness.’457 This anticipation 
is one of a future which confronts Dasein, such that Dasein finds its authentic 
Being only insofar as Dasein is ‘letting-itself-come-toward-itself’ particularly 
as regards the ‘future as coming towards’ Dasein.458 The interconnectedness 
of Being means, for Heidegger, that authenticity and understanding of Being 
are only possible if Dasein grasps the whole of its Being including its 
completion (as it is presently and will be in the future that is connected to 
present being). The critical component is the confrontation of the future 
completion of Being for Dasein. 
 This future confrontation of Dasein with itself is characterised by 
Heidegger as Dasein’s ‘Being-toward-death’ yielding an ‘authentic’ 
existence.
459
 Thus, it is the future anticipation of death that gives meaning and 
authenticity to the individual or Dasein. The result is that ‘Dasein never “finds 
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itself” except as a thrown fact,’ that is, as a self-throwing its being as present 
Dasein toward its future Being and eventual terminus.
460
 The unity of Dasein 
is granted only from the end of life in the future because of the incomplete 
nature of Dasein at the various modes of past, present, and future existence. 
Heidegger refers to these temporal modes of being as the ‘back-to,’ ‘letting-
oneself-be-encountered-by’ and the ‘toward-oneself’ nature of Dasein’s 
existence, requiring an ecstatic experience. These three dispositions of  
the “towards…”, the “to…”, and the 
“alongside…” make temporality manifest as 
three evkstatiko,n pure and simple. Temporality is 
the primordial “outside-of-itself” in and for 
itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the 
future, the having been, and the Present, the 
“ecstases” of temporality.461  
 
Even though Dasein is characterised by these various ‘ecstases,’ this does not 
constitute authentic Being. Instead the various ecstases serve to stretch Dasein 
between birth and death such that Dasein lacks an authentic existence so long 
as it is found solely in an ‘historicized’ ecstasis.462 It is only through the 
broader, universal Geschichte, characterized as a unified, ecstatic Being, that 
Dasein finds unity, wholeness, and authenticity. This differs substantially 
from what is (for Heidegger) the fragmented facticity of Historie. So strong is 
the distinction between Historie and Geschichte for Heidegger, rooted in the 
correspondence between Dilthey and Count Yorck, that authentic Being can 
only be found in reference to the mode of being that most closely corresponds 
to the future, being ‘toward oneself’ and only insofar as it is simultaneously 
being ‘outside of oneself’ or ecstatically.463 For Heidegger, ‘The primary 
phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future.’464 This 
‘authentic temporality’ found in Geschichte that incorporates the future can be 
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authentic for Dasein presently if Dasein is ‘futural’ in awareness of its own 
fate as finite, that is of Dasein’s ‘Being toward death.’465 Only then does 
Dasein have authentic existence. 
 
 1.2 Modifying Anthropology 
 While Pannenberg finds much he agrees with in Heidegger’s 
anthropology, he finds it lacking in a few areas. Although it may be tempting 
to suggest that the commonality between Pannenberg and Heidegger is rooted 
in Heidegger’s concurrence with the later Schelling, or the influence of Duns 
Scotus, such influences are not prevalent within Heidegger until his later 
philosophy, only recently published as his Contributions to Philosophy (From 
Enowning).
466
 Pannenberg does see something of value in Heidegger’s initial 
major work, Being and Time, in both the description Dasein, and the priority 
given to the future. However, even at this basic level significant modification 
is necessary for Pannenberg.  
For Pannenberg, the history that grants meaning to Dasein, the one in 
which God acts, must be the same history as is studied by historians.
467
 The 
distinction between Geschichte and Historie, first suggested by Kähler is 
artificial.
468
 For Pannenberg, a human is essentially an historical being, not in 
an history external or above the detailed facts of human existence, but 
precisely in the midst of them, and this history also comprises the realm of 
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God’s revelatory actions. Only in such a concept of history can anthropology 
truly begin for Pannenberg.
469
 
Pannenberg also disputes Heidegger’s notion of the world as ‘ready-to-
hand.’ Instead, argues Pannenberg, one of the fundamental distinctions 
between humanity and the animals is that humanity creates and modifies the 
world to make it ‘ready-to-hand’ rather than experiencing, or seeking to 
experience, the world as ‘ready-to-hand’ without this manipulation. ‘Only 
subsequently, by building a cultural world, an artificial world, does man 
prepare his surroundings in such a way that they become something ready-to-
hand for him.’470 This concept, which Pannenberg derives in part from 
Scheler, means that a human ‘has the world’ while an animal is ‘in the 
world.’471 Heidegger’s notion of the world granting meaning and ready-to-
handedness through the Vorgriff fails, in large part, because Vorgriff is 
grounded in the world, which Pannenberg demonstrates is the case not only in 
Heidegger’s writing, but through tracing the origin of the concept to Aristotle, 
where it explicitly functions in this way.
472
  
If the ‘ready-to-hand’-edness of the world is only the result of a 
cultural construct, which is made out of the world, then ‘the world is never 
able to give a definitive’ account of a human’s Bestimmung in this manner.473 
The result of humanity’s inability to find a suitable Bestimmung through 
constructs from the world is that every human is pushed to find Bestimmung 
‘beyond every horizon that opens’ to him or her.474 This experience of moving 
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beyond the constructs of humanity Pannenberg labels ‘openness to the world,’ 
in which each person is ‘completely directed into the “open.” He is always 
open further, beyond every experience and beyond every given situation. He is 
also open beyond the world,’ to a great destiny (Bestimmung).475 The language 
here is clearly that of Arnold Gehlen, who was influenced significantly by 
Max Scheler. Gehlen, like Pannenberg, argues that the distinguishing factor of 
humanity is its ‘world openness’ and that humans ‘create’ a world that only 
then becomes ready-to-hand.
476
 However, rather than examining Gehlen, who 
is building upon the work of Scheler, let us first examine any additional areas 
of consonance between Scheler and Pannenberg to gain additional insight. 
In agreement with Scheler, Pannenberg notes that, since the cultural 
constructs of our experience of the world are inadequate, a human is pushed to 
relate to something beyond the external world.
477
 As Scheler puts it, ‘every 
man must needs have an “object of faith”, and every man performs an act of 
faith.’478 Yet, in contrast to Scheler, Pannenberg does not believe that this 
drive can be entirely a ‘creation of man’ because, claims Pannenberg, 
‘something else always precedes all imaginative activity in the formation of 
religions.’479 Faith, Pannenberg argues elsewhere, must be built upon some 
basis of knowledge or authentically external encounter; otherwise, it is 
‘gullible-ness.’480 Eventually, because of the necessity of an external 
encounter that is required for man to have Bestimmung, even the concept of 
‘openness to the world’ proves inadequate as Pannenberg suggests it may be 
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more profitable to consider Helmuth Plessner’s reformulation of Scheler’s and 
Gehlen’s concept of Bestimmung as the egocentric and exocentric tension 
within man, rather than openness alone.
481
 For Plessner, humans are distinct in 
that they relate to others through an ‘exocentric’ relationship of which other 
animals are incapable. That is, humans can exercise empathy to such an extent 
that they can understand the other from that persons point of view. Humans 
share in common with animals an ‘egocentric’ tendency, understanding others 
as they relate to one’s self from one’s own perspective or introspection, yet 
humans cannot find meaning or authenticity only in themselves.
482
 
It is, in part, this exocentric capacity of humanity that causes 
Pannenberg to question how the Dasein can be understood, for Heidegger, by 
the Vorgriff of one’s death.483 Indeed, it seems that there is a circularity to 
finding one’s unity and meaning solely in anticipation of one’s very own 
Being, or, more correctly, the end of one’s Being. Instead, human life should 
be understood as corporate and in community, which Pannenberg correctly 
notes may find expression in Martin Buber’s ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ relationship.484 To 
be sure, Heidegger does introduce an ‘ecstatic’ element that bears some 
resemblance to this exocentricy, and allows for some connection of Dasein to 
the surrounding elements of Dasein’s Beng. Yet Heidegger’s account is still 
far too circularly self-focused from Pannenberg’s reading. However, for 
Plessner, the exocentric relationship lacks a concern for the future element and 
is more concerned with the self confronting its own self (from outside of the 
self) at the present with no reference to the future.
485
 Pannenberg, along with 
Heidegger and others, agree that the person existing in the present alone, 
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without respect to the future, cannot grant the meaning to one’s life that 
Plessner’s (and Gehlen’s) use of exocentricity promise.  
A possible remedy to this may be to engage with Max Scheler’s 
development of the concept via ‘spirit.’ To be sure, Scheler’s move 
incorporates the concept of a fixed future that confronts the present self 
exocentrically, and some commentators on Pannenberg’s theological 
anthropology suggest that this is precisely what Pannenberg does.
486
 However, 
Pannenberg is clear that he cannot follow Scheler’s ‘spirit’ because he finds its 
application to a holistic theology of history to be far too deterministic with its 
use of what Pannenberg considers indistinguishable from an Aristotelian ‘final 
cause.’ 487 Instead, Pannenberg moves to provide his own modification of 
Gehlen’s anthropology, focusing upon Gehlen’s use of ‘action.’ 
For Gehlen, ‘it is crucial for man’s survival that his needs and impulses 
function in the direction of action, knowledge, and anticipation’; only in this 
way can the human truly relate to the external world.
488
 This is not to say that 
Plessner’s emphasis on the present reality is altogether mistaken, only that 
both an immediate and future orientation are needed. As Gehlen puts it, 
Man must possess the ability to break through 
the boundaries of an immediate situation, to 
direct himself toward the future and what is not 
present, and to act accordingly…. Man thereby 
becomes “Prometheus,” simultaneously 




Humanity can embrace Bestimmung, suggests Gehlen, through applying 
present knowledge toward anticipation. For Gehlen, taking such action allows 
                                                 
486
 F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to 
Relationality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 133-134; and F. LeRon Shults, The 
Postfoundationalist Task of Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), ch. 3 
 
487
 ATP, 38-41. 
 
488
 Gehlen, Man, 44-45, italics added. 
 
489
 Ibid., 41. The reference to Prometheus may be a passing one to Nietzsche or Marx, though 
Ernst Bloch, who will be discussed below, suggests Nietzsche and Marx both may have 
derived it from Schelling’s lectures that eventually comprised the latter’s Spätphilosophie. See 
Ernst Bloch, Zwischen-Welten in der Philosophie-Geschichte in Ernst Bloch Gesamtausgabe 





humanity to relate both to the ‘external world’ as it is and toward a ‘common 
future’ as a result of the exocentric aspect to human existence.490 Yet 
Pannenberg’s eventual development of the idea that humanity finds identity in 
future oriented action has roots that extend beyond Gehlen, in Johann 
Gottfried Herder. 
 Herder was, according to Pannenberg, the first to seriously present an 
evolutionary-based anthropology that also exhibited a scepticism that human 
nature could perfect itself without the need for an intervening external force.
491
 
To be sure, Herder still claimed that perfection was possible, gained, in part, 
through rigorous education, but it was Herder’s introduction of the idea of 
God as providing the impetus for humanity’s self-improvement that stands as 
an important development for Pannenberg.
492
  
Herder grounds his view of humanity in evolution, one which he 
describes as necessarily taking into account cosmic history prior to humanity, 
but he nevertheless suggests that God intervenes to supply additional instincts 
in humanity that are not present in other creatures.
493
 Mankind was not left ‘to 
murderous chance,’ as Herder puts it, because a thing ‘cannot fashion 
itself.’494 Instead, God made us predisposed toward an unseen end that is not 
yet present, a future destiny.
495
 The result is that, as Herder puts it, ‘we are not 
yet men, but are daily becoming so.’496 
 Herder acknowledged that human perfection requires an external 
motivating factor, something that makes him slightly more sceptical of 
humanity’s inherent ability than his predecessors. Yet Pannenberg notes that 
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Herder ‘underestimated’ the destructive nature of sin. Herder understood 
morally evil people to be a disfiguration of humanity, and not as a ‘destructive 
contradiction of their very humanness itself.’497 Positively, Pannenberg notes 
that the common theme among Herder, Gehlen, and Plessner is an internal 




Drawing from this and his earlier work, Pannenberg contends that the 
human person is both historical and ‘exocentric’ to the point of being open not 
only to the world, but something beyond its present existence. For 
Pannenberg, this means that an authentic existence for an individual can only 
be found in some other future beyond the finite world of an individual’s 
life.
499
 If this is not the case, then the result is a highly subjective view of 
humanity, one that changes for each person—the very thing Pannenberg 
rejects from Heidegger’s account of Dasein.500 Instead, authentic existence 
relies upon the unity of humanity, which in turn relies upon the unity of 
cosmic history. As Pannenberg puts it, ‘because human beings are exocentric 
beings who experience themselves only via their world, they can become 
aware of the unity of their own Dasein only along with the unity of the 
world.’501 For Pannenberg, the unity of the present world must rest outside 
that present, and not merely in the ‘narration’ of individual history, as is the 
case in Dilthey’s scheme.502 Dilthey was correct to emphasise that historical 
knowledge can only come at the end of an event, or else the event loses its 
contingent and open character, but, because of the interwovenness of an 
individual with society, as discussed in the previous chapter, the unity that is 
                                                 
497
 ATP, 58. 
 
498
 ATP, 66-72. 
 
499
 ATP, 486. 
 
500
 ATP, 502. 
 
501
 ATP, 516. 
 
502









 The difficulty comes, of course, in the fact that the ‘end of history’ is 
inaccessible to finite humans. It occurs outside ‘the stream of [individual] 
history.’504 Thus, a finite person can only find knowledge of his or her 
historical self in that which is beyond the finite. No anticipation of death, as in 
Heidegger, is sufficient, as such an account is still grounded in the finitude of 
humanity.
505
 Mere anticipation is insufficient, as it is still grounded in the 
finitude of humanity. Instead, faith as trust in something external and 
authentically existing must serve as the grounding for a thoroughgoing 
anthropology.
506
 An individual’s death serves not to unify history, but only 
further fragment human existence, while God acts as the one who unifies the 
fragmented existence of each particular history into a single unified history.
507
 
In this way, God acts as the unifying reality for all of history.  
Yet by referring to God as the unifying reality Pannenberg treads very 
close to determinism, since, by suggesting a present unity to history, it 
suggests that future events may already be settled within that unity.
508
 
Pannenberg, believes he may avoid this problem by speaking of God as 
existing solely in the future. Thus, ‘God is…no object’ in the present reality 
upon which to fix trust.
509
 The relationship between a unifying and fixed ‘end 
of history,’ that serves to unify all of history thus granting humanity authentic 
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existence, will be explored at the end of this chapter and throughout the 
following two chapters. For now, we may note that Pannenberg’s future 
orientation is not merely a recapitulation of the futurity found in Dilthey and 
Heidegger.
510
 The future to which Pannenberg looks extends beyond that 
suggested by either Dilthey or Heidegger to include all of humanity.  
We may summarise Pannenberg’s anthropology by arguing that an 
individual person finds authentic existence only in the future of God’s 
unification of history. Therefore, it is not merely in ‘openness to the world,’ 
but in ‘openness to the future’ that is beyond all historical times where 
mankind can locate ‘his destiny, which is community with God.’511 Still, as 
discussed above, it is not merely imagination or anticipation of the future, but 
actual trust in the future as an already defined event that must serve to ground 
the individual’s own Being at present. Humans, as historical beings, must 
therefore encounter the future God in the midst of history. This is done, argues 





 2.1 Beginning From Below 
In relation to Christology, Pannenberg does not go the route typically 
taken by dogmatic theologians, which seeks to explain how the infinite 
became a finite person. If meaning is to be found historically, and if by 
historical we mean not only Geschichte but also Historie, then our Christology 
cannot be what is typically labelled ‘from above.’ Additionally, according to 
Pannenberg, the typical ‘from above’ Christology does not say much 
constructive. Since it presupposes the divinity of Jesus, the very thing, 
according to Pannenberg, that is the goal of Christology. It also presupposes 
the viewpoint of God and thus can only speak speculatively, never saying 
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 While one may say that such a Christology merely has 
faith as its starting point, without some sort of external justification, 
Pannenberg argues that such faith is the height of gullibility, in terms 
discussed above with respect to anthropology.
514
 In keeping with 
Pannenberg’s argument that theology, understood as a science, must engage in 
a new methodology, grounded in history, Jesus should be known first as the 
historical person. It is only ‘in the light of the historical particularity of Jesus 
himself’ that we can begin to understand God.515 
While Pannenberg acknowledges that his is not the first ‘from below’ 
Christology, noting Albrecht Ritschl and Bultmann as significant 
predecessors, he also claims that such Christologies often lose a strong sense 
of the divine, which is better preserved in ‘from above’ Christology, or else 
take soteriology as their starting point, thus simply pushing the question of 
gullible faith back one step.
516
 Indeed, these criticisms that Pannenberg notes 
of prior Christologies ‘from below’ parallel those made of his own position by 
Colin Gunton.
517
 However, it is a mistake to categorize Pannenberg’s attempt 
together with other prior attempts at a Christology ‘from below.’ For example, 
in distinction from both Ritschl and Bultmann, Pannenberg argues that 
soteriology cannot be the beginning of Christology since ‘the divinity of Jesus 
remains the presupposition for his saving significance for us and, conversely, 
the saving significance of his divinity is the reason why we take interest in the 
question of his divinity.’518 While there may be a presupposition of Jesus’ 
saving work that causes us to embark on a Christology, such a presupposition 
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 That is, we cannot argue from his saving work to his 
divinity, because the saving work of Jesus is predicated upon his divinity. To 
reverse the order, as is done in the ‘from below’ Christologies that Pannenberg 
surveys, is fallacious on a fundamental level. Thus we must take interest in 
Jesus as historical person first, independent of his saving significance.
520
 
At this point, it should be noted that Pannenberg’s ‘from below’ 
methodology is not as radical in Jesus-God and Man as it is often labelled.
521
 
While it is true that the historical figure Jesus acts as his starting point, 
Pannenberg is unwilling to discount every aspect of ‘from above’ Christology, 
going to the point of noting that ‘one cannot claim that the incarnational 
Christology which has ruled the history of the development of Christological 
doctrine was simply a mistake.’522 Thus, contrary to the often-cited study by 
Elizabeth Johnson, there was no radical shift between the first and fifth 
German editions of Grundzüge der Christologie.
523
 The afterword to the fifth 
German edition is, by Pannenberg’s own admission, merely a clarification that 
‘from below’ Christology is merely the overarching framework from which 
the book begins.
524
 Instead, Pannenberg’s Christology has always been one 
that moves ‘from below’ to encompass the claims of a ‘from above’ 
Christology—he begins epistemically ‘from below’ to arrive at a more 
comprehensive, and more firmly argued, ‘from above’ position. The question 
remains, though, as to whether Pannenberg can give the appropriate historical 
grounding for the future presence of God in Jesus, thus preserving 
‘Chalcedonian duality.’ Said differently, is Pannenberg justified in moving 
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 Wolfhart Pannenberg, ‘Afterward,’ trans. Duane A. Preibe, in Jesus—God and Man, trans. 





from ‘from below’ historical study of Jesus to ‘from above’ presuppositions 
regarding the future divine presence in Jesus? 
 
 2.2 The Resurrection of Jesus 
 Pannenberg argues that, in the historical person of Jesus, the future of 
God has already appeared. However, contrary to the arguments of the majority 
of those in the revitalized Quest for the Historical Jesus, Pannenberg argues 
that the future is not present most fundamentally in the message of Jesus.
525
 
To be sure, there is certainly an eschatological emphasis present in the 
message of Jesus, and the emphasis on the future characteristic of Jesus’ 
preaching, as noted by Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer, is a correct 
one.
526
 Yet, for the future oriented message of Jesus to have any validity, it 
must have a future confirmation.
527
 In other words, an eschatological event is 
required to confirm the eschatological message of Jesus and his claim to 
authority. It is precisely at this point that Pannenberg begins to make a radical 
claim. 
 Pannenberg argues that the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the both the 
confirmation of his message, and the eschatological end-of-the-world event 
where God meets humanity.
528
 In Jesus ‘the unity of history is established by 
the appearance of the end of all events through God’s revelation.’529 This unity 
occurs in Jesus fundamentally in his historical resurrection.
530
 As Pannenberg 
puts it in the context of his Christology, ‘if Jesus has been raised, then the end 
of the world has begun.’531 The argument here is twofold. 
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 First, Pannenberg makes the case that the resurrection of Jesus, if it 
actually occurred, could best be understood by the early church as an 
eschatological event. According to Pannenberg,  
Jesus’ expectation [of future confirmation] was 
not directed toward…a privately experienced 
resurrection for the dead, but toward the 
imminent universal resurrection of the dead…. 
Then when his disciples were confronted by the 
resurrected Jesus, they no doubt understood this 
as the beginning of the universal resurrection of 





In other words, the resurrection of Jesus was first understood in the context of 
Jewish apocalypticism that saw a general resurrection of the dead as an 
occurrence at the end of the world. Only later, continues Pannenberg, would 
the disciples argue that the resurrection of Jesus was a unique event that stands 
distinct from the general resurrection of the dead.
533
 
 The second part of the argument is historical in nature. In order for 
Pannenberg to affirm the unity of Historie and Geschichte and the necessity of 
a ‘from below’ Christology, Pannenberg must make the case that the 
resurrection is verifiable as an historical event. Pannenberg offers such a 
proof in Jesus—God and Man, and then expands upon it in a later essay.534 I 
will not take the time here to give an analysis of Pannenberg’s historical 
argument for our purpose in this thesis is not to validate the claim that 
resurrection actually did occur historically, but to see how this claim relates to 
our purpose of building an historical theology in order to address the tension 
between divine sovereignty and human freedom. Indeed, given the conditions 
of verification that Pannenberg himself lays out, it is difficult to suggest that 
we do have much epistemic basis for accepting this claim. Still, we might 
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understand the underlying thrust of his claim to be that, at the very least, the 
resurrection of Jesus is subject to historical scrutiny and acts as the primary 
historical grounding for the method of the discipline of theology as a science. 
As Pannenberg says more plainly elsewhere, Jesus’ resurrection must ‘be 
taken seriously, historically speaking.’535 
Rather than distinct from anthropology, though, such a Christology 
gives the needed grounding for the anthropology. If the authentic Being of 
Dasein is established by the unity of history given at history’s end, then it 
becomes vitally important for our self-understanding that the end of history 
has appeared in the resurrection of Jesus. ‘The unity of history is established,’ 
Pannenberg concludes his initial anthropology, ‘by the appearance of the end 
of all events through God’s revelation in Jesus.’536 Said again in his 
Christology, ‘as God’s revelation, Jesus is at the same time the revelation of 
human nature and of the destiny [Bestimmung] of man.’537 Not only is the 
destiny of humanity revealed, but the ultimate revelation of God himself is 
found in the resurrection of Christ. 
The resurrection of Jesus, for Pannenberg, thus proves to be revelatory 
and salvific. It is revelatory in that it confirms Jesus’ eschatological message 
of the Kingdom of God and establishes the unity of Jesus with God the father, 
and that, in the person of Jesus, we have seen the fullness of God understood 
as historical actor. That is, Jesus did not suddenly become the Son of God, but 
was revealed historically to have always been the Son.
538
 In this way we may 
say that Jesus as historical person is epistemically prior to us, while Jesus as 
the pre-existent logos is ontologically prior for us.  
The conflation of the ontological and the epistemic, that which is the 
case and the way we know that it is the case, respectively, is a common 
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problem in critiques of Pannenberg’s methodology here.539 The human 
understanding that builds our hypothesis must begin with the finite and only 
then move toward the infinite, though never actually obtaining it. However, 
this does not negate the ontological priority of Christ’s existence as the Son 
‘eternally begotten’ prior to the historical observation of the man Jesus. The 
resurrection does not make Jesus into God, but reveals that it had already been 
the case that God was in Jesus, reconciling the world to himself. 
Further, it is the resurrection that is salvific for Pannenberg, and not, 
and least not directly, the cross.
540
 Pannenberg explicitly rejects the traditional 
idea of substitutionary atonement as well as satisfaction theories of the 
atonement.
541
 Instead a modified substitutionary atonement model, that takes 
into account anthropology, is given. For Pannenberg, all humanity, in all times 
and places, is, by Jesus’ actions, placed before ‘the God who is coming.’542  
In the resurrection, Jesus is not understood as a determining force that 
of necessity brings the world into relation with God; Jesus ‘is not the law, but 
the reconciler of the cosmos.’543 Pannenberg brings the concepts with which 
this chapter has been concerned, anthropology, Christology and history, 
together in a description of the redemptive effects of Jesus’ resurrection: 
The world process as a whole, however, is a 
unique succession of events. Its entire set of 
interrelationships cannot, therefore, be 
understood in terms of law…. Because the total 
process of the world is a unique and irreversible 
course of events, even contemporary natural 
science does not speak of this total process as 
the test case of a law embracing the whole, but 
speaks of a history of nature…. Therefore, one 
can probably speak of a history of nature only 
with reference to man—who belongs to nature 
himself, after all—but hardly apart from man. 
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However, because the history of mankind 
achieves unity only light of the eschatological 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ, in the final 
analysis it is Jesus who embraces the world 




Thus, Jesus grants a unity to the ‘world process’ of events, and to humanity 
itself. The future is laid out before each individual, but it is ‘only he who gives 
up his life for the ultimate, eschatological reality of the Kingdom of God that 
has appeared in Jesus [who] will find his life ultimately saved.’545 Yet this 
only introduces further avenues that require explanation. In particular, the 
relationship between our present and God’s eternity, as well as the 
eschatological end that unifies the world-process of history, as well as 
particular individuals, must be further explored. Chapter six will revisit the 
doctrine of salvation in Pannenberg’s theology of history and interpret it in 
light of the development of the concept of the ‘end of history’ and the 
temporal field of history. 
 
3 Time and Eternity 
 3.1 The Kingdom of God as Eschatological Kingdom and Present 
Reality 
 Pannenberg continues his discussion of the end of history and its 
meaning for the Christian at present in a group of essays published together as 
Theology and the Kingdom of God.
546
 This work, of course, must be taken in 
light of Pannenberg’s statements on the resurrection of Jesus, which, as has 
been established, was the ‘unique break-in of the reality of the end-time’ into 
our history.
547
 The impact of the in-breaking of the future into human history, 
as well as some of the additional influences upon Pannenberg with respect to 
his emphasis on futurity, will be examined in this section. 
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 Pannenberg opens this work by observing that much of twentieth 
century theology has been eschatological in nature. Yet Pannenberg observes 
that while dialectical theology used eschatology as a ‘slogan,’ it remains that 
‘for Bultmann and for the young Barth, Jesus’ eschatology is timeless and 
deprived of its temporal meaning. Dialectical theology disregarded Jesus’ 
message about the Kingdom of God as an expectation regarding the concrete 
future.’548  
 Elsewhere, Pannenberg credits Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer 
with rediscovering the eschatological emphasis of Jesus’ message.549 
Schweitzer’s claim was insufficiently developed, though, as it focused on the 
message of Jesus rather than the fact of the resurrection, eventually becoming 
dehistoricized by dialectical theologians on the one hand, while Weiss’s claim 
follows a pathway nearly identical to Herder when he argues that ‘the 
Kingdom of God will be established’ by human effort. Instead, argues 
Pannenberg, it will be brought about ‘by God alone. The coming of the 
Kingdom will involve cosmic revolutions and change far beyond anything 
conceivable as a consequence of man’s progressive labor.’550 For Pannenberg, 
the Kingdom of God is ‘ontologically grounded’ in the future, thus also giving 
primacy to an authentic and concrete future.
551
  
As already intimated in this chapter, the ‘imminent Kingdom of God,’ 
understood as future, ‘precedes every Christology and every new qualification 
of human existence and thus becomes the foundation for both.’552 In light of 
the resurrection as the confirmation of God’s future presence in the historic 
person of Jesus, more can be said about the relationship between God’s future 
and human existence. ‘Only in light of this future’ of God’s imminent 
Kingdom  
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can we understand man and his history. God’s 
rule is not simply in the future, leaving men to 
do nothing but wait quietly for its arrival. No, it 
is a mark of Jesus’ proclamation of the Kingdom 





Thus, contrary to Oscar Cullman, for Pannenberg, the Kingdom of God is not 
merely inaugurated now to be fulfilled at some later date, but is a future that is 
imminently here in the message of Christ for Pannenberg.
554
 
 The result, then, is something of a reversal of causality. If the future is 
present in the message of the Kingdom of God, confirmed at the resurrection, 
and God’s Kingdom or his rule as God is eschatological, then, by virtue of the 
end being already present, causation flows not from past to future, but in the 
opposite direction.
555
 However, Pannenberg is well aware of the difficulty that 
such a reversal to the flow of causation can have for the idea of human 
freedom, and so must qualify it extensively, as the rest of this chapter will do 
as it also explores the implications this has for the present existence of God.  
Pannenberg expounds upon his meaning here by initially noting that, in 
ancient mythologies, the gods were identical with their power. In the same 
way, Pannenberg argues, the Christian ‘God’s being and existence cannot be 
conceived apart from his rule.’556 The result of such a line of thinking is that, 
for Pannenberg, ‘it is necessary to say that, in a restricted but important sense, 
God does not yet exist. Since his rule and his being are inseparable, God’s 
being is still in the process of coming to be.’557 This radical claim, which will 
be revisited in the next two chapters as well, would mean that in the same 
‘restricted but important sense,’ Pannenberg’s theology amounts to a kind of 
atheistic Christianity. To help make sense of this, let us turn to the atheistic 
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philosopher of hope, Ernst Bloch, who was highly influential upon 
Pannenberg’s own eschatology. 
 
 3.2 ‘Atheist Christians’ 
Ernst Bloch, in the frontpiece to his work Atheismus im Christentum, 
states that ‘only an atheist can be a good Christian; only a Christian can be a 
good atheist.’558 While Bloch’s utopian philosophy has had considerable 
impact upon twentieth century theology, the impact of his philosophy is 
particularly relevant as it pertains to the theologies of both Pannenberg and 
Jürgen Moltmann. Pannenberg later admits that it is Bloch’s philosophy that 
he had in mind during much of the composition of the titular essay in 
Theology and the Kingdom of God.
559
 Given the admitted influence of Bloch 
upon Pannenberg, it will be helpful to briefly analyse some areas of 
congruence. 
Similar to Pannenberg, Bloch decries the demythologizing of the 
biblical text done by Bultmann. Instead, Bloch argues ‘we do not cry out for 
the bible to be “demythologized” to its “kerygma” but for it be detheocratized, 
and so make the bible a saving text.’560 Jesus was the Messiah bringing in the 
Utopian Kingdom, continues Bloch, but not in an ‘otherworldly’ sense. 
Instead, he sought to bring a concrete future utopia in the present now.
561
 
Jesus, Bloch argues, was a type of Prometheus, giving freedom to the masses, 
but overtaken by those around him. While Prometheus was bound in chains, 
Jesus was crucified upon wood.
562
 Nevertheless through Jesus’ ‘Vor-scheinen’ 
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(fore-seeing), and the title ‘Son of Man,’ he is able to simultaneously identify 
with humanity and bring the concrete utopian future to them.
563
 For Bloch, 
there is an authenticity and concreteness to the Vor-scheinen that makes a 
claim upon the present by virtue of its concrete nature. 
The language of fore-seeing, is built upon the same linguistic root that 
Pannenberg utilises in his analysis of ‘Appearance as the Arrival of the 
Future.’ There, Pannenberg, though he uses the unhyphenated ‘Erscheinen,’ 
begins with an etymology reminiscent of Heidegger, on the one hand, but 
more so of Bloch’s use of ‘Vor-scheinen,’ on the other.564 Heidegger uses 
appearance, ‘Vor-scheinen,’ to mean the ‘announcement’ of Being, but not the 
actual presence of Being or any authentic existence of Dasein, which, as 
already discussed, finds its greatest fulfilment in the future.
565
 In contrast to 
Heidegger, Pannenberg argues that the already authentic and concrete 
existence of a future reality is ‘identical’ with its present appearance, though 
he admits there is still a being or essence beyond this appearance.
566
 Here, 
Pannenberg has moved closer to Bloch than Heidegger. Yet Pannenberg 
modifies the idea of Vorscheinen toward a yet different goal that does not 
entail an eschatological atheism.
567
  
Still, in both Pannenberg and Bloch, it remains that the future brings 
about the past and present in a contingent manner. For Bloch, this means that 
the future creates the present while still functioning as an ‘open system,’ an 
idea that can be traced back to Freidrich Schelling, for whom Bloch expressed 
admiration.
568
 Pannenberg, in contrast, argues that there is an intentionality to 
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the future’s actions, something absent in Bloch, that does not compromise the 
‘contingency of present events’ if one views this in light of faithfulness as 
understood to describe the Christian God.
569
 For Pannenberg, ‘the future is not 
an empty category,’ but is occupied by a subject who relates to our present as 




 3.3 Redefining the Term ‘God’ 
Returning to the fundamental problem of our thesis, Pannenberg 
argues that the existence of God in his complete omnipotence at the present 
would destroy any hint of human freedom. This means that God, in his 
fullness, as the ‘absolute in the mode of being present at hand is no longer 
thinkable.’571 This line of thought, taken together with Pannenberg’s earlier 
claim that ‘God does not yet exist,’ suggests, among other things, that we must 
redefine what we mean by ‘God,’ if the term is to have any positive use in the 
present.
572
 Therefore, reasons Pannenberg, we should not be ‘surprised or 
embarrassed’ by the atheistic claim that God is not here. ‘Obviously, if the 
mode of God’s being is interlocked with the coming of his rule,’ then it stands 
‘that God cannot be “found” somewhere in the present reality.’573 Giving an 
ontological priority to the future instead of the present, though gives ‘the word 
“God”…a new concreteness,’ found solely in the future.574 Pannenberg may 
reject the atheism of Bloch in the absolute sense, but there remains a ‘hidden 
God’ that exists in an absolute sense only at history’s end.575 
This does not mean, though, that we conceive of God only as the 
‘power from the future.’ One must still hold to the contingency of the future in 
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order to preserve the category of future as future. To speak of the future is 
speak of something which is open and contingent.
576
 For Pannenberg, such a 
‘contingency of events [of the future] is a crucial presupposition for 
understanding the future as personal, and to speak of God is to speak of a 
personal power.’577 Rather than de-personalising our understanding of God, as 
one might assume speaking of God from the future would do, the future 
personalises God, as I explain below. It is, at least in part, for this reason that 
Pannenberg notes ‘the idea of the future as a mode of God’s being is still 
undeveloped in theology despite the intimate connection between God and the 
coming reign of God in the eschatological message of Jesus.’578 For our 
purposes, this means that God’s sovereignty and human freedom are no longer 
to be considered as two distinct theological claims, both of which must be 
independently supported before forming a consonance with each other. 
Instead, God can only exist as sovereign God from the future, and still be a 
personal God, if humans are free at the present and in the time leading up to 
that future. 
Pannenberg elaborates. To understand events as contingent is a 
necessary condition for understanding God as personal. If an event is 
contingent and not personal then our description of history may simply ‘refer 
to the apparently erratic character of happenings.’579 Still, contingency is not 
enough to assume a ‘personal quality’ to events. ‘The required additional 
factor is the identity of the power that is operative in a series of contingent 
events, a unity behind contingent self-expressions. This unity acquires identity 
by exhibiting some meaningful connection in the sequence of events.’580 Thus, 
for the Christian, ‘the future is neither empty category nor bundle of chances. 
It also presupposes that there is a single future for all events. To speak of the 
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definitive unity of the world means that all events are moving ahead to meet, 
finally, a common future.’581 The extent to which we can speak of a contingent 
future when God already exists as the common future of all creation will 
continue to be addressed, but more explicitly in the coming two chapters. 
From Pannenberg’s claim, we can conclude that unity is established, at 
least in part, by the commonality of the future for all entities. This is the case 
because the future that confronts each person now in his or her particularity is 
also the same future that confronted all previous past events. If God is the 




This unity is only possible as a personal unity, that is as a unity that 
results from non-random events, if God is taken to be that unity to which all 
creatures at all times are confronted. The Kingdom of God, as Jesus’ 
eschatological message, ‘implies that the unity of the world is be expected 
from its future’ and this is not ‘in terms of an eternal cosmos but as something 
to be achieved by a process of reconciling previous schisms and 
contradictions. Reconciliation is a constitutive aspect of creation.’583 It is in 
this way that the future creates the present and past, and thus has ontological 
priority, by reconciling all events into a unity. In doing so, God, as the 
personal power of the future, establishes his sovereignty, but not in a way to 
disrupt the freedom of creatures. Pannenberg explains that 
Three ideas are essential here: unity, the future, 
and sovereignty. Sovereignty establishes unity. 
The coming of God to his sovereignty over the 
world is his gift to the world, unifying its 
scattered events. The coming of God also means 
that God has the power over the future of those 
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History is moving toward a unity, and this unity is established by God’s rule. 
That is ‘unity and power belong together.’585 God does not exist in his fullness 
at present, then, because God is a personal power and God has yet to establish 
that power through the unification of all events. Still, it does not remain that 




 For Pannenberg, God’s primary, or absolute, existence as the personal 
power from the future ‘does not mean that God is only in the future and was 
not in the past or is not in the present.’587 Instead God, as eternal being, exerts 
a causal influence upon the presently existing world, all the while not 
presently existing himself because, as has been mentioned, were God to be 
fully manifest in his infinite sovereignty presently, it would not leave room for 
individual freedom of finite creatures. As Pannenberg states 
If God is to be thought of in this way as the 
future event of even the most distant past, then 
he existed before our present and before every 
present, although he will definitively 
demonstrate his deity only in the future of his 
kingdom. He existed as the future that has been 
powerful in every present. Thus, the futurity of 
God implies his eternity. But it is one thing to 
conceive eternity as timelessness or as the 
endless endurance of something that existed 
since the beginning of time, and quite another to 





For God, then, ‘eternity is not timeless.’589  
 Instead, Pannenberg’s conception of eternity necessarily includes time. 
In redefining God as the personal power of the future, Pannenberg moves to 
redefine eternity as well. Eternity ‘is moved into a larger understanding of 
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reality that does not omit the temporal dynamics from the idea of eternity.’590 
Robert John Russell describes this aspect of Pannenberg’s theology as a 
‘temporal thickness’ to eternity.591 Time does not stop, but takes on a new 
character at the end of history. Russell’s interpretation of Eternity will be 
explored in more detail at toward the end of this chapter.  
For now, the salient point is that one need not give up the historical 
action of God by describing the temporal context of his existence as ‘eternal.’ 
Rather, it is the case, argues Pannenberg, that past, present, and future are 
unified together in the ‘ultimate eschatological future,’ and by this unification 
God may act as the God of the future of every past event.
592
 The way that God 
is able to both act upon temporal events, and by doing so exert his power as 
Creator, and unify everything as the God of the future can only be considered 
possible if we understand God’s actions as either determinative, or motivated 
from love. 
 
 3.4 God is Love 
 For Pannenberg, Jesus’ message of the eschatological Kingdom of God 
is ‘that the creative power of the future is conceivable only if we understand 
its actuality in terms of love.’593 The reason God is characterised as love in 
Jesus’ message is that ‘the present announcement of the imminent Kingdom of 
God offers man a chance to participate in God’s future rather than being 
overwhelmed by its sudden arrival and being conquered as an adversary of 
that future.’594 Love is necessarily relational and redemptive, on the one hand, 
and creative on the other.  
 Love is creative, Pannenberg states, because it is the only valid answer 
to the question ‘why should there be anything at all rather than nothing?’ 
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because ‘love grants existence and grants it contingently.’595 Heidegger’s 
foundational question can only find its answer in the love that comes from the 
future, for only in this way can God be said to exert his continuous creation 
without compromising their contingency, as noted in the first chapter and as 
will be revisited in chapter six. This is love ‘understood not in a vague 
emotional way but as the creative release of new reality’ that, by doing so, 
allows us to speak of contingent events, particularly those of the future, as 
already related to the world.
596
 That is, God relates to the present by lovingly 
intending the future of presently contingent events. ‘The [present] reality of 
God, then, is the creative arrival of this powerful future in the event of 
love.’597 Love creates, and sustains creation, without overwhelming 
contingency by relating to it in the event of love. This relational and, 
subsequently, redemptive action of divine love is inextricably tied to God as 
the personal power of the future as well. 
It is relational because it offers man a chance to enter into communion 
with God: ‘In Jesus’ message it is only as future that God is present,’ and this 
divine absence is felt by humanity in the present reality.
598
 Yet in the divine 
action of love, present humanity can relate to the future God. Communion 
with God is itself the redemption of the world. Pannenberg argues that a unity 
will be established by God at history’s end, and, by the message of the 
Kingdom of God, humanity is offered an opportunity to experience that unity, 
and so experience the divine whose absence has been otherwise felt.
599
 Thus, 
humanity does not simply face the future, but must relate to the future as either 
friend or as enemy. Enmity to the future is sin, while communion with the 
God of the future is the offer of redemption. This is means that which relates 
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to the God of the future can be said to have genuinely existed both presently 
and at all previous times.
600
 
God as the personal power of the future does not exist in the absolute 
sense except at the end of history. His presence can only be felt or related to if 
the end of history has in fact occurred since this is where God most fully 
exists. As Pannenberg states it in Theology and the Kingdom of God, ‘the 
reality of God, then, is the creative arrival of this powerful future in the event 
of love.’601  
While God, existing at the end of history, has broken into the flow of 
history, ‘only in the future…will the statement “God exists” prove to be 
definitely true, but then it will be clear that the statement was always true.’602 
Yet, the future epoch exerts a causal influence upon the present because ‘what 
turns out to be true in the future will then be evident as having been true all 
along…. God was present in every past moment as the one who he is in his 
futurity.’603  
The question of God, while unsettled until the end of history, does not 
mean that there is no present relation with God.
604
 Instead, inexact speech 
about God, what we may call mythology but which Pannenberg elsewhere 
describes as analogy, a Scotist term, is presently overcome by the future 
doxology.
605
 History finds its end in the historical event of the resurrection, 
but is simultaneously unfinished, meaning that knowledge of the end of 
history is still incomplete.
606
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Pannenberg concludes his titular essay in Theology and the Kingdom 
of God by arguing that the tension between the future God to whom we must 
relate in love, and the presently existing world, to which God relates without 
overwhelming its contingency, can only be reconciled through the Trinity. By 
way of summary he says 
The Trinitarian doctrine describes the coming 
God as the God of love whose future has already 
arrived and who integrates the past and present 
world, accepting it to share in his own life 
forever. The Trinitarian doctrine is, therefore, no 
mere Christian addition to the philosophical idea 
of God. Rather, the Trinitarian doctrine is the 
ultimate expression for the one reality of the 





Thus, God’s existence as the future, eternal God who nevertheless acts in 
history is only conceivable by an appeal to the Trinity. The complex 
relationship, between God as eternal Trinity and God as active in history, will 
have an extended treatment in the next chapter. However, prior to examining 
the Trinity and, in particular, the role of the Spirit as the Trinity is related to us 
presently, we turn now, instead, to Pannenberg’s later discussion of eternity, 
which is closely tied to this idea of the ‘end of history’ that has occupied the 
attention of the majority of this chapter. 
 
4 Eternity and Eschaton 
 Pannenberg begins one of his last published discussions of eternity by 
grounding the concept of time in the Augustinian sense of ‘the distention of 
the soul, distentio animi,’ and makes no mention, as in his previously 
mentioned anthropology, of Heidegger’s concept of the soul being 
stretched.
608
 However, in an early essay, Pannenberg traces Heidegger’s entire 
concept of time, and thus also his anthropology as it occurs in Being and Time, 
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back to Augustine, via Dilthey, and eventually to Plotinus and Aristotle.
609
 
Pannenberg is arguing against Heidegger’s claim that metaphysics has been 
fundamentally altered to the point of uselessness. Pannenberg makes his 
counterclaim by arguing that the connection between being and time, which 
Heidegger himself takes as foundational, is the same fundamental ontological 
question which confronted the Scholastics and Aristotle, and is therefore 
necessarily a metaphysical question.
610
 
 The mention of the Scholastics is, of course, related to Pannenberg’s 
earlier work in Duns Scotus’ theology and is likewise related to the mention of 
Aristotle, upon whose metaphysics Dun Scotus had been building in order to 
develop a suitable definition of contingency. It was Aristotle, who conceived 
of the future through a ‘psychological interpretation of time, a path followed 
also by Heidegger in developing his own theory of time’ that is the 
understanding of time being primarily Dasein’s connection to the world in its 
ready-to-handedness as comprehended through Vorgriff.
611
 Yet the 
psychological interpretation, at least when speaking of God as eternal in the 
future, is unsatisfactory. Perhaps the most developed psychological 
interpretation of time was explored by Augustine, who regarded the past as 
existing only in the memory of God. Yet, for Augustine, God does not truly 
exist in the future, but exists outside of time. That is, time was absent for 
God’s eternity, and the divine only experiences time within his own mind.612 
 However, much of Christian theology would dispute the notion that 
God has no real relation to eternity, if for no other reason than the historical 
occurrence of the incarnation, or the very idea of the economic Trinity, to be 
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discussed in the next chapter. If God’s eternal existence is understood to mean 
that there is no time for God, that is time is merely a mental trick of the human 
psyche, then any notion of the historical person Jesus, or a distinction between 
the economic and immanent Trinity is entirely removed.
613
 Instead, argues 
Pannenberg, for God the future exists as future, and past as past; not as 
psychological perceptions of these events, but they ‘are present to God in their 
actuality.’614 Augustine’s assertion of divine timelessness, which he derives in 
large part from the revelation of the tetragrammaton in the third chapter of 
Exodus (I am who I am), is based, continues Pannenberg, upon a faulty 
translation.
615
 Rather than a minor point of discrepancy, this casts doubt upon 
Augustine’s entire description of eternity as timeless. 
 Instead of understanding the tense of the revelation of YHWH as an 
atemporal declaration of existence, as in the LXX’s rendering of the Hebrew 
as ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν (I am the being), the revelation of the divine name should be 
understood in the terminology of the other verbs in Exodus three: as future 
tense. Thus, claims Pannenberg, more accurate understanding of the biblical 
passage ‘the God who will be whosever he will be is not a God to whom time 
does not matter.’ The biblical concept of God, rather, is of God who acts in 
different ways at different times, yet is concerned that his identity be 
understood as entirely consistent through his commitment to be who he will 
be.
616
 In other words, if God is to make the commitment to be faithful, as he 
does in the Exodus account, this necessarily implies a temporally bound 
promise. If there is no time for God, then revelation recorded in the third 
chapter of Exodus is not a promise, but a statement of fact, and neither the 
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language, nor the greater witness of biblical history, would seem to support 
such an assertion. Instead, continues Pannenberg, ‘the biblical view of God’s 
everlasting existence is more similar to the Plotinian concept of eternity than 
to that of Augustine.’617 
 For Plotinus, rather than understanding eternity as something entirely 
opposed to time, time has its source in eternity, and not in any human mind.
618
 
The Plotinian eternity, also, gives a certain priority to the future, leading 
Pannenberg to observe that ‘it was not Heidegger but Plotinus who first 
maintained the primacy of the future in the understanding of time.’619 
Plotinus’ advantage over Augustine is that eternity, for Plotinus, consists of 
‘the whole of life in simultaneous presence.’620 For Plotinus, the present 
experience of time as differentiated events, rather the unified whole of 
eternity, is a result of some cosmic fall by the human soul.
621
 The perfect unity 
of eternity then is lost into a fragmentation of life. Here, the language reflects 
Plato’s description of a descent by the human soul in his Timaeus.  
 Pannenberg’s description of the Plotinian view of eternity seems to 
focus primarily upon the first definition Plotinus offers of eternity as temporal 
wholeness. Further, Plotinus seeks to describe eternity (aivw,n) in terms of 
everlasting time (avidio,thj), declaring that these are simply two ways of 
discussing the same ultimate perfection from which time ultimately is 
derived.
622
 Yet Plotinus’ description of eternity is problematic; his description 
of the soul faces the same difficulties that would eventually confront Dilthey, 
that is, how a soul, or human being, can be said to have a completeness. 
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 Plotinus solves this problem by suggesting that presently existing 
beings can have a form of completeness by participation with the eternal 
‘Mind,’ and this participation is that toward which all creatures are moving.623 
This unity is possible for Plotinus because the ‘soul’ he speaks of is not of an 
individual, but of the entire kosmos (kosmoj). This, however, would lead to 
such a loss of identity that it is difficult to say how any sense of human 
autonomy, and thus human freedom is possible. For our purposes, then, 
Augustine has an advantage over Plotinus on this point by individualising the 
soul, though, as mentioned, Augustine fails to prioritize the future.
624
 Despite 
the failing of Plotinus on this one point, it may be possible to salvage his 
concept of eternity within a Christian theology. Eternity could be conceivable 
as possessing all time and events. 
In order for us to characterise eternity as the wholeness of creation, it 
must contain the ‘fullness of life’ possessed ‘simultaneously,’ which is to say 
that it contains all historic events. Pannenberg labels this concept of eternity 
‘omnitemporal.’625 This concept of eternity, explains Pannenberg, allows for a 
‘differentiation’ of events that nevertheless takes them as a unity. In doing so, 
Pannenberg is drawing from both the Plotinian conception of eternity as a 
unity, and the Augustinian concept of duration for the individual Dasein.
626
  
Given Pannenberg’s insistence that God acts with temporality in mind, 
by presenting the incarnation as an historical event most of all, but also by 
confronting all past events from the future, it is unsurprising that he would 
likewise insist that eternity preserve a distinction between the various 
temporal loci of historical events. By preserving the differentiation in eternity, 
Pannenberg affirms the experience of time by individuals through history and 
shows that ‘time is not an illusion in the eyes of the Creator, to whom all 
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things are present,’ as is the case in Augustine.627 However, even more 
fundamental than this, is Pannenberg’s insistence on avoiding determinism 
and preserving human freedom. 
Pannenberg confirms the argument made in chapter one of this thesis 
when he states that the problem of determinism first occurred to him during 
the writing of his doctoral dissertation.
628
 One reason for emphasising the 
genuine historical nature of God’s revelation and action is that both classical 
and neo-orthodox formulations of the doctrine of God seem to lead to a sort of 
determinism, a critique which was foundational for Bloch’s atheism.629 Thus 
the reformulation of the doctrine of God as the ‘power from the future’ has the 
advantage not only of making a greater sense of Jesus’ eschatological message 
of the Kingdom of God, but also of removing the problem of an omnipotent 
being existing absolutely at present, since God is ‘not yet,’ in his fullness. 
Yet, if human freedom is to be preserved in its fullest sense, which is 
that every human person can exert genuine causal force upon the external 
world, the idea of an authentic temporality to events must be preserved.
630
 As 
suggested in the first chapter, contingency, which is requisite for human 
freedom, can only be conceived in the context of time. If there is no sense of 
time, then all historical occurrences are necessary or else fail to exist at all, 
and if something is necessary, it can in no way be construed to have acted 
freely. 
Robert John Russell ably describes the distinctive aspects of 
Pannenberg’s doctrine of eternity understood as omnipresence. Russell uses 
the terms ‘duration’ and ‘co-presence’ to speak of the simultaneous unity and 
distinction of time and temporal events which occurs at eternity. Time, 
continues Russell, is not ‘point-like’ but has a ‘temporal thickness.’631 The 
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result is, argues Russell, that the whole of time is taken up into eternity as 
‘distinct’ instants that are somehow not ‘separate’ instants.632 Russell argues 
that eternity cannot be described in more detail than that, citing Pannenberg’s 
own appeal to the unity and diversity within the Trinity. In the same way that 
there are three persons and one substance, so there is a myriad of temporal 
occurrences relating to each other as past, present and future, but which are all 
unified in simultaneity without compromising their distinctiveness, yielding a 
‘temporal thickness.’633 Thus, God is not yet present with respect to the 
fragmented nature of the human experience of history, but is already God from 
history’s end, and thus throughout all events held in unity. With this 
understanding of eternity, we turn back to its particular relation to 
eschatological talk and the ‘end of history.’ 
Pannenberg readily acknowledges that his concept of history means 
that the ‘end of history’ is the temporal locus where ‘time and eternity 
coincide.’ This type of language, coupled with Pannenberg’s earlier argument 
that God nevertheless acts within history as the God of future, necessitates that 
time cannot be conceived as spatialized.
634
 In other words, talk about the 
temporal aspect of kosmos as either ‘block’ or ‘open’ will be unhelpful as will 
discussion of time along a line. There simply are no visual analogies that can 
be drawn. Still one cannot deny, in light of Einstein and others, that there is a 
link between space and time.
635
 There is a sense in which the future is, 
nevertheless, ‘open’ in that it is contingent in the same way that other events 
are contingent. However, the unresolved conclusion to history does not mean, 
argues Pannenberg, that this future has no causal influence upon the present 
and past. How exactly this can be the case, though, Pannenberg is unable to 
say, citing the limitations of language.
636
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Pannenberg argues that this limitation of religious language will be 
overcome at the eschaton when, as noted above, God overcomes 
epistemological concerns as well. Not only does God exist in the future, but 
knowledge of God is also necessarily future in orientation.
637
 Still, despite 
Pannenberg’s argument that the concept of a defined end to history that 
nevertheless leaves the present and future otherwise contingent cannot be 
comprehensively addressed due to the limitations of language, we will 
continue to explore this topic, articulating Pannenberg’s idea of the ‘end of 
history’ in more detail toward the end of chapter six. 
What can be said at present, though, is that eschatology is not only 
important for epistemology in Pannenberg’s theology, but for redemption as 
well. Redemption or salvation is necessarily eschatological, and as such 
eschatology has an additional prominence in theology.
638
 For Pannenberg, 
rather than two separate aspects, epistemology and redemption are linked 
together in eschatology. 
eschatology is not just the subject of a single 
chapter in dogmatics; it determines the 
perspective of Christian doctrine as a whole. 
With the eschatological future God’s eternity 
comes into time and it is thus creatively present 
to all the temporal things that precede this 
future. Yet God’s future is still the creative 
origin of all things in the contingency of their 
existence even as it is also the final horizon of 
the definitive meaning and therefore of the 
nature of all things and all events. On the path of 
their history in time objects and people exist 
only in anticipation of that which they will be in 
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The ‘anticipation’ that Pannenberg mentions must be understood as genuine 




Up to this point, we have affirmed, with Pannenberg, the claim made 
in chapter three that there is only one history within which God operates, as 
opposed to a super-history or redemptive history somehow distinct from 
human history. While that remains the case, we should affirm that God 
experiences history in a manner entirely distinct from humanity. This may 
help to explain, at least partially, the phenomenon of an end to history 
occurring within the midst of history, around which so much of Pannenberg’s 
work is based. As has been noted throughout this section, Pannenberg is 
unable to find a suitable language to describe what he considers the apparent 
incongruity between the eschaton, as both present and future, that 
encompasses the whole of history, existing as a defined end, without it 
necessarily infringing upon the contingency of human history. A possible 
solution may exist, though, if one re-examines the structure of time itself. 
Russell’s suggestion of a ‘temporal thickness’ to time at the eschaton is 
helpful, to a degree, but Russell offers little in the way of a constructive 
explanation regarding what this thickness might entail. One avenue that 
warrants investigation is within multi-dimensional time. The concept, though 
possibly having traces in Heidegger, Plotinus or even earlier, was first 
formally described by J.W. Dunne’s An Experiment with Time.641 While much 
of the work relies upon a particularly puzzling interpretation of idealism and 
begins with a much criticized discussion of ‘pre-cognitive dreams,’ at least 
one critique, J. Alexander Gunn, notes the promise of additional metaphysical 
dimensions of time, if not physical ones.
642
 Yet Gunn’s modification relies 
heavily upon his limited understanding of the, at the time, very new sciences 
of quantum mechanics and relativity physics. 
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Current work in physics demonstrates that not only is it viable to 
consider time as at least two dimensional, but that a six dimensional model of 
the universe (four spatial and two temporal) shows considerable promise in 
achieving a unified quantum field theory.
643
 To be clear, it had already been 
established that equations within modern physics, such as the Standard Model, 
are likely to hold for at least six temporal dimensions.
644
 Bars explores 4+2 
physics in order to give a more robust picture of the physical universe, though 
as is often the case in these sort of discussions, it is not definitive. 
For our purposes, however, this introduces a possible resolution to the 
tension between an extant ‘end of history’ and an contingent flow to history. It 
may be helpful to connect this with the spatial analogies used to describe our 
experience of the physical universe in four rather than three dimensions. 
Modern Physics refers to the universe as having ‘no edge,’ yet this does not 
require that the universe be considered to be infinite. To help, an analogy is 
drawn between two relations: that of two dimensional to three dimensional 
space, on the one hand, and that of three dimensional to four dimensional 
space, on the other. 
A being that perceives space within two dimensions would, upon the 
surface of a three dimensional globe, never experience an end or edge to the 
universe, though it would, in fact, exist finitely for a three dimensional 
observer. In a similar manner, we might consider that our three dimensional 
experience of space might be a three-dimensional experience of space that 
actually extends into four or more dimensions.
645
 This is, in many ways, one 
conclusion drawn from Edward Abbott’s classic Flatland: A Romance of 
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 The point for us is that understanding space in multiple 
dimensions beyond our own can yield surprising conclusions regarding 
movement within such space.
647
 
Specifically, if one moves along an additional temporal dimension 
beyond our own punctiliar experience of it, one could experience what we 
might label an ‘edge’ or ‘end’ to the experience of time along one dimension 
of that time, without it necessarily being the end of time, and even have that 
experience of time intersect within the flow of that time. This may even help 
to explain the psychological understanding of time as existing single 
dimensionally (along a time line), while only experiencing it without 
dimensions (the experience of ‘now’ only), as though we are grasping for an 
understanding of time that is dimensionally more complex than our present 
experience of it. 
To be clear, this is not an argument that God experiences time in a 
different dimension than humans do, but instead that God experiences the 
same history more completely by experiencing all of past, present and future 
simultaneously, as the fullness of multi-dimensional time. This more complete 
experience of time would account for the description of ‘temporal thickness,’ 
while still allowing that this multidimensional time remain contingent.  
This also accords well with Pannenberg’s own statements, though it 
seems he lacked the language to fully elaborate upon them. For instance, 
Pannenberg argues that the duration of each moment is fully present to God, 
but, in what he perceives to be following Barth’s decision to rework the 
relation between time and eternity in Plotinian/Boethius’s, as opposed to 
Augustinian, terms that do not see them in opposition, in such a way that the 
experience of the now is seen as a gift from the fuller experience of time that 
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defines God’s being.648 However, despite his praise of Barth’s move to 
redefine the relation between time and eternity, Pannenberg states that Barth 
failed to ‘explore’ what this means.649  
Rather than seeing our experience of the now as the intersection 
between past and future, Pannenberg hopes to move beyond the Augustinian 
vision of time experienced as a ‘fleeting vision.’ He allows that ‘human 
experience is not real duration,’ in line with Augustine, but argues that it is a 
minor participation in the greater experience of time that is rooted in God, 
who ‘gives’ us the present.650 For Pannenberg, the experience of the human 
life is incomplete not only because the end has yet to be experienced, but 
because we have not fully experience each ‘now’ or present moment, which 
can only occur at the future coming of eternity into our temporal 
experience.
651
 The ‘fragmentary and restricted’ experience of time will then be 
replaced by the ‘eternal today of God.’ It is defined, not from a lack of 
temporality, but in its duration, for, according to Pannenberg ‘God’s day lasts. 
The “fleeting Now” of our sense of the present corresponds only remotely to 
the lasting and abiding Now of his present.’652 We have a slight connection to 
this via the concept of duration.  
If there is past, present and future, yet each present has its own 
duration that does not cross into past or present, as Pannenberg argues, 
without losing its temporal character, then, we might ask, into what is the 
‘Now’ extended if it is neither into past nor present? Such a concept is 
impossible if time is understood along a single dimension. However, it may 
extend, and thus have duration, if time exists infinitely along two distinct 
dimensions, or at least infinitely in the direction that does not constitute our 
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experience of past, present and future. Thus, while Pannenberg does not 
explicitly state that time exists as two dimension, given the manner in which 
Pannenberg speaks about time, and the promising work being done in ‘4+2 
dimensional’ physics, noted above, we can extend Pannenberg’s introductory 
remarks on this matter into this new realm.
653
 We shall return to this topic 
again at the end of chapter six along with its implications for understanding 
human freedom in the context of eternity as defined by Pannenberg. 
 
Conclusion 
 The inclusion of multidimensional time also makes more concrete the 
anticipation of God as the future relating to us in our present. This ‘hope,’ of 
our experience of the future God, must be grounded, continues Pannenberg, in 
the ‘soil’ of anthropological concerns.654 Rather than a separate disjointed 
concept, anthropology, then, is tied together with epistemology and 
redemption as fundamentally eschatological. The anthropological concerns, 
which were themselves historical concerns of Dilthey, Gadamer and 
Heidegger discussed in the previous chapter and extended into a discussion of 
Scheler, Gehlen, Herder, and Plessner, all look forward to fulfilment in the 
future. Bloch’s principle of hope insists that every person must face his or her 
own future. While for Bloch this future is empty, for Pannenberg we find 
instead ‘that God and not nothing is the end of time.’655 Thus, each Dasein 
only exists so far as he or she relates to the coming future as personal power, 
that is as God. Authentic being of everything is ‘complete’ or ‘fails’ to exist 
based upon whether or not it participates in the future, which is God.
656
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 Christian theology and revelation can find genuine participation in the 
future as future now. While it will not be confirmed to have been the case until 
God unifies all of creation, it is nevertheless the case, and will be proven to 
have been the case, that Christianity can have ‘finality in the midst of 
unfinished Geschichte.’657 This is possible because the resurrection of Jesus is 
an eschatological event. The resurrection, then, is the interruption of 
incomplete history with history’s defined end. In doing so, we may relate to 
God in his eternal absolute existence, as the God of the future, because his 
future has confronted us in the resurrection. 
 Nevertheless, a tension remains between our present existence and still 
incomplete finality of God’s eternity. If history is truly contingent, we might 
ask, how can its end be defined yet possess an existence so concrete that we 
may relate to it? Pannenberg suggests that such a reconciliation may be 
possible if we look to ‘the role of the field concept’ within physics.658 
Amazingly, a similar suggestion was present as far back as a 1963 essay. 
There, Pannenberg argues that God unifies fragmented history, but only does 
so from the end toward which the kosmos is advancing. In this context, he 
argues that the motion toward this defined end might be understood as the 
Spirit working via a ‘field’ (Feld).659 While it is unlikely that Pannenberg had 
in mind the specific field concept of physics, at least to the extent he did in his 
later work in the philosophy of science, the early beginning of the concept had 
already begun to find a place in Pannenberg’s earliest theology. Further, as we 
have seen, the application of other concepts from contemporary physics, such 
as multidimensional time, can amplify Pannenberg’s argument. The next two 
chapters will expand upon the field concept in order to conclude the 
construction of Pannenberg’s theology of history and apply that theology to 
the tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom. 
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CHAPTER 5: DYNAMIC FIELD IN HISTORY AND THE ACTION OF 
SPIRIT 
 
 The last chapter not only helped define the key parameters of 
Pannenberg’s theology of history, but also highlighted one of the central 
problems of this thesis. If the ‘end of history’ is so defined that it has been 
witnessed proleptically in the resurrection, and if God acts from that end, then 
it is difficult to see how the contingency defined in the first chapter, that is so 
critical for the concept of human freedom, is not eradicated. In order to 
address this issue over the next two chapters, we must look at the causal 
mechanism of God’s action within creation. In other words, if we are to 
articulate how both divine sovereignty and human freedom, in terms of 
contingency, can coexist, we must describe the manner in which God acts 
from the end of history in such a way that these actions do not overwhelm the 
actions of creation, without also negating the sovereignty of God. In order to 
do so, we will examine the manner in which Pannenberg describes God’s 
actions in creation: through the application of field theory.  
This chapter is primarily concerned with two related objectives as it 
pertains to field theory. First, we need to understand what field theory is, 
along with its philosophical background, so that we may ascertain in what 
manner Pannenberg utilises the concept within his own theology. Second, I 
will elucidate what this application to the Spirit means for our theological 
understanding of God in eternity and how understanding the Spirit as field 
relates to God acting in history. The understanding of the Spirit as field has 
profound implications for the doctrine of the Trinity as God acts in history and 
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the relation of God acting in history to his eternal self. This will be examined 
toward the end of the chapter. The next chapter will extend this discussion to 
more directly address the action of God as it relates to history and our question 
of human freedom and divine sovereignty. 
 
1. Defining the Concept of Field Theory 
1.1 Definition and Background to Field Theory 
 Field theory, broadly understood, is a branch of physics that is 
concerned with causal action-at-a-distance
660
 on a cosmic scale. In its post-
Newtonian use, field theory posits this action-at-a-distance as occurring 
between material objects via a non-material field. For Michael Faraday, this 
non-material field was force itself, and, for Albert Einstein, it was space-time, 
understood in terms of metric field. This modern understanding of field 
theory, with its description of non-materially influenced causation, opens the 
door for a theological dialogue with science, since God is understood non-
materially. It will be beneficial to examine the background for field theory 
before proceeding to the various theological implications that arise from it in 
the following section. 
 Pannenberg introduced the concept of field as his primary descriptive 
model for divine causal action at roughly the midpoint of his career.
661
 This 
stands in contrast to the more commonly employed theological appeal to 
quantum theory as the primary means of describing causal action in the 
universe.
662
 The distinction between quantum theory and field theory might be 
                                                 
660
 The term ‘action-at-a-distance’ is used frequently throughout various treatments of field 
theory and quantum theory to describe an interaction be/tween two material objects over a gap 
of space that cannot be traced to occurring through some intervening physical medium. 
Usually this is observed by ‘simultaneous’ action, though this qualifier is not necessary. See 
the introduction to William Berkson, Fields of Force: The Development of a World View 
From Faraday to Einstein (New York: Halsted Press, 1974), esp. pp. 2-4 
 
661
 TTN, 37-38. 
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 See, for instance, John Polkinghorne, The Quantum World (London: Longman, 1984); and 
T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); 
However, it should be noted that, while Torrance spends more time in his theological dialogue 
with quantum physics, he does not dismiss a relation of theology to field theory as 
Polkinghorne does. 
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characterised as a difference between emphasising microcosmic causation on 
an atomic/sub-atomic level and emphasising macrocosmic causation in light of 
the whole of space-time. The reasons for Pannenberg’s macrocosmic outlook 
will become clear below.  
 Pannenberg first examines field theory through its historical 
development. In contrast to the once-dominant scientific paradigm offered by 
Rene Descartes, which related causal force exclusively to material forces, 
Isaac Newton proposed, through his analysis of gravitational force, that 
immaterial forces could also act upon objects.
663
 In particular, the concept of a 
non-material force can be seen in Newton’s Principia, first appearing in 
definitions 5 and 7 which describe the effects of gravitational force, a non-
material force, between two material objects over some distance.
664
 Still, while 
Newton’s calculation and description of gravitational force spoke of gravity as 
immaterial, gravitational force was understood as exerting an influence 
through material substance, which he identified as aether.
665
 While Newton 
did not completely commit to the concept of ‘action-at-a-distance,’ the 
defining characteristic of field theory, his work suggested that such a thing 
was not only conceivable, but altogether likely on the basis of the mathematics 
alone. According to Pannenberg, the idea of a causal force not linked to any 
spatial (material) body was first proposed in earnest by Michael Faraday 
through the concept of ‘field.’666 
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 ST2, 79; I. Bernard Cohen, ‘A Guide to Newton’s Principia,’ in Isaac Newton, The 
Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. I. Bernard Cohen and Anne 
Whitman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 43-49; Cohen argues that Newton 
was intentionally working against Cartesian theory wishing his own scientific work to take the 
place of Descartes’ hypotheses. 
 
664
 Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. I. 
Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 405, 
407. [def. 5; 7] 
 
665
 Ibid., 809 [book 3, prop. 6, corollary 2]. Cohen in his ‘Guide’ in the same volume argues 
that Newton initially did not account for an aether, but could not make the philosophical leap 
to account for a completely non-material force that his math suggested, 55-56; of course, the 
concept of ‘aether’ is no longer in use in contemporary Newtonian-based models of physics. 
 
666
 Ibid., 80-81; Wolfhart Pannenberg, ‘The Doctrine of Creation and Modern Science,’ in 
Cosmos as Creation: Theology and Science in Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 1989), 163-164. 
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 Pannenberg draws his understanding of field theory and its history in 
large part from the writings of William Berkson and Max Jammer, who argue 
that while the first definitive expression of field theory is found in Faraday, 
the philosophical underpinnings of his theory can be found earlier, particularly 
in Newton.
667
 According to Berkson, the defining characteristic of any field 
theory is that it requires a non-material ‘intervening medium’ to transfer 
energy from one body to another. Although for some of the precursors to field 
theory it ‘was felt to be a quasi-liquid or solid obeying Newton’s laws, called 
the ether,’ Faraday was unique being the first to describe this field as ‘force 
itself.’668 
Faraday did so by linking force ‘to the totality of the field that 
embraces one or more bodies.’ In Faraday’s view, ‘mass...depends on the 
concentration of force at a given point.’669 This move is important, for it 
suggests that, rather than being a property inherent to material objects, mass is 
dependent upon a non-material force. Following this line of thought, forces are 
not reducible to the motion of physical bodies, rather the physical bodies are 
actually manifestations of force fields.
670
 Thus, according to Faraday, the 
entire universe constitutes a single field of force, or force field, and all 
material objects are manifestations of that field. As Max Jammer argues, from 
the perspective of a philosophical history of science, energy has begun to be 
seen as more fundamental for understanding matter, while mass, previously 




                                                                                                                                
 
667
 Pannenberg openly admits his view is heavily influenced by Berkson and Jammer in MIG, 
108. A brief examination of his footnotes in his Systematic Theology, Towards a Theology of 
Nature, and most other works, in his discussion of field theory will confirm heavy reliance 
upon both Berkson and Jammer. 
 
668
 Berkson, Fields of Force, 2-3. 
 
669
 Ibid., 81. 
 
670
 Grenz, Reason for Hope, 85. 
 
671
 Max Jammer, Concepts of Mass in Classical and Modern Physics (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1961), 215-221. 
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In addition to Faraday, Jammer, and Berkson, Pannenberg also draws 
on the work of Albert Einstein, whose general theory of relativity might be 
considered the peak of field theory.
672
 Einstein formulated his field theory in 
terms of Riemannian geometry, which uses the terminology of a ‘metric field’ 
or vector field. Non-Euclidean geometry, like Riemannian geometry, was 
created when it was discovered that certain axioms, postulates, theorems, and 
other aspects of Euclidean geometry could be dispensed with while still 
yielding a consistent mathematical system. Since Euclidean geometry is 
understood merely to approximate the natural world, rather than to have a 
direct correspondence to it, relying as it does on abstract postulates divorced 
from physical observation, it was argued that a new, empirically based system 
might be more useful. Rather than being purely axiomatic or analytic, most 
non-Euclidean geometry has a ‘significant empirical basis.’673  
 It is in this context that Einstein speaks of space or space-time as itself 
a metric field.
674
 Using this, Einstein is therefore suggesting that not only is 
force and motion variable, as understood in traditional physics, but space-time 
itself is also variable according to the perspective measurement of the metric 
field of space.
675
 Einstein suggests that space-time, understood as a single 
measurable continuum, rather than two discrete continuums (space and time), 
is variable along each of its four axes (length, height, depth, and time), while 
certain vectors within the continuum, particularly the speed of light, must be 
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 Berkson, Fields of Force, 3. 
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 Hans Reichenbach, ‘Non-Euclidean Spaces,’ in Problems of Space and Time: From 
Augustine to Albert Einstein on the Fundamentals for Understanding our Universe, ed. J.J.C. 
Smart (London: Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1964), 215-220. 
 
674
 The metric field describes a range of potentially valid values in relation to a given distance, 
given that distance, in Reimannian geometry, is understood to be somewhat variable. 
 
675
 Albert Einstein, ‘Die Feldgleichungen der Gravitation,’ Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Nov 25, 1915): 25, pp. 844-847, available online at 
http://nausikaa2.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/cgi-bin/toc/toc.x.cgi?dir=6E3MAXK4&step=thumb 
[Accessed 25/05/2010]. From this point forward, unless preceded by ‘metric’ when using the 
term ‘field,’ it will be assumed to have its scientific sense and not its mathematical sense. 
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taken as a constant vector value.
676
 By accepting Einstein’s argument that 
space-time itself is contingent in terms of metric field because it is variable, 
the entirety of the universe, which is indistinguishable from space-time, is 
understood as contingent.
677
 One finds a parallel in the argument of Scotus, 
particularly as it finds application in Pannenberg, for Scotus demonstrated that 
either the totality of the universe is contingent, or none of its constituent parts 
are contingent, due to the transitive property of contingent causation. It is 
important to note that not only is causation contingent, as explicitly argued in 
chapters one and two of this thesis, but, as Einstein suggested, space-time 
itself is likewise understood in terms of a contingent metric field. This will 
prove particularly important toward the end of the thesis. 
Despite understanding causation and all of space-time as contingent, 
relativity physics also suggests, as a field theory, that there is some ontos, 
whether force or matter or something else entirely, that is the fundamental 
basis of the universe and capable of becoming manifest in all of the forms that 
constitute the material universe.
678
 In relativity physics, this means that all 
aspects of the universe are relative to each other on a cosmic scale such that 
energy and mass are directly proportionate, as famously stated by Einstein.
679
 
Pannenberg summarises Einstein’s work in this way: 
A. Einstein in his general theory of 
relativity (1916) could even try to reduce 
the concept of force to the metric field of 
a non-Euclidian space-time. Conversely, 
the metric field of space-time might 
                                                 
676
 It is in this instance that Einstein speaks of the theory of relativity arguing that time can be 
in flux, a radical idea at the time, now largely accepted. 
 
677
 The same holds true for Faraday’s more radical claim concerning the adaptive nature of 
causal field, most well-known through his connection of magnetic and electric force; see 




 See the discussion below on the Stoics. This idea is put forth by Max Jammer, who 
suggests that field theory is built upon certain ontological commitments of the Stoics; Max 
Jammer, ‘Feld-Feldtheorie,’ in J. Ritter, ed., Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 2 
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itself be reduced to the concept of force. 
At any rate, field theories see a close link 




Pannenberg is too cautions here, for field theory sees not only a ‘close link’ 
but direct equivalence between space-time, matter and energy. Einstein’s 
argument that energy and mass are directly proportionate suggests that mass 
can be ‘created’ from energy, understood mathematically as a force vector, 
and energy is ‘created’ from matter.681 It is from this that Pannenberg will see 
potential for speaking of the Spirit in terms of field. 
Pannenberg’s overt focus on field theory, instead of quantum theory, is 
revealing of his underlying focus. Dynamic field theories give priority of the 
whole over the parts; this priority is also present in Pannenberg’s theological 
thought.
682
 While individual aspects of the cosmos and particular events are 
important, this importance is secondary to their contribution to the entire 
cosmos and its history.
683
 It is clear, then, why both Faraday’s and Einstein’s 
description of field as encompassing the whole of reality, would seem so 
appealing to Pannenberg.
684
 If God is Lord over all of history and creation, 
then it is appropriate to understand God’s activity in and for the world in light 
of the totality of cosmic existence. Field theory may be generally understood 
as a branch of physics that seeks to explain causal relation between objects 
over a metric distance through the concept of a mass-less field. Since field 
theory is a macro-theory, which describes the field as immaterial, Pannenberg 
suggests it may be of significant value for theological discussion. 
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 Einstein’s special theory of relativity means that mass and energy are interchangeable, 
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See Douglas Burke et al., ‘Positron Production in Multiphoton Light-by-Light Scattering,’ 
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 A competing theory in physics is quantum theory or quantum 
mechanics. At the subatomic level, the mathematics of quantum theory 
provides more accurate predictions of causal events while discussions of the 
workings of the universe on a more cosmic level, such as with black holes and 
galaxies, field theory, particularly Einstein’s, is a more accurate predictor of 
the causal events. In light of this, contemporary physics tends generally to 
affirm the validity of both quantum theory and field theory with some work 
toward combining the two into ‘quantum field theory.’685 
In particular, the ‘Standard Model’ of the universe, one of the most 
widely accepted and utilised equations of physics, both derives from quantum 
field theory and has its limitations revealed by quantum field theory.
686
 
Specifically, the Standard Model disregards the pull of gravitational field 
among certain types of subatomic particles and must account for this if there is 
to be a grand ‘theory of everything.’687 While contenders for alternatives to the 
standard model exist, most notably string theory (except some forms such as 
11dM-Theory or F-theory), and loop quantum gravity that minimise, but do 
not eliminate, the impact of both classical field theory and relativity theory, 
most physicists work within some form of a ‘unified field theory,’ which 
attempts to either quantize fields, as in quantum field theories, or demonstrate 
a reaction between subatomic quanta and non-material fields.
688
 This is not to 
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 This is now quite commonly acknowledged in physics, but see especially Biplin Desai, 
Quantum Mechanics with Basic Field Theory (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
esp. pp.32-78; Heinrich Saller, Operational Spacetime (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 111-145; 
T. Padmanabhan, Gravitation: Foundations and Frontiers (Leiden: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 591-642; Yorikiyo Nagashima, Elementary Particle Physics, vol. 1, Quantum 
Field Theory and Particles (Weinheim: Wiley-VCH, 2010), esp. ch. 7; and Alexander 
Altland, Condensed Matter Field Theory (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 360-
368. All of these works are built upon the foundation of affirming both field theory and 
quantum mechanics. In other words, it is part of the system within which they operate.  
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say that this chapter will be pursuing field theory on its 
scientific/mathematical terms, but to acknowledge that, contrary to one of 
Polkinghorne’s assertion against Pannenberg, field theory in both its classical 





1.2 The Theological Implications of Non-Material Force 
 In his adoption of a basic theological orientation focused on God’s 
activity in the whole of creation and history, Pannenberg proposes that field 
theory may give insight into the manner in which God might be understood to 
exert a causal influence in the universe. A major benefit of field theory, for 
Pannenberg, is that it allows for the possibility of an intelligent dialogue 
between theology and science generally, and concerning God’s activity within 
the physical world specifically.
690
 If a material entity can be subject to a force 
exerted non-materially, as in field theory, then it becomes intelligible to speak 
of God, as non-material Spirit, exerting causal force upon material objects.  
Pannenberg acknowledges that shortly after Newton’s discovery of 
gravitational force, the immaterial nature of gravity was criticised in the world 
of physics, particularly by Ernst Mach and Heinrich Hertz who ‘sought to 
reduce forces to bodies or masses.’ As Pannenberg notes, if non-material 
causes are excluded, the idea of God’s active presence in the real world would 
be ‘totally nonsensical’ given that God is non-material.691 The exclusion of 
theological language from the analysis of natural phenomenon was well 
established in the sciences up to the time of Faraday, who renewed the concept 
of a non-material force.
692
 Faraday’s concept of field theory, therefore, made 
                                                                                                                                




 John Polkinghorne, ‘Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Engagement with the Natural Sciences,’ 
Zygon 34, no. 1 (March 1999): 151-158. 
 
690
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dialogue about the causal activity of God within the material universe 
intelligible again by opening up the possibility of a non-material cause upon 
material objects. 
 The concept of a non-material force, as described in field theory, is 
important because it means that ‘action-at-a-distance’ is possible while 
allowing the causal force acting upon a material body to lack mass itself.
693
 If 
applied theologically, this allows Pannenberg to speak of God’s ‘effective 
presence’ as being with us and within the material world, such that we might 
speak of both God’s continuous creation and God’s intervention in the flow of 
cosmic history. Thus, ‘the field concept could be celebrated as the 
inauguration of a spiritual interpretation of nature.’694 Before examining the 
fuller implications of using field theory in relation to theology, it will be 
important to explore the manner in which such a dialogue might occur. 
 
1.3 The Relation of Science and Theology 
 As the previous section implied, the introduction of field theory, 
especially in the form hypothesized by Faraday, could open the door for 
dialogue between science and theology. It need not be disputed that there are 
certain fundamental differences between science and theology that make any 
relationship between the two somewhat difficult. In scientific enquiry, natural 
phenomena are observed and naturalistic explanations are offered. Such an 
enquiry does not take God into consideration, nor indeed should it, because 
God is not empirically observable and naturalistic explanations by definition 
exclude God. 
While scientific enquiry requires that the universe be understood as 
uniform, and while numerous theologians concur with this sentiment, theology 
is not necessarily bound, in the same way scientific enquiry is, to the 
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assumption that the universe be understood as entirely uniform. By contrast, 
all scientific approaches assume uniformity of the cosmos, given the value 
placed upon symmetry and universal application of formulas and laws in 
science. Uniformity is a necessary presupposition for natural law, or at least 
for natural law to be helpful to any scientific investigation.
695
 If the universe 
does not behave uniformly, then scientific enquiry cannot produce useful 
predictions nor give a reliable description of cosmic events, particularly those 
that are not directly observed. 
Rather than a feature inherent in the universe, for Pannenberg the 
uniformity of the universe is only possible as a result of God’s act of 
continuous creation, discussed in chapter one. Two things, in particular, 
Pannenberg argues, should prevent the theologian from accepting an 
inherently uniform universe. The first is the belief in miracle. Miracles, by 
their very nature, are incidents where the perceived uniformity of the universe 
is radically interrupted. The second reason is the Christ event.
696
 For 
Pannenberg, this is the most unique event in all of history. That is, if there are 
miracles, and if God became incarnate in the person of Christ and died on a 
cross, being raised from the dead, as a one-time historical event, then the 
universe cannot be considered entirely uniform as it is in contemporary 
scientific investigation. Rather than a problem for theology, though, the 
unusual and non-uniform nature of the resurrection is what allows one to 
perceive the activity of God. 
A dialogue between science and theology is further complicated with 
regards to temporal foci. As discussed in the previous chapter, a Christian 
anthropology suggests that humanity is oriented toward the future.’ In 
contrast, science is concerned first with the past for the purpose of 
understanding the present and only then, after past and present are taken into 
account, is the future addressed. For Pannenberg, the already-defined future is 
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so powerful that it exerts a causal influence upon the present.
697
 In light of 
these and other differences, the theological use of field theory will understand 
field theory in a different way than in its purely scientific presentation.
698
  
Because of this, Pannenberg claims, ‘we cannot have a direct 
theological interpretation of the field theories of physics.’699 More exactly, 
scientific theories, such as field theory, cannot be engaged by theology in their 
‘scientific presentations’ but must instead be engaged through their 
‘philosophical presentations.’ A philosophical presentation of a scientific 
theory is less concerned with the exact experimental methodologies and 
mathematical proofs of a theory than with its epistemological presuppositions 
and philosophical/metaphysical implications. Since we are approaching field 
theory on terms other than its own, reasons Pannenberg, we must have good 
reason to suggest such a transition in dialogue.
 700
  
 Pannenberg states that his primary reason for entering into dialogue 
with field theory is his interpretation of the biblical understanding that God is 
Spirit.
701
 He claims that field theory, alone among the modern scientific 
theories, ‘does justice to the history and concept of spirit.’702 Specifically, 
Pannenberg wants to demonstrate that a common metaphysical background 
exists between field theory’s description of a field as encompassing or 
permeating all of reality and theological discussion of the dynamic presence of 
the Spirit in the entire cosmos, via the term ‘pneuma.’ The theological use of 
‘Spirit’ and the philosophical underpinnings of field theory’s use of ‘force’ 
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have enough in common to grant us ‘strong material reasons’ for engaging in 
dialogue between science and theology.
 703
 
 On the one hand, the concept of field theory is promising ‘because it 
seems to offer a modern language that possibly can express the biblical idea of 
the divine Spirit as the power of life that transcends the living organism and at 
the same time is intimately present in the individual.’ Yet, caution is needed 
because no philosophical implication of field theory can be extended far 
enough to yield a complete picture of God’s kingdom or the ‘Christian hope 
for new life of a resurrection of the dead.’704 Thus, as Grenz argues, although 
field theory is helpful and suggestive for theology, ‘Pannenberg does not 
simply equate the concept of the cosmic field with the divine Spirit, but looks 
to the interesting coalescence of the language of the two disciplines as arising 
out of their common background.’705 This also means, because of the 
fundamental differences between scientific and theological enquiries, the 
integration of one into the other will be necessarily uneven. 
 Another reason that a dialogue with between science and theology 
seems promising via field theory is due to field theory’s unique description of 
energy as ‘autonomous’ and not as an attribute of material bodies only.706 In 
particular, ‘Einstein’s field theory comprises space, time, and energy in such a 
way as to make thinking about the whole of time intelligible.’707 That, along 
with field theory’s philosophical foundation that allows for intelligible 
discussion of the ‘spiritual presence of God in natural phenomena,’ make the 
link between it and theology even more promising. 
708
 Since scientific theories 
are best engaged by theology on philosophical grounds, and field theory’s 
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philosophical foundations seem to allow for intelligent theological dialogue, it 
will be advantageous to explore field theory’s philosophical roots further. 
 
1.4 Philosophical Roots of Field Theory: Pneuma vs. Nous 
 As mentioned above, Pannenberg claims that a commonality exists 
between a Christian conception of God and the philosophical background of 
field theory, specifically through the Christian concept of ‘Spirit.’ Pannenberg 
bases this claim upon an article by Max Jammer that makes significant use of 
Berkson, and makes a strong case for locating the metaphysical foundation for 
Faraday’s field theory in the Stoic concept of pneuma.709 Though not directly 
cited by Pannenberg, Jammer’s argument is itself built upon the seminal work 
in the history of science by Samuel Sambursky.
710
 Sambursky makes the case 
that pneuma of the Stoics functioned in the exact manner as Faraday’s force 
field.
711
 This is predicated upon the fact that the concept of Spirit as pneuma is 
understood differently from the concept of Spirit as nous. 
Pannenberg notes that within ancient Greek philosophy there are two 
interpretations of the arche, or unifying element of the universe, which echo 
the two senses of ‘spirit’ that theology has employed, that is pneuma or nous. 
Pannenberg dates the understanding of spirit as pneuma significantly earlier 
than that of nous. Pneuma’s use dates back to the pre-Socratic philosophers, 
most notably Anaximenes, and finds its mature expression in the Stoics, while, 
platonic and neo-platonic philosophers advocated for the concept of spirit as 
nous.
712
 The primary distinction between pneuma and nous is that while 
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pneuma implies a personal sort of spirit,
713
 the idea of spirit as nous suggests 
an impersonal order or logic acting as the governing force of the world.
714
 
Further, the pneuma of Stoicism is a state of material flux that interpenetrates, 
and on many Stoic accounts, is what makes up the entire universe, while 
nevertheless having a causal action very close to the modern concept of 
‘field.’715 
Although a lengthy exposition on physics from the Stoics is not extant, 
enough fragments of their writings exist to be able to comprise what 
approximates their understanding of the physical world.
716
 For the Stoics, 
three branches of ancient philosophy, physics, logic and ethics, were all tied 
together.
717
 At the basic level, Stoic physics sought to ‘overcome the dualism 
between mind and matter taught by other Greek philosophical schools.’ One 




Given that the Stoics held that the entirety of the universe is held 
together by a single unifying material force, which they understood to be God, 
it will also be helpful to examine the specific terminology they applied to this 
unifying material force: logos is the term employed for it when they wanted to 
emphasise the rationality of the universe; tonos was used to speak of the 
tension that holds the universe together, as explained below; and pneuma was 
used when discussing the active creative force, or ‘fiery breath of life.’719 For 
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the Stoics, all three terms were understood to be the same unifying material 
force that shared the properties described by these terms. The term with which 
we are most concerned, in this study, is that of pneuma. 
While it is unclear how much of the concept of pneuma was influenced 
by Heraclitus and his idea of flux, it nevertheless remains that the universe, 
understood in terms of pneuma was dynamic rather than static for the 
Stoics.
720
 This active pneuma was both the whole of the universe, and 
manifest within ‘each individual thing in the universe.’721 Therefore, one can 
say that the Stoic God, understood as pneuma, is actively present to and within 
every object of the universe. 
According to Sambursky, this permeating, dynamic, pneuma interacts 
with living creatures via the ‘hegemonikon’ of a soul, which was itself a 
manifestation of pneuma as an independent, yet dependent, object.
722
 
According to Stoic philosophy of the mind, the soul is divided into multiple 
parts with the hegemonikon being the controlling element that is itself a 




Through the ‘hegemonikon,’ continues Sambursky, the Stoics believed 
that a tension between the independent existence of a soul and the dependence 
of that soul upon the omni-permeating pneuma allowed the sensory experience 
of causal activity via a ‘tensional motion (tonike kinesis).’ Eventually, the 
Stoics came to understand all causal action to occur as a result of the ‘tension 
of the pneuma’ or ‘pneumatikos tonos.’724 Specifically, the Stoics claimed that 
the presence of the pneuma in every aspect of the universe caused a tension 
between three different aspects that grew out of this pneuma. First, the hexis or 
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cohesion of the universe holds all things together as a single unity.
725
 Second, 
everything in the universe exhibits a phusis, normally translated nature, that 
allows for things to exist or be ‘alive’ as independent objects.726  
The third form of the pneuma is the psuchē, frequently translated as 
soul or consciousness, but perhaps best understood, among the Stoics, as will 
or volition. This third form is the exclusive domain of animals, who exhibit 
motion under their own power, and humans.
727
 It is here that the tension is 
most notable.
728
 The activity of the pneuma exists in tension, tonos, with the 
possibility of things that exist outside of pneuma, most notably human will. 
This tension within the pneuma constitutes the pneumatikos tonos that actually 
produces the material world as something actualised rather than possible, in a 
way that is reminiscent of the independent-dependent tension between Creator 
and created described in the first two chapters. To further understand the 
context of this ‘pneumatic tension’ as it existed in early Stoic philosophy, it 
will be helpful to note the modest critique of Sambursky’s description of 
Stoicism made by John Sellars. Sellars, who admits that Sambursky’s reading 
is not uncommon, nevertheless suggests that Sambursky creates a picture that 




While there is certainly some consonance between the two, Sellars 
points to the hard distinction between the philosophical/religious and the 
scientific that pervades cultures that trace their origin to the Enlightenment 
and post-enlightenment ‘Western world,’ arguing that no such tension exists 
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within many ‘Eastern’ cultures, nor among pre-Enlightenment Europeans. For 
the Stoics, continues Sellars, it is a mistake to consider pneuma as more or less 
equivalent to Nature, an impersonal force, which Sambursky eventually 
does.
730
 Rather, the Stoic pneuma is active and has volition which it exercises. 
It is this conflict of wills, even within the pneuma, that is it is the cause of 
creation, as the conflict moves from potential to actual when the created is 
distinguished as outside the creator-pneuma.
731
 We might take the work of 
Sellars and Sambursky here and connect to Pannenberg’s concept of 
continuous creation examined at the start of this thesis. While it must be 
admitted that the Stoic concept of pneuma is not entirely analogous to the way 
that the early church used the term, the parallels between the two uses, and its 
connection to field theory, give us strong reasons to investigate whether field 
theory, understood via this connection, can be successfully applied to 
Christian theology, in particular to address the problem of divine causation. 
 The idea of God as Spirit who permeates all things is a fundamental 
premise in Christian theology. Pannenberg argues that the Church Fathers 
were faced with a choice in early dialogues concerning the nature of God as 
Spirit.
 The strong material element of the Stoic’s presentation of pneuma, 
which, in its materiality, was similar to the early atomists understanding of the 
universe, led to its rejection by the Church Fathers in favour of the immaterial 
platonic understanding of Spirit as nous, evidenced, for instance, by the firm 
establishment of the doctrine of the impassibility of God.
732
  
Pannenberg rejects the notion of the divine spirit as nous, considering 
it an improper picture of God’s true nature since the concept of God as an 
impersonal nous seems to contradict the personal and relational picture of God 
as pneuma presented in the bible.
733
 Pannenberg argues that the Old Testament 
concept of Spirit, or ruach, denoting a moving, active, and present wind, 
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corresponds more closely with pneuma in Stoicism than the impersonal 
nous.
734
 Thus, Pannenberg argues that ways in which Faraday adapts pneuma 
to his field theory make the Stoic pneuma more amenable to the Old 
Testament use of ruach, and thus to Christian doctrine as a whole, than the 
concept of nous can be. 
As Pannenberg puts it, ‘For the Stoics the pneuma was a very fine stuff 
that permeates all things, that holds all things in the cosmos together by its 
tension (tonos), and that gives rise to the different qualities and movement of 
things.’735 Similarly, in contrast to the scientific descriptions of causal action, 
movement, and matter prior to his writing, Michael Faraday  
regarded bodies themselves as forms of forces 
that for their part are no longer qualities of 
bodies but independent realities that are 
“givens” for bodily phenomena. He now viewed 
these forces as fields that occupy space in order 
to avoid the problems involved in the idea of 
force working at a distance, and he hoped that 
ultimately all these fields would be reducible to 




The points of correspondence between the Stoic idea of pneuma and Faraday’s 
field of force are clear. Both view causal ‘action-at-a-distance’ as having its 
basis in something other than the observable bodies involved. This unobserved 
cause, whether pneuma or force field, is something that permeates the entire 
cosmos, impacting every activity, what the ancient Greeks called arche.
737
 
While the suggested link between Stoicism and field theory is ampliative for 
theological discussion of Spirit, before this concept can be responsibly 
engaged, the problem of pneuma being understood as matter according to the 
Stoics must be addressed. 
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While Pannenberg is willing to accept that the Stoic pneuma was 
understood to be material substance, and so would need to be further adapted, 
it can be argued that such a view is somewhat spurious. Instead, the idea that 
the Stoic pneuma is material was likely built upon criticisms of the Stoics.
738
 
Further, it is questionable how much Faraday actually modified it within his 




Michael White argues that the Stoic pneuma is better understood as the 
‘active principle’ of material objects rather than having a materiality of its 
own.
740
 Further, upon close examination of Sambursky’s work, it becomes 
clear that although the Stoic pneuma and Aristotelian aether, the latter of 
which was understood materially, began to be used interchangeably from a 
very early period prior to the Middle Ages, such a conflation mischaracterises 
the Stoic understanding of pneuma.
741
 Instead, as Sambursky notes, ‘although 
the Stoics believed in the corporeal nature of the pneuma, they came to regard 
it as something not akin to matter, but rather to force.’742 The Stoics described 
pneuma in ‘god-like’ terms, with Chrysippos referring to ultimate cause in the 
universe as a pneumatic force, or ‘dynamis pneumatike.’743 The idea of God as 
the pervasive dynamic force that brings about the corporeality of all things, as 
well as the ultimate cause of everything, will find extensive consonance within 
Pannenberg’s use of field theory.  
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This underlying concept of the Stoic pneuma seems particularly 
promising given that Pannenberg is careful to add that ‘the person of the Holy 
Spirit is not himself to be understood as the field but as a unique manifestation 
(singularity) of the field of the divine essentiality.’ In order to maintain a view 
of the Spirit’s work in creation as necessarily personal while still having ‘the 
character of dynamic field operations,’ the Spirit must ultimately be 
understood as ‘more than a field of divine essentiality.’744 Because of this, 
even though Pannenberg’ application of field theory in a theological context 
will bear strong similarities to the scientific presentation of field theory, it will 
differ in significant ways.
745
 In particular, Pannenberg’s unique understanding 
of Spirit, taken by him to be field theory’s modification of the Stoic pneuma, 
heavily influences Pannenberg’s doctrine of the Trinity. Because 
Pannenberg’s understanding of God’s dynamic interaction with the created 
world in terms of field is related to the understanding of God as Spirit, a 
discussion of God’s existence as Spirit, which necessarily becomes a 
discussion of the immanent Trinity and the relationship among the trinitarian 
persons, must follow.  
 
2. The Holy Trinity and Field Theory 
2.1 Spirit of God 
As stated, Pannenberg maintains that his ‘critical reflection has 
dissolved the idea of nous as the subject of divine action’ because of the 
term’s incompatibility with the Hebrew ruach or the New Testament God who 
becomes incarnate and interacts directly with His creation.
746
 Instead, the 
adoption of field, seen as an adaptation of the Stoic pneuma, carries with it 
‘some astonishing possibilities’ that allow for ‘a new understanding of the 
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relations between the trinitarian persons and the divine essence that is 
common to all of them.’747 
Pannenberg notes that the New Testament uses the term ‘Spirit’ in two 
senses: the unified Godhead, and the third person of the Trinity, the Holy 
Spirit, specifically. This highlights some of the difficulty in defining the 
trinitarian relationship, particularly with regard to the Holy Spirit, who is 
united, yet distinct from the other two persons of the Trinity. While one may 
recognise that these are two distinct senses that the New Testament uses to 
speak of the ‘Spirit,’ it quickly becomes clear that the two senses are 
unavoidably intertwined and inseparable. Pannenberg insists that 
understanding the Spirit in terms of field transforms both senses of Spirit.
748
 
Pannenberg begins his engagement field theory by focusing on the 
unity of the Godhead.
749
 Although orthodox formulations of the doctrine of 
God affirm co-equality or deny an intra-trinitarian hierarchy, Pannenberg 
argues that, by conceiving of the Spirit primarily along the terms of nous there 
is a natural and unintended, implied hierarchy. Because the Holy Spirit is seen 
as proceeding from the Father, the Holy Spirit, understood as nous distinct 




In order to avoid the inevitable tendency toward a hierarchical picture 
of the Trinity that comes with adopting a notion of the Holy Spirit as nous, 
Pannenberg maintains that an understanding of the divine Spirit as pneuma 
can yield a more egalitarian understanding of the Trinity. In contrast to nous, 
‘the deity as field can find equal manifestation in all three persons’ who ‘are 
not independent of the Spirit of love that binds them. They are simply 
manifestations and forms—eternal forms—of the one divine essence.’751 He 
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describes each trinitarian person as a unique manifestation of the fullness of 
the same divine field or Spirit of love.
752
  
This shared divine Spirit is also the Holy Spirit such that each person 
of the Trinity is equal as far as each one is a manifestation of the divine field, 
and the Holy Spirit is the manifestation of this divine field by acting as the 
unifying field between all three persons. Thus one might say that the Father 
and Son share a common essence through their unity to the Spirit, and it is the 
Holy Spirit as this common essence that distinguishes the Spirit from the 
Father and Son.
753
 In this way the two senses of Spirit are understood, at least 
on one level, as indistinguishable. But Pannenberg acknowledges that, though 
understanding Spirit in terms of field may avoid a hierarchy with the Father as 
primary, it may lead to a hierarchy with the Holy Spirit as primary. 
To avoid this problem, Pannenberg describes the distinctive nature of 
each person of the Trinity within a relational model of the Trinity. Because the 
Spirit proceeds from the Father and is received by the Son, the person of 
Father and Son can be distinct from each other in that one imparts and the 
other receives.
754
 The Spirit between them is the unifying factor (divine field 
of love) that ensures that even though distinct persons, they are still one 
essence. It is at this point that Pannenberg introduces a marked shift that 
grants the ‘new insight’ he had promised. Because the Spirit, existing only as 
field, ‘would be impersonal,’ Pannenberg declares that ‘the Spirit is not just 
the divine life that is common to both the Father and the Son. He also stands 
over against the Father and Son as his own centre of action.’ Or to expand 
further, ‘if the union [of Father and Son] is to include the Spirit as person, it 
must be assumed that the personal Spirit, as he glorified the Son in his relation 
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to the Father and the Father through the Son, knows that he is united thereby 
to both.’755 
The Spirit exists as a distinct, yet interdependent person of the Trinity 
by virtue of his ‘self-relation, which in each [person of the Trinity] is mediated 
by the relations to the other two persons.’756 In other words, each person of the 
Trinity is both distinct and interdependent as a member the Trinity, through 
the unification of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit expresses distinctness by 
acting as the source of trinitarian interdependence, and acting in relation to 
himself. Thus, the Holy Spirit is distinct precisely in his self-relation. 
Although Pannenberg acknowledges that this conclusion is by no means a 
complete picture of the Trinity, he maintains that the primary thing we can say 
about the trinitarian persons is that they are fundamentally persons in relation 
and, as persons, are thus also active in the world in a manner that bears 
resemblance to the dynamic field of physics.
757
 Thus the active relation to the 
Spirit within the immanent Trinity may be said to be the unifying factor, but 
the manner that such a relation occurs also distinguishes each member of the 
Trinity from the other two. 
While Pannenberg discusses the insights into intra-trinitarian relations 
that are offered through his application of field theory, he spends more time 
examining the implications of field theory upon his understanding of the 
economic Trinity. For Pannenberg, the economic Trinity is the primary means 
of understanding God. Through introducing dynamic field as the unifying 
element of the Trinity, Pannenberg, according to Grenz, ‘brings the divinity of 
the three persons into the divine activity of history. Constitutive for this 
divinity is the activity of each person in view of the others. In this way the 
deity of the one God, that is, God’s unity, is bound to the work of the three 
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persons in the world.’758 Said differently, for Pannenberg the immanent 
Trinity is best understood in light of the economic Trinity. Therefore, it is 
important to examine how Pannenberg describes the activity of God, the 
economic Trinity, in relation to dynamic field. 
 
2.2 Divine Dynamic Field in light of Michael Polanyi’s work 
 One way that Pannenberg’s adoption of field theory purports to 
respond to the problems of materiality associated with the term pneuma is by 
relating pneuma to space or space-time instead of physical entities. 
Pannenberg reasons that the way in which the concept of field ‘can be used to 
interpret the idea of God as Spirit depends largely on how we relate time and 
space to God’s eternity.’759 Given the focus upon time in the previous chapter, 
it will be useful to focus our discussion where that one ended: that all of 
creation is moving toward a single goal, which Pannenberg terms ‘the end of 
history.’ 
Pannenberg approaches the concept of the end of history via Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, a Jesuit Priest who argued that humanity’s ultimate 
evolution would be found at ‘Omega Point.’760 Pannenberg’s primary reason 
for appealing to Teilhard is that Teilhard allows that there may be more than 
one form of energy. One that is material, which he terms ‘tangential energy,’ 
and one that is spiritual, which Teilhard terms ‘radial energy.’761 However, 
Teilhard’s description of radial energy begins to fall apart, for Pannenberg, 
once it is examined to be largely indistinguishable from Aristotle’s final cause, 
which lapses into determinism.
762
 The situation is only compounded upon 
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further examination, for the later Teilhard clarifies his stance on ‘Omega 
Point,’ declaring that it is not an eschatological concept and has no true 
relation to the ‘end of history’ as Pannenberg understands it.763 Instead, 
Teilhard allows that history continues, but after the ‘Omega Point’ humanity 
has evolved to be part of the ‘Super Christ’ who is beyond history, in 
terminology akin to the pantheism of Brahmic Hinduism, where the individual 
ceases to exist independent of God.
764
 
This, more than anything, leads Pannenberg to reject Teilhard’s 
discussion of Omega because, for Pannenberg, conscious, independent, 
existence of creatures continues after the ‘end of history,’ albeit in a non-
temporal (i.e., eternal) frame of reference; the sustained independent existence 
of creation is a necessary aspect of the creative act itself for Pannenberg, both 
initially and in continuous creation, as noted in chapter two.
765
 Teilhard’s 
vision, though, does not require sustained independent existence, in part, 
because contingency is not central to it. Through his likening of the ‘Omega 
Point’ to the Thomist/Aristotelian final causation Teilhard relinquishes 
contingency for the sake of a fixed timeline. Creation is drawn on fixed 
temporal pathway, in Teilhard’s reasoning, toward the ‘Omega Point.’ It is a 
fixed destiny that reinterprets contingency in terms of the diachronic 
contingency of Aristotle abandoning the synchronic contingency of Scotus. 
This is because, as Teilhard describes Omega Point, God is overwhelmingly 
causing this end not only to occur, but to occur in a particular sort of way. 
Still, Pannenberg suggests that Teilhard’s Omega Point might be 
salvaged through application of ‘the phenomena of an energy field’ 
understood in terms offered by Michael Polanyi.
766
Specifically, Pannenberg 
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suggests that combining Michael Polanyi’s concept of a ‘morphogenic field’ 
with Teilhard’s ‘vision of point Omega at work in the process of evolution’ 
would mean that the causal influence of field upon matter could be a way of 
describing ‘the power of the divine spirit’ within creation.767 Pannenberg, as 
noted in the last chapter, accepts the idea that all of creation is moving toward 
a specified goal, linking this concept to both his anthropology and his 
understanding of the resurrection of Christ. However, the ‘radial energy’ 
described by Teilhard cannot be guided directly by the Omega Point. If it were 
to be directly guided, this would amount to a one-to-one causal influence from 
the future of the present and all intervening periods. However, we can suggest 
an indirect guidance, and thus adapt the concept of radial energy as guided by 
Omega through the medium of morphogenic field described by Polanyi.  
To understand Polanyi’s view of a morphogenic field, we must begin 
by noting that Polanyi argued against the scientific perspective that reduces all 
biological processes to chemical and mechanically physical actions.
768
 
Morphogenesis is the process where a cell or embryo begins to take its unique 
shape or when it begins to mature at the cellular level. Polanyi argues that, 
rather than viewing this process as completely ‘mechanically’ determined by 
DNA, there is room to suggest an ‘organismic’ development that disallows the 
reduction of biology to a mechanistic process.  
To make this argument, Polanyi adapts the concept of dynamic field. It 
is critical to note here that Polanyi is not using the term ‘field’ to describe a 
different process than the field from physics that we have been discussing in 
terms of Faraday and Einstein. Rather, Polanyi, a former student of Einstein, 
uses the same core concept of field as Einstein, showing the broad potential of 
the ‘field’ concept through its biological application.769 
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Polanyi adapts the field concept in such a way that it may be 
understood as the guiding process of cellular development that allows for an 
undetermined (contingent) process of each unique cell’s development because 
each instance is a unique application of the dynamic field. For Polanyi, rather 
than the super-dense point from which the universe began (or which possibly 
exists at the centre of a black hole), the singularity is the way that the 
undefined field eventually expresses itself, and thus might be understood in 
terms of any manifestation of the field. Specifically, Polanyi suggests that 
DNA provides the information necessary for the ‘boundary conditions’ of a 
cell without exactly determining every aspect of the cell’s growth. He notes, 
for example, that the regeneration properties of an embryonic sea urchin do 
not always produce identical sea urchins.
770
 Nevertheless, there are certain key 
ways in the process of each cell’s development which suggest there is 
something in addition to DNA that guides the development or, in the case of 
the sea urchin, regeneration of the cells. 
Polanyi explains that, in these developments ‘we see an integrative 
power at work here, characterized…as a “field”, which guides the growth of 
the embryonic fragments.’771 Continuing his discussion of a biological field, 
Polanyi notes that the field is both the causal guiding force behind cellular 
growth and maturation, and is somehow fully integrated into each individual 
cell. While Polanyi notes that the study of ‘epigenetics’772 may highlight one 
aspect of that ‘field,’ he is sceptical that it can fully account for all of the 
morphogenic and regenerative properties of life.
773
 Polanyi concludes his 
argument by stating that ‘once "field"-like powers guiding regeneration and 
morphogenesis can be recognized… I think the evidence for them will be 
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found to be convincing,’ but he gives no indication as to what this evidence 
may actually look like.
774
 Still, given the increased interest in a ‘field theory of 
information’ it seems that contemporary science is advancing upon the idea 
that information, which Polanyi noted exists biologically as DNA, can give 
guidance to a non-physical causal field.
775
  
For our purposes, this demonstrates a close association between the 
non-physical field and causation upon the physical world. More directly, 
Polanyi suggests that while DNA provides the overall information for cellular 
construction, it is the morphogenic field that determines the particular 
expression of this DNA. The morphogenic field, as described by Polanyi, 
provides the ‘boundary conditions’ in which the contingency or freedom of 
individual genetic expression at the cellular and morphological, or organ-level, 
can occur. It is not that these processes are random, nor that they are 
determined entirely by environmental factors, as evidenced by the sea urchin, 
but that cells are allowed freedom
776
 to a particular outcome, which may be 
obtained through a variety of avenues. It is these boundary conditions, that 
nevertheless encourage a certain amount of non-determined action, that 
comprise the morphogenic field. While the individual cells may not have a 
volition, there is strong reason to believe, concludes Polanyi, that certain 
morphological structures, such as the brain, do determine future growth, 
guided by this morphogenic field, in accordance with an independent will.
777
 
Polanyi’s ‘morphogenic field’ applied to Teilhard’s Omega point, 
along with Teilhard’s concept of radial energy, resonates with Pannenberg’s 
argument that the Spirit, as field, acts from the eschaton, manifesting himself 
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causally in the whole of creation, down to the cellular level. Thus the ‘radial 
energy’ of Teilhard is guided, not in an absolute sense by the Omega Point as 
Teilhard claimed, but via Polanyi’s ‘morphogenic field.’ In this way, the 
Omega Point provides a boundary condition. There is a determined, or fixed 
with regard to its nature/character, end to history, but the manner in which that 
end is achieved remains open. 
From this, we might describe the causal activity of God in terms of 
dynamic field such that God exerts a causal influence upon all of creation 
down to the cellular level and even to the molecular level, without 
overwhelming that same creation. This is because, as Polanyi noted, such a 
causal field still allows for the development of cells, or the causal interaction 
of molecules, to occur contingently. If both Teilhard and Polanyi are taken 
together, then one may speak of God acting from the future upon our present 
as a field. To speak of God’s action in the present is to speak of the economic 
Trinity, while God’s existence in eternity or from the future is understood in 
terms of the immanent Trinity. These two diverse ways of speaking about the 
Trinity are brought together through Pannenberg’s understanding of the 
relation between the immanent and economic Trinities. In order to seriously 
engage the link between the immanent and economic Trinity, particularly in 
the manner Pannenberg does, we must also examine the way in which 
Pannenberg understands Rahner’s famous dictum linking the economic and 
immanent Trinity. 
 
3 The Immanent and Economic Trinity 
3.1 Rahner and Moltmann 
 It would be an understatement to say that Karl Rahner’s axiom ‘The 
“economic” Trinity is the “immanent” Trinity and the “immanent” Trinity is 
the “economic” Trinity’ has made a significant impact on contemporary 
trinitarian studies.
778
 While it would be well beyond the scope of this study to 
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give an in-depth analysis of Rahner’s axiom and subsequent reactions to it, a 
general overview of Rahner’s position, followed by Moltmann’s response, will 
provide the necessary background for discussing Pannenberg’s own 
engagement with the axiom. 
In developing his axiom, Rahner emphasises the Trinity as three 
persons,
779
 distinct in their personhood and united in an eternal mystery that is 
given by revelation, unknowable through empirical or any other means.
780
 
Further, while it is not incorrect to refer to the incarnation as God becoming 
man, Rahner emphasises that incarnation is unique to the Logos: ‘only he is 
man.’781 Each person of the Trinity distinguishes himself to us by his own 
‘hypostatic function’782: the Father is the ‘unoriginate one,’ unmade and un-
generated; the Son is begotten and incarnates; and the Spirit is breathed and 
descends.
783
 At its core, Rahner’s claim is meant to emphasise the present 
reality of God revealed in salvation history as Trinity, graciously present to 
humanity through the unique missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit, through 
whom we know the Father.
784
 Rahner seeks to maintain a soteriological focus 
on the Trinity in contrast to the rationalistic way that the ‘economic Trinity 
                                                                                                                                




 Though as noted below, Rahner prefers the term ‘subsistances’ to ‘persons.’ Note this is 
distinct from subsistence. The subsistance is connected with substantia itself connected with 
ustantia and hypostantia. We may consider the term, as Rahner uses it, to be roughly 
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 Hypostasis may be understood as person, in a different sense. Rahner may prefer 
‘subsistence’ because it allows him to differentiate the divine Christ from the human Jesus, 
but these two are ‘hypostatically unified,’ into the one ‘hypostatis’ of Jesus. Rahner’s use of 
terminology is highly technical, and there is certainly not universal agreement on the best way 
to engage in this discussion.  
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was not considered until many other doctrines had been discussed.’785 Rahner 
argues that his axiom navigates between modalism and tritheism, while 
offering a genuine trinitarian conception of God.
786
 
 Jürgen Moltmann, however, argues that Rahner is in danger of falling 
into modalism, owing to what he sees as Rahner’s misunderstanding of the 
modern notion of ‘person.’787 Rahner posits that the modern use of ‘person’ 
suggests a highly individualised personality with its own ‘centre of activity,’ 
which would create too stark a separation between Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit, and therefore suggests that instead the term ‘subsistence’ be used, 
rather than ‘person’ in discussion of the Trinity.788 Moltmann, however, 
argues that ‘person’ is properly understood as an ‘I-Thou’ relationship, 
characterised in the Trinity as a love from an I to a Thou. Thus, for Moltmann, 
there can be no mutual love or trinitarian relationship, or even, therefore, a 
trinitarian person, without a ‘Thou.’ A mutual love is requisite for the Holy 




Still, Moltmann affirms Rahner’s claim that ‘the economic Trinity is 
the immanent Trinity’ and vice versa. For Moltmann, the focus begins at the 
cross; the Trinity cannot be understood apart from the cross for that is the 
central event in revelation history and the core identity of both the economic 
and immanent Trinity is found in the cross. The cross is so central that it is not 
enough to say that the economic Trinity ‘reveals the immanent Trinity [in the 
cross]; it [the cross] also has a retroactive effect on it [the immanent 
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Trinity].’790 The relationship of the Trinity to the world, therefore, is also a 
mutual relationship, and, as such, the Christ event impacts the eternal 
(immanent) life of the Trinity, and this effect continues throughout the ‘history 
of the Spirit.’ The effect of the cross is completed at the end of history, 
through the work of the Spirit within history.
791
 The influence of the cross 
upon the Trinity is both eschatological and exerts a retroactive influence upon 
the immanent Trinity back to creation. In this way, Moltmann emphasises not 
only the cross, but also the eschatological effect of the cross upon creation as 
having an impact upon the trinitarian relationship, until ‘the economic Trinity 
is raised into and transcended in the immanent Trinity.’792 Thus, for 
Moltmann, Rahner’s axiom becomes a way of describing the influence of 
historical occurrence upon the Trinity, and vice versa, rather than a way of 




3.2 The Primacy of the Economic Trinity in Pannenberg 
 Pannenberg also enters into dialogue with Rahner’s axiom, but first 
suggests that Barth may have addressed this same issue ‘in the prolegomena 
to’ his Church Dogmatics, as well as in the second chapter of the first 
volume.
794
 In referring to Barth’s discussion of ‘the manifestation of the 
Trinity in the economy of salvation,’ Pannenberg suggests that Barth’s claims 
correspond ‘to the realization that the immanent Trinity is identical with the 
economic Trinity.’795 Pannenberg allows for the possibility that this apparent 
‘unity of the immanent and economic Trinity...set forth in Barth’s discussion’ 
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may simply be a ‘shortening of perspective due to the Christocentric concept 
of revelation,’ but this apparent unity of the immanent and economic Trinity in 
Barth may have served as the impetus for Rahner’s statement. 796  
By grounding the background to Rahner’s axiom in Barth, Pannenberg 
lays the ground for his eventual claim that, in acting upon the created world, 
God ‘has made himself dependent’ upon that creation.797 A basis for this 
connection can be found in Barth’s claim that ‘Yahweh does not stand above 
the covenant, but in it.’ However, Pannenberg disregards Barth’s additional 
qualifier ‘yet He is also not under it’798 and argues that the act of creation not 
only produces a strong connection between the economic and immanent 
Trinity, but makes God subject to the covenant he inaugurates at creation. 
There is still some continuity with Barth for, as Pannenberg argues, God 
subjugates himself willingly and is not subjugated as one who is conquered.
799
 
The act of creation is, for Pannenberg, grounded in the active presence of the 
Holy Spirit within the present world. So, when Ted Peters notes that, for 
Pannenberg, ‘the persons of the trinitarian Godhead and the independent 
creation are singularities arising from the dynamic field of the Spirit’s 
activity,’ we should immediately begin to draw connections between the 




Like Moltmann, Pannenberg describes the created world and the 
trinitarian life of God as interwoven through the active working of the Spirit. 
Pannenberg’s view of the Spirit as the unifying bond between the persons of 
the immanent Trinity,
801
 and his claim that creation is animated by that same 
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uncreated life giving spirit, which he equates with the divine breath, adds an 
interesting dimension to discussion of the economic and immanent 
Trinities.
802
 In light of his description of the role of the Spirit, Pannenberg 
suggests that, by ‘extending the thought of Rahner, one might thus say that 
creation is brought into the relations of the trinitarian persons and participates 
in them.’ Additionally, through the interaction of Spirit and Son with the 
world, ‘the Father, too, stands in relation to the history of the economy of 
salvation.’803 By relating the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity so 
strongly with the created world, Pannenberg reminds us again of the tension 
inherent in the very act of creation, first discussed in chapters one and two, 
that is only resolved at the eschaton. 
 Related to this discussion of the immanent Trinity and economic 
Trinity, Pannenberg draws on Hegel’s philosophy to argue that ‘the concept of 
essence presupposes an existence into whose essence we inquire.’804 For our 
present discussion, this means that, for Pannenberg, the divine essence of the 
Trinity (immanent Trinity) presupposes a real existence that is observable in 
some way within material space-time (economic Trinity) which is ‘more 
basic’ than this corresponding essence, at least as concerns knowledge of God. 
Given Pannenberg’s insistence that revelation is grounded in historical event, 
as discussed in chapter three, it makes sense that he would ground knowledge 
of the Trinity in history as well. Our primary means of epistemic access to the 
Trinity is, therefore, through the historical action of the economic Trinity, 
which in turn reveals the nature of the immanent Trinity, understood in part by 
the evidence of the economic Trinity and in part through the exercise of 
reason. 
 Continuing this line of thought, Pannenberg argues that ‘the divine 
persons…are concretions of the divine reality as Spirit. They are individual 
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aspects of the dynamic field of the eternal Godhead.’805 In other words, our 
primary knowledge about God comes from our experience of the divine 
persons as manifestations of the active Spirit, whom we are closely associating 
with field in Pannenberg’s theology. Pannenberg amplifies this connection 
between our knowledge about God and the present, observable work of the 
Spirit when he declares that ‘the Father and Son have their unity, and therefore 
their divine essence, only through their relation to the Spirit; and the Spirit is a 
distinct hypostasis only by his relation to the distinction and fellowship of the 
Father and the Son in their differentiation.’806 Following this logic, then, the 
Spirit not only serves as the unifying element of all creation, by virtue of being 
the source of all creation, but also serves as the unifying element within the 
Immanent Trinity. Rather than an entirely novel claim, however, one can see 
the basis for this in a wide range of ‘social Trinity’ models, like those of John 
Zizioulas and Stanley Grenz, which claim heritage in the Augustinian model, 




Setting aside, for the moment, Pannenberg’s more radical claim 
regarding the ontology of the trinitarian persons, let us first examine 
Pannenberg’s discussion of the related epistemological issues of the Trinity, 
which is how God is known as Trinity. Pannenberg cites the ancient Christian 
creeds to argue that, while the Father is known as a person through his 
distinction from the Son (the Father is the begetter), and the Son is likewise 
known through his distinction from the Father (the Son is the begotten), the 
Spirit is known as a separate person through his distinction both from Father 
and Son and through his distinctive action as the unifying divine essence of all 
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three persons of the Trinity precisely in their own distinction.
808
 Pannenberg 
views the Holy Spirit both as ‘one of the personal concretions of the essence 
of God as Spirit in distinction from the Father and Son’ and as the ‘dynamic 
field’ that is manifest in such a way as to unify the trinitarian persons.809 Thus, 
‘on the one side the Spirit and love constitute the common essence of the 
deity...on the other they come forth as separate hypostasis in the Holy 
Spirit.’810  
In light of this, Pannenberg can apply the language reserved for the 
Holy Spirit to the divine essence, what he refers to as simply Spirit. This will 
prove particularly important later in the chapter since Pannenberg finds the 
linguistic connection between the dynamic field of physics and the Stoics to 
find its most suitable connection to Christian theology via the language of the 
Holy Spirit. It is for this reason that he states ‘the idea of the divine life as a 
dynamic field sees the divine Spirit who unites the three persons as proceeding 
from the Father, received by the Son, and common to both, so that precisely in 
this way he is the force field of their fellowship that is distinct from them 
both.’811 This identification of the person, and the activity of the Holy Spirit as 
both distinct from the other persons of the Trinity, in that he acts directly 
within our history and is radically present to creation, and as the uniting 
presence among the Trinity, means that our language about the Holy Spirit, 
acting within the world, directly applies to God, as eternal Trinity. It is in this 
way that Pannenberg interprets Rahner’s axiom. 
 Through identifying the immanent Trinity with economic Trinity, 
Pannenberg asserts that the Godhead’s self-revelation to humanity in history is 
primarily through God’s observable action on earth. Knowledge about the 
Trinity as Trinity can only come from the action of the Trinity in history. 
Moreover, so tangible is this activity that these actions are open to observation 
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 This is all, of course, in distinction from the interpretation 
offered by the dialectic theology paradigmatic of Bultmann as discussed in the 
second and third chapters. The Holy Spirit provides more knowledge of the 
immanent Trinity than the Father or Son, despite being ‘manifest only in 
distinction from’ the other two trinitarian persons, because ‘his working in 
creation has more of the character of dynamic field operations,’ than either the 
Son or Father, and so we can understand God’s causal action from eternity 
through the picture of it given via the Spirit’s ‘working in creation.’813  
However, we are here immediately presented with a problem. If 
Pannenberg wants to ground our knowledge of God in the historical action of 
God, should it not be the case that the Son, who acted most visibly in history, 
would be the epistemological foundation for such knowledge, and not the 
Spirit? Pannenberg acknowledges this inclination by noting that our 
knowledge of God was grounded historically first in the actions and words of 
the incarnate Christ.
814
 According to Pannenberg’s interpretation of the 
biblical text, Jesus revealed the nature of the Trinity primarily through the 




According to Pannenberg, the early church did not receive these 
statements of Jesus, concerning his relationship with the Father, as indication 
of the Trinity in their own right, but only in light of the resurrection. For 
Pannenberg, ‘the starting points for the history of primitive Christian 
Christology and also for that of the doctrine of the Trinity which arose out of 
primitive Christology’ are found only in light of the resurrection of Jesus, 
which itself serves as a ‘divine confirmation of the claim’ that Jesus made 
during his historical earthly life.
816
 So the historical development of 
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Christology, which, in light of the statements of Jesus necessitates the 
development of a doctrine of the Trinity, must be grounded in the historic 
event of the resurrection.  
Before directly examining the resurrection event in light of the Trinity, 
however, Pannenberg returns to the actions of Jesus for which the resurrection 
acted as confirmation. Specifically, Pannenberg notes that the description of 
the ‘words and works of Jesus in the Gospels’ acts primarily as ‘an expression 
of the presence of the Spirit of God within him’ and in this way leading to a 
doctrine of the Trinity. As Pannenberg summarises, ‘the fellowship of Jesus as 
Son with God as Father can obviously be stated only if there is reference to a 
third as well, the Holy Spirit.’817 This, in turn, means that our discussion of 
field in relation to the Spirit will have direct bearing upon our understanding 
of the Godhead as a whole. 
Moving now to a more direct understanding of the Trinity in light of 
the resurrection, one should recall the discussion in the previous chapter which 
noted that the resurrection, for Pannenberg as for the earliest followers of 
Jesus, was necessarily an eschatological event. The eschatological hope, 
grounded in the ancient Israelite view, is that the Spirit of God would be 
‘present with eschatological ultimacy as an abiding gift’ to the people of God. 
This was exemplified, for the early believers, ‘especially in the expectation of 
the Spirit-filled Messiah.’818  
For Pannenberg, the relation of Jesus as ‘Kyrios’ to God as Father is 
only understood in the Spirit’s working as the ‘mediation of the fellowship’ 
between the two into which the believer is invited.
819
 It is ‘the involvement of 
the Spirit in God’s presence in the work of Jesus and in the fellowship of the 
Son with the Father’ that resulted in ‘the Christian understanding of God…in 
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the doctrine of the Trinity and not in a biunity of the Father and the Son.’820 
Thus, while the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity is found in an historical 
event that is central to personal identity of Jesus, the resurrection, the 
development of the doctrine, requires the activity of the other two persons of 
the Trinity in relation to the Son.  
In particular, the Spirit is the foundation for our understanding of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, and the Spirit as the Spirit of God is only revealed as 
both distinct from and equal to the Father in the historic message and actions 
of Jesus. It is not the message of Jesus primarily that reveals the Trinity, but 
‘the content of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ’ in his historical actions, 
and the historical milieu into which that message occurs, that reveals the 
Trinity.
821
 This content acts as revelation in light of the confirmation of the 
message of Jesus provided through the resurrection accomplished in the power 
of the Spirit. Having demonstrated that the basis for a discussion of the Trinity 
is found in the Spirit, we now turn to the radical claim of Pannenberg 
concerning his doctrine of the Trinity. 
Pannenberg begins questioning the legitimacy of the early theologians’ 
decision to describe the Son and Spirit as having their origin in the Father 
only, and not also in relation to each other, such that the Father also begets the 
Spirit, and sends forth the Son, and the Son sends the Spirit and is the begotten 
of the Father. Pannenberg argues that this focus on the action of Father toward 
the Spirit and Son, without simultaneous consideration of the action of the 
Spirit and Son toward the Father, creates a hierarchy within the Trinity.
822
 To 
support his argument, Pannenberg turns to Athanasius, whom he notes ‘argued 
forcibly against the Arians that the Father would not be the Father without the 
Son. Does that not mean that in some way the deity of the Father has to be 
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dependent on the relation to the Son?’823 To further explore this issue, he 
examines the reign of God from the perspective of the economic Trinity. 
In particular, for Pannenberg the Kingdom of God is the ‘handing over 
of rule to the Son’ who, in turn, hands it ‘back again to the Father in the 
eschatological consummation.’ Moreover, this handing of authority from the 
Father to the Son and back again is revealed in the economic Trinity, not the 
immanent Trinity. That is, it is only ‘to be inferred from the mutual relations 
between the historical person of Jesus and the Father.’824 For Pannenberg, this 
handing over of power and back again is ‘to be seen also as a defining of the 
intra-trinitarian relations between the two,’ of Father and Son. However, it 
does not constitute two separate acts, but rather a single act where the two 
persons ‘interpenetrate one another.’825  
Further, the handing over of authority from the Father to the Son, as 
historical person, means that the sovereignty of the Father, as God, ‘is now 
dependent upon’ the historical action of Jesus because the Kingdom of God is 
integral to the nature of the Father, contrary to the arguments of Barth and 
Athanasius, for whom the Kingdom is vital, but separate from the identity of 
God.
826
 Thus, for Pannenberg, the ontos of the immanent Trinity is made 
dependent upon the action of the economic Trinity. This is seen particularly 
well in the accounts of the passion that are concerned both the human nature 
of Christ as well as ‘the trinitarian life of God. In the death of Jesus the deity 
of his God and Father was at issue.’827 
However, the event of the crucifixion does ‘not merely bring the deity 
of the Father as well as the Son into question. It refers [also] to the work of the 
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Spirit, who as the Creator of all life raises Jesus from the dead.’828 Pannenberg 
goes on to cite various references in Scripture that refer to the resurrecting 
power of the Spirit, but focuses the majority of his attention on the ‘life-
giving’ nature of the Spirit, which is addressed in the next chapter.829 Not only 
is the Spirit the grounding of our doctrine of the Trinity, the Spirit also, as 




Pannenberg’s more radical claim extends this discussion further to 
reject outright the Augustinian notion of double procession of the Spirit from 
both Father and Son, arguing that the filioque attachment to the Western 
Nicene Creed is altogether unnecessary, disagreeing with Barth’s defence for 
the inclusion of the term. Further, Pannenberg considers Moltmann’s 
reformulation of procession of the Spirit to be a non-starter because it does not 
address the fundamental, ancient description about the Spirit. Specifically, the 




Pannenberg pushes the boundaries of our discussion of the three 
trinitarian persons well beyond the claims of Rahner, by insisting that each 
trinitarian person exists ‘as living realizations of separate centres of 
actions.’832 Citing R. W. Jenson’s argument on this point, Pannenberg states 
that the self-distinction of each member of the Trinity not only affirms each 
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person’s own identity, but that this self-distinction is constitutive of the 
divinity of each person of the Trinity.
833
 
The ‘constitution’ of the Trinity is only arrived at as a ‘result of the 
common operation of the three persons’ within history.834 Pannenberg’s 
argument here is that to describe the Spirit as proceeding from both the Father 
and the Son is to understand the action of the Spirit in the exact opposite 
manner it should be understood. The Spirit does not proceed from the Father 
and from the Son, but proceeds from the Father to the Son and brings the Son 
to the Father. While the Son is distinct in his being begotten from the Father 
and being incarnate in observable human history, ‘the inner dynamic of [the 
Son’s] divine life finds expression in its concreteness as Spirit and love.’835  
Here, we are brought to the radical claim of Pannenberg: If the deity of 
the Son is preserved only as a result of the action of the Spirit, as Pannenberg 
has claimed, and if the Son, in light of the incarnation, must be understood as 
a ‘concretion’ of the Spirit, then the Spirit is epistemologically prior to the 
Son, that is the Son can only be known as the Son by the actions of the Spirit. 
This is not to say, however, that the Spirit or the Father is divine without the 
Son, only that a true understanding of the Trinity as coequal persons within a 
single essence would preclude the constitutional subjugation of any person in 
the Trinity to any other. The Spirit’s actions in history as ontological field are 
not only the primary source of revelation, but constitute the very nature of the 
Trinity. 
At this juncture, it becomes increasingly clear that Pannenberg’s 
description of the Trinity requires that we consider the Trinity primarily in 
terms of the economic Trinity. Yet Pannenberg affirms Rahner’s claim that the 
economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, such that we cannot neglect the 
nature of the immanent Trinity. Only in this way can we seriously meet Karl 
Barth’s demand that ‘we base the doctrine of the Trinity on the revelation of 
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God in Jesus Christ,’ something Pannenberg argues Barth did not achieve with 
respect to the immanent Trinity.
836
 Because of the incarnation, the history of 
the world becomes the history of God as immanent Trinity. As noted 
previously, it is not only the Son and the Spirit who must be revealed as divine 
in the events of the crucifixion and resurrection, but ‘the deity of the Father 
was itself called into question by the death of Jesus on the cross if it was the 




Pannenberg’s conclusion is that ‘the divine essence can no longer be 
thought of as an unrelated identity outside the world.’838 Instead, the 
sovereignty of God in his immanence is grounded upon his actions in history; 
the question of divine sovereignty and human freedom only makes sense in 
light of history. Yet, Pannenberg is not claiming the absorption of the 
immanent Trinity into the economic Trinity. Instead, for Pannenberg, the 
‘Trinity has sense and significance only if God is the same in salvation history 
as he is from eternity.’839 We must reject ‘the idea of a divine becoming in 
history, as though the trinitarian God were the result of history’ for such a 
description would make God involuntarily subject to historical processes and 
thus not truly divine.
840
 Rather, the resurrection of Jesus is only new life if it is 
tied to the resurrection of the dead at the eschaton, and only salvific if it is 
God’s decision to make himself dependent. For, in the latter case, God would 
be impotent to change the course of history, while creation would likewise be 
subject entirely to a history that exists beyond its control. Without God’s free 
choice from his sovereignty to make himself subject to the outcome of history, 
there is no sense of freedom for creation. 
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Who God has revealed himself to be in his universally observable 
actions is who God actually is; God has been revealed as knowable through 
his interaction with the created world, even if he is beyond that world. 
Pannenberg states that, while the Father maintains his transcendence, because 
of his vicarious relational action of ‘the creation of the world and the sending 
of his Son and Spirit to work in it, he [the Father] has made himself dependent 
upon the course of history.’841 God the Father is distinct from the world and 
beyond its comprehension, but places himself in the world by the action of the 
Spirit. 
Despite the declaration of God’s dependence upon history, Pannenberg 
is emphatic that the transcendence of God, and particularly the Father, is not 
lost.
842
 He argues that his claims do  
not mean that God’s transcendence vanishes 
pantheistically in the infinity of nature, as in 
Spinozism, nor that it is simply an element in 
the divine process of producing and dissolving 
the world, as in Hegel, nor finally that it is just a 





Instead, God remains transcendent while drawing the world toward that same 
transcendence by his actions in nature. In his act of self-subjugation, God 
maintains a distinction between himself and his creation, thereby allowing for 
their freedom, lest his theology lapse into pantheism. Whether Pannenberg is 
able to maintain this distinction in light of criticisms of panentheism will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
 Pannenberg goes further still by suggesting that ‘in an advance on 
Rahner the person of the Father is thus implicated also in the course of 
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salvation history, and indeed in such a way that the progress of events decides 
concerning his deity as well as the deity of the Son.’ The course of the created 
world’s history is a determining factor in the nature of the Trinity, and while 
Pannenberg admits that ‘Rahner did not go this far,’ he asserts that ‘Only by 
this step, however, can we give life to his [Rahner’s] thesis regarding the 
identity of the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, for now the 
immanent Trinity itself, the deity of the trinitarian God, is at issue in the 
events of history.’ The eschatological event within history, of which the 
resurrection is a prolepsis, as discussed in the last chapter, is the final 
unification of the economic and immanent Trinities who, in light of the 
resurrection occurring in the midst of history, are already united. 
 This talk of the end of history brings the discussion back to Teilhard’s 
Omega point. Recall that Pannenberg suggested that Teilhard’s concept of 
energy could be modified through the adaption of field, as in Polanyi’s 
writings, in order to maintain the transcendence of the all-penetrating energy 
together with the freedom of independent creatures. Through the application 
of field theory to evolution, as in Polanyi, Pannenberg suggests it can ‘offer a 
modern language that possibly can express the biblical idea of the divine spirit 
as the power of life that transcends the living organism and the same time is 
intimately present in the individual.’844 In this way, we will be able to connect 
the sovereignty of God, identified as the end of history akin to Teilhard’s 
Omega Point, with the contingent actions of creatures within history. 
 For now, we should keep in mind that the epistemic primacy of the 
economic Trinity over the immanent Trinity for our understanding of the 
nature of God, as described by Pannenberg, means that God must be 
understood in light of his actions in creation, which is itself history. Given that 
we know God through history, we can now also begin to address the other 
fundamental concern of our thesis, relating human freedom to divine 
sovereignty. 
 
                                                 
844
 TTN, 24. 
 




 This chapter has laid the groundwork upon which the constructive 
work of the next chapter will build. We began by taking the conclusion of 
chapter four, that God’s sovereignty is secured in that the end of history is not 
only defined, but has been seen proleptically within the course of history, and 
began to develop the manner in which we can understand history to remain 
contingent. While not fully addressed, the groundwork necessary to providing 
this critical answer was given through an examination of Pannenberg’s use of 
the ‘field’ concept in modern physics. In particular, the connection that the 
field concept makes between space and time, as evidenced by Einstein’s 
relativity physics, and the philosophical background for field theory in 
Stoicism will prove integral in the final chapter for giving a clear articulation 
of Pannenberg’s use of the ‘field’ concept. There the connection of the field 
concept to the Stoic pneuma, as well as the Stoic use of tonos will be placed in 
connection with the creative impact of a pneumatic field as it connects to time 
and history. To reconcile God’s sovereignty, which we may connect most 
directly with the immanent Trinity, with human freedom, we must understand 
the role of the Spirit not only within the intra-trinitarian relation, as given in 
this chapter, but also as the Spirit is involved in the act of creation, first 
introduced for this thesis in chapter one, but which will continue to drive the 
argument in the final chapter. The process of history, and the way in which 
these disparate ideas of sovereignty and freedom might be reconciled, is found 












CHAPTER 6- THE DYNAMIC FIELD OF HISTORY: SOVEREIGNTY 
WORKING THROUGH HUMAN FREEDOM 
 
The prior chapter introduced God’s action as Spirit via field and examined 
how this potentially impacted the doctrine of the Trinity. While Pannenberg’s 
use of field theory was examined generally, along with its philosophical 
background, the specific manner in which this offers a constructive description 
of the nature of divine causation was not given directly. Instead, the chapter, 
through examining the impact of field upon the Trinity, moved to emphasise 
the role of the economic Trinity for theological concerns above that of the 
immanent Trinity, while still affirming Rahner’s dictum. In so doing, the 
conversation was brought back to the issue of history in relation to God’s 
actions. In order to demonstrate how articulating Pannenberg’s overarching 
theological project as a theology of history gives a new approach to the 
tension between human freedom and divine sovereignty, this chapter will 
describe Pannenberg’s use of field theory as a field of temporality, wherein the 
Spirit creates the grounding of history as a manifestation of himself in the 
same manner as the dynamic field.  
A key aspect for our understanding of freedom beyond mere 
contingency, which could just as easily be characterised as randomness, is the 
concept of purpose, which can be achieved via Pannenberg’s modification of 
Teilhard and Polanyi to describe goal-oriented, contingent action. Pannenberg 
does this, in part, through an appeal to ecstasis as a creative response to the 
actions and being of God, as elucidated below. 
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However, in establishing the ecstatic response of life, there remains a 
danger in denying the distinction between Creator and created. This distinction 
is needed to maintain both the sovereignty of God and the freedom of 
humanity, since freedom would require that each human constitutes a distinct 
centre of volition. It seems that Pannenberg overcorrects by rejecting not only 
pantheism, but also panentheism. While it is important to reject pantheism and 
many forms of panentheism, Pannenberg fails to consider certain forms of 
panentheism that may actually buttress his theological vision, as creator and 
created choose to work toward a common goal, without being so unified that 
one is absorbed into the other. Indeed, in the discussion of panentheism at the 
end of this chapter, Pannenberg’s narrow definition of panentheism, as a sort 
of ‘naïve panentheism,’ will be critiqued.  
Once the ecstatic response of creation has been properly understood in 
Pannenberg’s theology, we can then move to articulate the way that field 
theory functions within Pannenberg’s theology of history. In the course of 
doing so, I will demonstrate the influence of Schelling upon Pannenberg, 
highlighted in chapter two, and place this in conjunction with the Stoic 
grounding for field described in the previous chapter. Given that the Stoics 
speak in the language of potentiality, it would be safe to conclude that, for the 
Stoics, the act of creation is one that takes place ‘from the future,’ in terms 
strikingly similar to those employed in chapter four. Further, given that the 
language of creation for the Stoics is one of potentiality moving into actuality, 
it would be wrong to characterise the Stoic idea of creation as the pneuma 
creating the material world and also the present. Rather, it should be argued 
that, by creating the present, or by actualising the potential future, the entirety 
of existence, including the material world, is made. 
It will be argued that Pannenberg’s theology is best understood as a 
theology of history, and the tension between divine sovereignty and human 
freedom can be resolved, if the Spirit is understood to causally act as a 
temporal field. The key to this will be establishing, in this chapter, that, for 
Pannenberg, the Spirit upholds creation by continually releasing the grounding 
for historical events from the future into the present such that while the end of 
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history has already been observed, the length of time between the present and 
the actualisation of that end within history is undefined. It is only in this way 
that we can speak of the end of history arising out of the free actions of 
creatures, while also claiming that the end is entirely defined. The former is 
critical for establishing that human actions are free and meaningful, while the 
latter is critical for maintaining the sovereignty of God. To begin this 
discussion, we must start where the prior chapter ended. Given Pannenberg’s 
connection of the Spirit with field, we must distinguish the manner in which 
we understand the Spirit to create as opposed to the other persons of the 
Trinity.  
 
1 The Holy Spirit Working as Dynamic Field in Creation via Singularity 
 Although Pannenberg seeks ‘to ground creation in the triune God,’ as 
noted in the previous chapter, when discussing the activity of God within the 
cosmos, Pannenberg places primary emphasis on the role of the Spirit.
 845
 The 
Father and Son also create, but ‘the Son’s...role in creation takes place in such 
a way that it is in the power of the Spirit that he [the Son] is the origin of the 
different creatures in their specific distinctiveness.’846 Since the Spirit is the 
unifying force within the Trinity and the person most readily present to us 
among the economic Trinity, what is said of the Spirit will inform our 
theology of the Triune God as a whole.  
Pannenberg’s approach to explaining the effective working of God 
within the physical universe is to explain the creative work of God through the 
application of ‘field,’ understood primarily as Spirit. Prior to examining the 
extent to which Pannenberg is successful in applying the field concept 
theologically, we must first understand how the Spirit broadly, in terms of 
field, functions in the world according to Pannenberg’s theology. Once 
Pannenberg’s application is examined and elaborated, its relation to our 
central questions of the tension between human freedom and divine 
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sovereignty, and the impact of understanding Pannenberg’s theology as one of 
history, will then be addressed.  
 According to Pannenberg, the Holy Spirit ‘understood as 
field...functions as the principle of the immanence of God in creation.’847 In 
other words, the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity through the Spirit’s 
role in creation, as the vicarious presence of the Father and the one by whom 
the Son acts, working as a dynamic field. The Holy Spirit, in this role, is 
necessarily creative and functions as the source of life for creation, an idea that 
has its roots in Teilhard.
848
 This concept of the Holy Spirit as the source of life 
is described by Teilhard as an extension of the spiritual energy characterised 
by love.
849
 Pannenberg, influenced by Teilhard, describes the Holy Spirit in 
terms of field, also characterised by love, who is the source of life, or Spirit of 
life, a concept that will also be explored in more detail in the next section.
850
 
 The concept of the Holy Spirit as the source of life is understood by 
Pannenberg via the Spirit’s working as the primary, creative, dynamic field 
upon all existence.
851
 To fully appreciate the depth of Pannenberg’s 
application of field theory, we should elaborate upon his contention that 
creation occurs as the manifestation of field, which Pannenberg describes as 
occurring via ‘singularities’ arising from the dynamic field of Spirit.852 We 
should first describe what is meant by ‘singularity’ in this context. 
In physics, a singularity is an area of immense density, having a high 
mass and concentrated in relative little space, which is undefined to a certain 
extent.
853
 It is hypothesised that, at the beginning of the universe, either 
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multiple singularities or a single singularity functioned as a sort of pure 
potentiality for which, in relation to forces expressed as fields, the number of 
variable values in relation to other particles is infinite.
854
. In this way, multiple 
singularities, or a single singularity, as a concentration of the dynamic field, 
resulted in the present state of the physical universe by collapsing all possible 
outcomes to a more limited set, initiating the ‘Big Bang.’855  
Today, the use of the term ‘singularity’ within modern field theory has 
been adapted from mathematics. There, a singularity generally means a point 
or points at which, for a given equation or vector (directional value), the 
values are undefined or for which all values become undifferentiated. In 
modern field theory, the term ‘singularity’ is used to describe massive 
gravitational fields that come into and out of existence and can develop into 
any number of physical objects. The exact vector values for these fields, 
which determine how they will interact with space-time and thus what they 
will become, remain undefined until they have a particular interaction. The 
existence of these fields is measurable, but the way in which they will interact 
with space-time is not predictable in light of the undefined nature of their 
vector fields. While Einstein’s physics equations theorised that singularities 
actually only occur at event horizons in black holes, field theory as it used 
outside of narrow relativity physics, does not necessitate that singularities 
only, or at least that they always only, occur in black holes.
856
 One might be 
tempted to reject field theory’s use of singularities by noting that, despite 
having initially suggested their existence, Einstein himself rejected the idea 
that singularities exist at all, whether in black holes, or even that singularities, 
or a single singularity, functioned as a beginning point of the universe at the 
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 Despite this, both Einstein’s equations as they have been 
developed within relativity physics, and the work of physicists working in 
other areas, have predicted and continue to predict the existence of these 
singularities throughout the universe.
858
  
Pannenberg hypothesises that God’s initial act of creation was via the 
Spirit, who manifested himself as singularities and functioned as the dynamic 
field, thus creating the world.
859
 Whether this is meant to be taken literally or 
metaphorically will be addressed below. For now, we should understand that, 
for Pannenberg, the Spirit of God is the creative force either as field or acting 
causally in the same manner as the dynamic field, though related to the 
physical universe in a unique manner. The introduction of the terminology of 
‘singularity,’ which will become particularly important toward the end of the 
chapter, highlights the contingent nature of creation first explained in chapter 
one. By applying field to creation as a whole and not just the manifestation of 
physical objects, through the doctrine of creatio continua, Pannenberg also 
incorporates fields beyond physics into the discussion. Of particular 
importance, when speaking of life, such as human life, is the relation of field 
to biology, which, as noted in the previous chapter, was first examined by 
Polanyi. Polanyi, as has been established, sought to counter what he 
considered the mechanistic view of the development of life by proposing that 
life develops contingently. One result of Polanyi’s application of field and 
singularities to biology is, among other things, the idea that life is, in 
Pannenberg’s terms, ‘ecstatic.’ Pannenberg takes the idea of ‘ecstasis’ and the 
concept of ‘ecstatic responses’ to be the manner by which the Spirit, 
understood as field, gives life to creation, as will be elucidated below.  
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2 The Ecstatic Nature of Life  
 Pannenberg asserts that the Holy Spirit acts as Creator by working as 
the life-giving field for creation, noting that ‘in the Bible the divine Spirit is 
understood as the origin of all life.’860 Pannenberg makes his claim, in part, 
based upon the ‘old image of breath’ which he equates with Spirit ‘as being 
the creative origin of life’ to bring a new understanding to the particular act of 
the creation of humanity. When Pannenberg employs Teilhard’s radial energy, 
he does not accept Teilhard’s claim that the Omega Point constitutes the 
consummation of evolution in the glorified state of people.
861
 Evolution, on its 
own, cannot be directed toward anything specific. It is a process that could just 
as likely lead to less complexity as it could to more complexity.  
Instead, Pannenberg uses Teilhard’s writing to argue that by examining 
the history of the world through an evolutionary lens one can see the life-
giving breath of God as the continuous active presence of the Spirit. For the 
Spirit to be ‘life-giving,’ Pannenberg argues that the evolutionary process 
must be guided toward a goal by the Spirit that necessarily includes a life-
giving stage, but not in such a way as to compromise the contingent nature of 
the process. 
 Again drawing on the work of Polanyi, Pannenberg describes the Spirit 
as a biological field that arouses an ‘ecstatic’ response in creation.862 
Pannenberg refers to the ecstatic response that the Spirit elicits in three 
different areas: in the church, found, for instance, in the presence of spiritual 
gifts; in redemption, by allowing the believer to participate in a life beyond 
himself/herself and commune with the ‘other’ who is God; and in creation by 
eliciting an ecstatic response in creatures that is essentially relational.
863
 Due 
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to the focus on historical action and, in particular, the creation event, it is with 
this latter use that we presently concern ourselves. 
For Pannenberg, all life is, to some measure, ecstatic. He means this in 
the simplest sense. All life must reach out beyond itself, such as from the 
environment, in order to survive and in so doing each creature brings about its 
own future.
864
 This ‘ecstatic character of the self-transcendence of life,’ is 
related to a future of which most animals are not necessarily aware. This is 
where Pannenberg draws the connection to Teilhard’s ‘radial energy.’865 
Teilhard defines radial energy as the presence of the Spirit of God within 
every created thing that guides and pulls it toward the Omega Point.’ The 
concept is important for its vision of a variety of independent causes moving 
toward a single goal, yet, as noted, Pannenberg argues that Teilhard’s vision is 
too deterministic. Instead the ‘radial energy’ of Teilhard must be 
‘replaced…by the assumption of a field of energy.’ This offers an explanation 
of the movement of history that it is ‘more complex’ than Teilhard’s and 
allows for contingent action by allowing each creature to participate in ‘an 
activity…beyond its limitations.’ In so doing, the field of the Spirit is able to 
‘grant it [the creature] its life.’866 For Teilhard, the ecstatic response of life in 
creation refers to what is essentially a response of the human consciousness to 
the Spirit’s continuous presence as a life-giving source, but for Pannenberg, 
the ‘Spirit is not identical with mind, nor is it manifested primarily through 
mind’ as in Teilhard.867 Pannenberg describes the development of a child 
growing independently of the mother as one of the most recognisable 
examples of a human ecstatic response.
868
 He qualifies his claim, though, by 
arguing that the ecstatic response is not ‘first and 
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foremost…consciousness.’869 Rather, the ecstatic response is the act of 
participating in something beyond the self that transcends one’s own finite 
existence. In this act the child recognises that there is an increasing level of 
distinction between himself and his mother and that the two are still in relation 
that allows for this distinction to be observed. While the child does not fully 
comprehend it, he has begun to observe the infinity of the other within his or 
her finiteness, though he or she may not recognise it as infinite.  
Given that this recognition of the child is a psychological development, 
Pannenberg recognises that the ecstatic response in humans is related to 
consciousness, but ‘only inasmuch as consciousness, and in particular 
charismatically intensified and ecstatic consciousness, is seen as an especially 
heightened form of life.’ Only through this recognition might we describe this 
development as evidence of the fact that life is ecstatic. However, if we are to 
say that the child is participating in the infinite beyond his or her own finite 
experience, reasons Pannenberg, there must be some infinite force drawing the 
individual into such an experience. For Pannenberg, this drawing of the finite 
toward the infinite is ecstatic only insofar as it is ‘the work of the Spirit.’870  
If the intervention of the Spirit is required to produce a truly ecstatic 
response, reasons Pannenberg, then we can describe all life as ecstatic only to 
the extent to which it is spiritual. The animal that reaches beyond itself to 
bring about a future of which it is largely unconscious does so only through 
the leading of the Spirit. While all life is ecstatic, for Pannenberg, ‘the ecstatic 
character found in all life reaches a new level of intensity, a new high point, in 
human beings.’871 Pannenberg notes that this intensity is found because 
humans are unique in possessing ‘a consciousness that bridges time,’ thereby 
not only anticipating the future, but also dealing with the present to bring 
about a unique and previously unimagined future goal. In other words, the 
life-giving act of the Spirit, to the extent that it is ecstatic, ‘grants a measure of 
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freedom unique to humanity.’872 This freedom is present in Pannenberg’s 
theology in a way that it is not for Teilhard due to the locus of the Spirit’s 
operation. For Teilhard, the Spirit operates from within the centre of 
individual beings, driving them toward Omega. For Pannenberg, the Spirit 
operates from without the human centres of consciousness, enticing them, but 
not overwhelming them, toward the future of God, which is itself life. Only in 
the context of a future orientation is Pannenberg’s use of ‘ecstatic life’ 
sensible. 
While Pannenberg acknowledges that his connection of ecstasy to the 
future may resemble Heidegger’s Sein-zum-Tode (Being-toward-death)873 he 
notes that ‘contrary to what Heidegger says [with respect to the anticipation of 
the future/one’s hour of death] …this anticipation is not to be understood 
originally in the light of care.’874 Pannenberg, in an interview with Godfrey 
Onah, reiterates his position that ecstasy is more than anticipation of the 
future, when he notes that his anthropology is not merely one of 
anticipation.
875
 While anticipation and eschatology are important, it is the 
present experience of the ‘prolepsis of the future,’ and not only its 
anticipation, which is key. In doing so, Pannenberg shifts the discussion away 
from the future only and toward a theology of history as a whole, one that 
incorporates the present experience of the historical future.
876
 Pannenberg 
elaborates, that ‘our Christian faith very much depends on the actual course of 
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history, [and] on the actual arrival of the fullness of the kingdom of God.’877 It 
is not enough to be drawn toward the not-yet-existent future, or to anticipate a 
future that is yet to come. In order for the Spirit to elicit an ecstatic response in 
humanity, we must be confronted with the ‘actual arrival’ of the end of history 
as the future that appeared, proleptically, at the resurrection of Jesus, as 
discussed in chapter four.  
In light of the inclusion of the proleptic appearance of the end of 
history, Pannenberg argues that ‘ecstatic self-transcendence’ is characterised 
not only by hope, but also by trust. Hope is understood with respect to the 
anticipation of the future end of history. Trust is necessary because of the 
proleptic arrival of that end in the Christ event—we trust in Christ and that in 
his resurrection as historical fact the end is already determined and has been 
revealed. Given that the future orientation is also tied to the past occurrence of 
that future, for Pannenberg, ‘history is the principium individuationis’ that is 
vital for an ecstatic response. The ecstatic response, as will be described 
below, not only draws the individual outside of herself/himself, but also 
allows the individual to recognise the distinction of himself/herself from the 
‘other’ toward which she/he is drawn. In this way, the ecstatic response also 
grants identity as an individual, a necessary component for freedom, as argued 
in chapter four.
878
 Pannenberg claims, then, that the ecstatic response is tied to 
history as a whole, and not the future alone, since it ties together our present 
experience of the past revelation of the future end of history. It is true that 
‘human beings grasp the meaning of their lives,’ from the end or goal of 
history, but that goal must be integrated into a present identity, ‘for the human 
being as historical being is not only the goal but also the movement of the 
history that leads to the goal.’879  
The ecstatic response of humanity is tied to history in at least two 
distinct ways. First, humanity is the product of historical occurrence, thus we 
                                                 
877
 Ibid., 211. 
 
878
 ATP, 526, 527. 
 
879
 ATP, 527. 
 
Sovereignty and Freedom: 241 
 
 
might say that God creates humanity by creating history.
880
 Second, humanity 
only comprehends anything as real insofar as it is historical.
881
 If these are 
both true, then God can only reveal himself to humanity if his revelation is 
also, itself, history, and to the extent that it is history it amounts to his self-
revelation. One way in which the Spirit begins to elicit an ecstatic response is 
through his self-revelation from the end of history. The locus of this revelation 
from the end of history is key, for ‘this movement [of history]…derives its 
unity from the future by which it will be completed.’882 Thus one cannot 
examine this or that moment of history in isolation, but must examine each 
event of history in relation to its unity which ‘has emanated from the God of 
the Bible and his revelation in Jesus Christ.’883 Humanity’s ability to perceive 
history, that is the connection of the future with present and past, what 
Pannenberg labels the ‘time-bridging present’ is what ‘makes possible the 
independence which characterizes human beings as subjects of responsible 
actions.’884 They are individuals in that they each individually experience and 
interpret history in a distinctive fashion. They are morally responsible in their 
individuality, first, and in their ability to perceive the connection of present 
actions to future outcomes. Again, as elucidated in chapter four, the 
individuality of humanity is necessary for freedom. However, the moral 
responsibility that is implied by the ‘time-bridging present’ experience of 
humanity implies human freedom as well.  
The ecstatic character of humanity is not only understood in its relation 
to God, but seeks to relate to all creatures as an individual ‘other,’ distinct 
from the self, as well.
 885
 In this way, ecstatic life is the differentiation of an ‘I’ 
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from a ‘Thou’ in the development of human conscious existence, and as such 
is also relational.
886
 It is ecstatic because the ‘I’ recognises the relationship of 
him/herself to the ‘Thou’ as an ‘I’ entering the relationship while still standing 
outside of, or independent of, the ‘Thou’: ‘As an individual the human I is 
always distinct from its relation to any specific human person.’887 For 
Pannenberg, it is characteristic of the human experience to be ‘present to the 
other as other.’888 In order for the I-Thou relationship to truly be the 
connection between two parties, and not a pantheistic relation of God or some 
other entity within itself, the ‘I’ must exist as distinct from the ‘Thou’ and the 
‘Thou’ as distinct from the ‘I.’889 This distinction of the ‘I’ from a ‘Thou’ is 
necessary for individual human freedom, as discussed in chapter four. Yet, it 
is here that we find the distinction of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ is connected to an 
‘ecstatic’ response to the work of the Spirit. Thus the distinction must be 
maintained not only between other persons, but also between each individual 
and God. 
According to Buller’s comments on Pannenberg, for humanity the 
ecstatic response of a human person also involves taking the world into one’s 
self.
890
 This response is a further development of the conscious self as the ‘I’ 
understands itself as part of the universe, which is taken into the conscious 
existence of the ‘I.’891 In this way, by taking the universe into the self, the 
ecstatic response is relational and spiritual, because the taking of an infinite 
universe into a finite self is only possible by the Spirit, acting as an infinite 
dynamic field present to the finite. It is in this relation to the infinite that the 
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ecstatic response of life has its origin, since the ecstatic response requires 
relationship beyond the individual’s finite existence.892 
For Pannenberg, this ecstatic response of creation reaches its climax at 
the end of history through the redemption of the world; for only then is the 
relationship between finite humanity and infinite God fully consummated.
893
 
By being the source of life, through acting as a dynamic field, the Spirit has 
not only elicited an ecstatic response in creation, but is life itself. The 
independent and dependent tension present in creation is maintained, and 
indeed has been extended between all creatures. Although creation may have 
an independent ecstatic life, ultimately its life is grounded in the Spirit as life 
itself, and life in a concrete, non-metaphorical way, since it concerns the 
physical world and genuine cosmic history.
894
 The ecstatic experience with the 
‘other’ is one mediated through and guided by God as Spirit, since the Spirit is 
infinite in his very being. 
Another way to understand the force of this claim, that life is ecstatic, 
is to think of the Spirit not as imparting life to an individual creature that 
exists independently of the Spirit, but rather as the very life of creatures by 
virtue of their existence as manifestations of the dynamic field of Spirit. 
Functioning as ‘this energy field’ the Holy Spirit ‘thus produces the existence 
of individuals’—not merely their awareness of an independent life, but their 




 If the Spirit is life itself, then it implies that ‘every form of life, 
especially the human being, shares in the divine spirit,’ and does so in an 
active way, even if unaware. However, Pannenberg is quick to note that this 
participation is not a complete participation.
896
 Whereas Christ, in his human 
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self, displayed a complete participation in the life of the Spirit, proven by his 
resurrection, the rest of humanity does not participate as fully in the life of the 
Spirit until the new life is made fully manifest at the eschaton.
897
 Then the 
Spirit will be understood fully to be the Spirit of life when ‘the Spirit totally 
permeates the new human being.’898  
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which this ecstatic ‘life is present for 
us, as for other creatures, as we sense it in its indefinite totality.’899 Given the 
ties of our ecstatic response to history as an ‘indefinite totality,’ we should 
recall that while our experience of the past and future is fragmentary, and thus 
incomplete, it is experienced as a totality, with duration, for God in 
simultaneity. Eternity, for Pannenberg, is not ‘timelessness,’ but is rather the 
unity of all time, as history, in God. Given that freedom requires an ecstatic 
relation, which leads to individuation to the extent that it is historical, and that 
this ecstatic relation is consummated only at the eschaton, but present 
proleptically to us now, we must elaborate on the manner in which God can 
elicit this response, while also remaining distinct from creatures. For, if God’s 
ecstatic relation is also tied to his act in creation such that, as has been noted 
numerous times, Pannenberg claims that God ‘makes himself dependent’ upon 
creation, we must, give an account of the manner in which God remains 
distinct from creation. God not only relates to us by taking us into himself, but 
also ecstatically by admitting the distinction between us.  
 
3 Creator and Creature in Relation 
3.1 The distinction between creator and creature 
 If humans find their identity primarily in their relation to God, or as 
‘singularities’ of the dynamic field of the spirit, then humans are ‘made in the 
image of God’ in that they are a particularly unique manifestation of the 
dynamic field of the Holy Spirit. 
900
 Of course, this anthropology would seem 
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to suggest a doctrine of God that is panentheistic, yet Pannenberg is adamant 
that this is not the case.
901
 Given the ties between the doctrine of God 
advanced by a theology of history and Pannenberg’s theological anthropology, 
it will be helpful to examine the extent to which Pannenberg’s denial 
regarding panentheism may be taken as consistent with the rest of his 
theology.  
A major factor in Pannenberg’s hesitancy to admit to panentheism may 
be his relation to process theologians. Pannenberg has consistently and 
intentionally distanced himself from process theologians.
902
 Considering that 
Pannenberg was one of the first non-American theologians to engage seriously 
with process theology, there may be good reason for Pannenberg to make such 
a distinction clear.  
Process theology is a theology of becoming and, as such, does not 
recognize a defined end. Instead of a telos at the end of history, all temporal 
occurrences have within them the complete telos of God connected to each 
other event by this single, non-temporally located, telos that acts as a goal and 
gives meaning to all events, but without particular regard for any temporal end 
toward which they strive. In other words, Gadamer’s critique of Dilthey as 
being ‘teleological without a telos,’ mentioned in chapter three, is embraced 
by the Process theologian. This contradicts Pannenberg’s idea of a defined 
temporal end accessible proleptically through the resurrection. Further, within 
process theology, because all events directly connect to all other events in 
their fullness, efficient causation as ‘external’ is untenable since efficient 
causation, for the process theologian, entails the ‘entering into’ of one event 
by another. In other words, causation, including efficient causation, is 
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necessarily internal, even if it includes external elements.
903
 Requiring that all 
causation is necessarily internal is incredibly problematic for Pannenberg, who 
cannot engage in thoughtful dialogue with physics if he applies such a notion 
to material object interaction. These ideas of entering into one another and 
temporal interconnectivity on such level result from the panentheism of 
Whitehead and Hartshorne, and no scholar now seriously considers 
Pannenberg to be in any way a process theologian.
904
 
Despite Pannenberg’s objections and his distance from process 
theology, good reasons for maintaining that Pannenberg’s theology is 
panentheistic persist, though perhaps not in the way that Pannenberg’s critics 
allege.
905
 A more fundamental issue would be to ascertain if panentheism of 
the sort to which Pannenberg may ascribe, regardless of whether he labels it as 
such, is in fact something that should be avoided, or even can be avoided, 
given Pannenberg’s other theological commitments, particularly with respect 
to the relation between humans, history and the Spirit acting as field. We may 
affirm, with Pannenberg, that his theology rejects what might be termed ‘naïve 
panentheism.’ On such a view, God is not identical with the material/visible 
world, as in pantheism, but the world is, nevertheless, fully the manifestation 
of God. It merely remains that God is more than the world on such a view.
906
 
 By contrast, the definition of panentheism offered by Philip Clayton 
seems particularly promising given Pannenberg’s view of history as the divine 
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action of God within which humans operate, and his creation of the world as 
singularities of himself. According to Clayton, panentheism should be 
understood ‘to stress that the infinite God is ontologically as close to finite 
things as can possibly be thought without dissolving the distinction of Creator 
and created altogether.’ 907 In this way, biblical statements about God relating 
to creation as a distinct entity are not discarded. Rather, this form of 
panentheism provides a framework for understanding those statements in a 
different way, namely as a God who chooses to be infinitely close to Creation 
without overwhelming the existence of creation.  
Despite his language of the singularity, Pannenberg maintains that God 
is Spirit who is present to creation and is actively operating in the historical 
occurrences of history, while still being ontologically distinct from creation.
908
 
In his comments on this point, found in the introductory book to his systematic 
theology, Pannenberg’s assertion is virtually indistinguishable from Clayton’s 
description of panentheism. What remains to be seen, however, is whether 
Pannenberg can simultaneously claim that God as Spirit is distinct from his 
creation while nevertheless creating in the manner described above as a 
singularity. 
Perhaps we may say that panentheism is another way of describing the 
relation between the immanent and economic Trinity wherein the economic 
Trinity manifests itself to and in creation, simultaneously drawing that same 
creation into itself as the immanent Trinity, while also allowing that same 
creation to remain distinct and independent. In this form of panentheism, 
while we might say that the Creator is ‘more’ than the ‘totality’ of all creation, 
we must simultaneously declare that in a qualified, but very real and important 
sense, the totality of all creation is more than, which is to say ontologically 
distinct from, its Creator. As noted above, this distinction is grounded in the 
ecstatic nature of life and of the divine identity of the Trinity.
909
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I do not mean to argue, however, that Pannenberg is a ‘classical theist.’ 
Beyond his reluctant, but qualified, panentheism, certain aspects of classical 
theism, specifically divine aseity, and with it impassibility and immutability 
are abandoned. It is clear that, for Pannenberg, the ascension of the resurrected 
Christ as a human, is incompatible with immutability; in at least one important 
sense, God did change. While one may read Chalcedon to mean that Christ 
has, from eternity understood atemporally, always had the human nature that 
does not mix or intermingle with his divine nature, such a tack still requires 
that the contingency of the incarnation be maintained.
910
 This may preserve 
immutability if Leibnizian contingency is in view, but a Scotist contingency, 
as noted in chapter one, requires a temporal element. The Scotist view, built as 
it is on the Aristotelian one, requires that for contingent action to occur, a 
change must occur. Since it cannot be the case that Christ become a human as 
an ontological necessity, which would imply either a dependence or a lack in 
the nature of Christ, the action of incarnation must be considered contingent. 
Further, for Pannenberg’s theology, the very concept of atemporality is a false 
one. The openness of the future rejects atemporal existence as a possibility. 
With respect to aseity specifically, Pannenberg unambiguously 
abandons it. It is true that God, in his essential nature, has no need for anyone 
or anything and is, therefore, inherently without dependence. Yet, for 
Pannenberg, by choosing to create and making space for the free actions of his 
creation, God ‘makes himself dependent,’ upon the course of that history 
within which he is one of many participants. 
To be clear, these aspects of classical theism are not rejected because 
God lacks these aspects by nature. Rather, in Pannenberg’s view, God 
voluntarily abandons aseity. God, by his nature, does not require anyone and, 
as concerns his character, he does not change, but God sacrifices his aseity and 
immutability to make himself dependent upon the flow of history via creation 
and incarnation. In many ways, this is nature of love itself. As a partner may 
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abandon certain aspects of his or her self for the sake of a spouse, so too does 
God give of himself for the sake of his creation. The core character of God 
remains as love, and indeed it is precisely because this is the core of God that 
such a change might be expected. 
There are two other traditional positions, outside the doctrine of God 
that Pannenberg rejects. First, Pannenberg rejects the Virgin birth.
911
 He does 
so, in large part, in order to reject the Mariology he saw as pervasive in 
Roman Catholic theology. As it does not affect any other part of his theology, 
we may note that such a discussion as to its validity is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The second is the doctrine of Original Guilt as inherited, according to 
the Augustinian understanding. Pannenberg’s reasons are that if Jesus is 
understood to be both fully human and fully divine, the human nature cannot 
have inherited sin as part of the structure of humanity.
912
 Pannenberg still 
maintains that all humans other than Jesus do, in fact, sin, and, as a result, his 
position here effectively does not impact any other aspect of his theology. 
Despite this divergences from classical theology, it is not the case that 
Pannenberg entirely abandons classical theism either. Many aspects of 
classical theism, such as omnipotence, personhood, the pre-existent Christ,
913
 
the idea of God as fully ‘other,’ and a robust Trinitarian theology, are clearly 
maintained by Pannenberg, and have been discussed in various parts of this 
thesis. In particular, it is Pannenberg’s insistence on maintaining the 
sovereignty of God, despite his claim that God ‘has made himself dependent’ 
on the unfolding of history that has been the central conflict driving this thesis. 
This desire to maintain divine sovereignty without impeding human freedom 
is why the definition of Panentheism, within which we understand 
Pannenberg’s theology to be placed, must maintain a creator/creation 
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distinction. Without such a distinction, not only do we risk forgoing the 
freedom of humanity, but the sovereignty of God is made less tenable.  
Therefore, this distinction between God and creation must be 
maintained, even in light of the reinterpretation of history as divine actions 
within which we participate, first outlined in chapter three. The actions of 
creatures occur upon the grounding action of God, given that his action within 
creation never ceases when the concept of creatio continua is rightly 
understood, as described in the first and second chapters. Nevertheless, certain 
problems with the interplay between creator and creature remain, which will 
require a further engagement with the Stoics and with Schelling in order to 
approach a resolution.  
 
 3.2 The creator-creature tension in contingency  
The freedom of creatures, coupled with the power of God to create, has 
within it an inherent tension. In large part this is because not only is there 
creaturely contingency, but God maintains his contingent nature, even while 
making himself dependent upon creation. As discussed above, the second 
implication of viewing creation as a singularity of the dynamic field of the 
Holy Spirit is that ‘the creative dynamic of the Spirit also has an element of 
indeterminacy.’914 It is important to note the independence of both God and 
humanity for this is a necessary precondition of freedom. It is not enough to 
merely be contingent; there must be purpose in addition to contingency. While 
we discussed the purpose of God as the climatic end of history toward which 
he is guiding creation in chapter four, we must not forget that individual 
humans must act with particular purpose as well. In order for this purpose to 
be unified, which it must be to some extent if we are to speak of the end of 
history as arising out of the contingent actions of both humanity and God, we 
find that God and humanity enter into a dependence on each other. Yet, as has 
already been noted, this dependence must be held in tension with each 
person’s independence as well. Rather than a problem to explain away, 
though, this independent-dependent tension, first described in chapter one, 
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should be viewed as the key feature of creation. It is foundational for the 
occurrence of history that entails human freedom and divine sovereignty, not a 
challenge to it. 
As noted in the first two chapters, the creation of the world is a 
contingent act resulting in a contingent creation, which means that the 
‘distinctive form that comes forth from’ creation is largely undefined until ‘it 
takes concrete shape in the creature.’915 It is ‘the Spirit’s dynamic’ as a field 
that grants creation an independent existence.
916
 Thus, despite creaturely 
dependence upon God, as unique creaturely manifestations of the dynamic 
creative field, the indeterminate nature of the act of creation suggests that 
creation produces autonomous creatures who are also independent of God, 
resulting in the same tension between dependence and independence of 
creation addressed in earlier chapters.
917
  
Pannenberg suggests that this tension is evident in creation’s 
participation in the life of God, seen through the Spirit’s participation in 
creation. Pannenberg notes that the ‘Orthodox East’ gives us the best example 
of maintaining ‘a continuous awareness of the fundamental meaning of the 
participation of the Spirit in the act of creation.’ This meaning is ‘the basis of 
the implications of his [the Holy Spirit’s] salvific presence in the Church and 
in Christian experience.’918  
It is important to recall from chapter one that the dependent-
independent tension is a necessary aspect of creation; without this tension, one 
cannot speak of an independent God making free creatures. Taken in light of 
the discussion in chapter one, then, given that Pannenberg is utilising field 
theory and that we are grounding his use of it in the Stoic concept of pneuma, 
the tonos of creation is critical for understanding this aspect of creatio 
continua. Created things come into existence through the will of God. In order 
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for these things to be contingent, they must exist independently of God. 
Nevertheless, if we are to take Pannenberg’s statements regarding singularities 
seriously, in a very important sense this independent existence is only possible 
because, in creatio ex nihilo, God creates from his own being. We might state 
that creation occurs ex nihilo in the sense that it is not created out of any other 
physical object. In a limited, but very real sense, God’s manifestation of 
himself into his own history creates the conditions necessary within which the 
physical universe may come forth. Thus the created object is simultaneously 
dependent upon God for its very existence, while also being independent of 
God as it is contingent.  
It is in this way that we must understand the Stoic tonos pneumatikos; 
the tension of creation is not only the result of creation, it is the act of creation 
in this broader sense. God creates the universe from the tension between his 
own sovereign independence and humanity’s free and independent existence. 
While the Stoics, as will be examined below, may have understood this in 
physical terms, we may amplify and extend Pannenberg’s argument to suggest 
that this occurs in temporal terms. God’s history, then, becomes our history 
while still remaining his own history. There becomes an interpenetration 
between human temporal action and divine temporal interaction such that each 
acts independently, but we enter into God’s history and, by the act of creating, 
God simultaneously creates the landscape of what will shape into our history. 
We can describe our actions as independent in that we bring about our own 
purposes, but these purposes are part of a larger history as well toward which 
God is guiding his own free actions within time. Through the submission of 
himself as dependent upon our actions and through our own dependence upon 
his actions, we create a divine-human history out of the tension between each 
of our beings.  
Further, this confirms our assertion from the first chapter that creatio 
ex nihilo and creatio continua are not separate events, but different 
descriptions of the same sustained event. The tension between dependence and 
independence of creatures is exemplified in the relation of the Spirit, as life-
giving field, to creation, since it is primarily through the Spirit that God 
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creates. This role of the Spirit as life-giving field, is vital for understanding the 
nature of God, and God’s actions, in relation to history and humanity. The 
tension between God as sovereign creator and humanity as still independent, is 
an exemplification of a core question of this thesis: how can God be sovereign 
and humanity be free? This tension between creator and created is 
fundamental for addressing this question, because the tension of creation is 
indistinguishable from the issue of divine sovereignty and human freedom, 
and is tied together with Pannenberg’s own theology of history. To examine 
the exact manner in which the tension of history leads to the creation, both 
initial and continuous, of a free humanity by a sovereign God, we should first 
examine the way in which the Stoics, whose philosophy is foundational for 
Pannenberg’s depiction of field, understood creative tension before amplifying 
that use specifically through the historical philosophy of Schelling.  
 
4 Revisiting the philosophical background of Field 
4.1 The Stoics and Pannenberg 
 Throughout the last chapter and this one it has been argued that 
Pannenberg’s application of field was the fundamental manner by which he 
understood divine action. However, beginning with the paper ‘Geist als Feld,’ 
it became clear that Pannenberg’s focus should be understood not only in 
terms of the modern use of field in physics, but also in light of the ‘Stoic 
pneuma-doctrine,’ which, according to Jammer, Berkson, and others, provided 
the philosophical foundation for field theory.
919
 Thus any reaffirmation of 
field theory will need to examine Pannenberg’s use of the concept through the 
medium of the Stoics. What is of critical importance for our purposes, though, 
is the way in which the Stoic depiction of the creation and sustaining of the 
universe by the pneuma informs Pannenberg’s theology of history, especially 
as it relates to the issue of divine sovereignty and human freedom vis a vis the 
creative action of the Spirit via field. 
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 One might argue that due to the material aspect of the Stoic pneuma, it 
could not be the foundation of the philosophical claims concerning field for 
Pannenberg. However, in the last chapter, I noted that many scholars of 
Stoicism have tried to demonstrate that the Stoics never truly regarded pneuma 
as in any way material. If the pneuma is not to be regarded as material, then, 
as suggested in the last chapter, the objections of the early Church Fathers 
leading to the philosophical dominance of the nous over pneuma, while still 
using the term ‘pneuma’ as it was utilised in the New Testament, is invalid. 
 As noted above, the manner of creation would fall in line with the 
Stoic tonos. This creative tension also means that the Spirit is present to all of 
creation as its life, ultimately embracing the whole of creation at the 
eschatological redemption. Surprisingly, although much scholarship has 
addressed Pannenberg’s use of field theory, it appears that no one has 
seriously engaged Pannenberg’s move back to the Stoic pneuma, modified 
through field theory. Given the close parallel between the Stoic tonos and 
Pannenberg’s description of creation occurring in light of an inherent tension, 
it is entirely reasonable to consider that Pannenberg is substantively reflecting 
the Stoic description of creation rather than merely using Stoicism as a 
stepping stone to talk about field theory. For our purposes, this relates directly 
to the tension between free humans and sovereign Spirit. 
 This may be complicated somewhat, however, when one recalls that 
Schelling also described creation as resulting from a creative tension between 
the nature of God and the nature of independent and free creatures.
920
 
Creation, for Schelling, is the direct result of a tension within God and 
between the absolute sovereignty of God and the radical contingence of 
creation.
921
 It should be noted, though, that Schelling was well informed of the 
Stoics, and we should also recall that Schelling’s Spätphilosophie, with which 
this thesis is primarily concerned, understands that tension in the light of 
history. 
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Schelling encountered Stoic philosophy, among other places, through 
his reading of Hegel. Following the split between the two, Schelling believed 
that many of Hegel’s writings were a polemic against him personally, and so 
read Hegel’s work, which frequently referenced the Stoics, very carefully.922 
Schelling also noticed certain Stoic themes in the writing of Spinoza, whom he 
regarded to have become a sort of stoic ‘physicist’ or ‘metaphysician.’923 In 
response to this, Schelling tries to find a middle ground between the ‘stoic-
metaphysician-physicist’ seen in Spinoza and the Fichtean ‘Epicurean-
metaphysician-physicist.’924 Specifically, Schelling attempted to find a way to 
enliven or make the Stoic description of action substantially more dynamic. 
While the terminology of ‘physicist’ as used by Schelling is likely in its 
philosophical sense, and not a reference to its contemporary scientific use, the 
term should not be overlooked. As noted in chapter two, Schelling argued for 
a positive ‘philosophy of science’ as a potential method for detailing the 
action of history in relation to God.  
It is therefore not insignificant that Pannenberg, whom I have 
demonstrated was deeply influenced by Schelling, took up the call to complete 
Schelling’s depiction of history through the implementation of field. Given 
Schelling’s position with respect to Stoicism, we should take the Stoic 
position all the more seriously. Even if we cannot draw a strong link between 
Schelling and Stoicism, the tension which is necessary for the creation of the 
world, of which Schelling frequently speaks, is sufficient reason to re-examine 
the tonos of Stoic creation.  
As noted in the last chapter, the Stoic concept of tonos found its 
clearest expression, available to us today, in the writing of Chrysippus, whose 
work is extant only in fragments. Nevertheless, from these fragments we may 
piece together a few key elements. First, Chrysippus extended the concept of 
tension beyond that proposed earlier by Zeno, the latter of whom, by all 
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accounts, only advocated for an internal tension within human persons.
925
 
Chysippus’s extension suggests a ‘tensional connection’ between every aspect 
of the universe, connecting heaven and earth and bringing about, ultimately 
and paradoxically, a unity within the tension.
926
 
Even though we have explored the likelihood that most Stoics 
considered the pneuma to be immaterial, for Chrysippus, at least, it is 
important to note that much of the universe is a corporeal expression of 
pneuma in some way or another, including events and actions.
927
 Yet, 
corporeal is taken in much broader terms than one might assume today. 
Something is corporeal, for Chrysippus, if it either is available to direct 
sensory experience, or if it affects objects that are available to direct sensory 
experience. In this way, for Chrysippus and other Stoics who follow him, such 
as Marcus Aurelius, would argue that abstract concepts, such as Justice and 
Truth, as well as God are all corporeal, though not necessarily physical.
928
 It is 
only in this way, via a shared corporeality, that Chrysippus may argue for a 
unity within the tonos.  
The corporeality of the Spirit, then, must be taken in this much 
broader, and not narrowly physical sense. In particular, Pannenberg explicitly 
incorporates the Stoic tonos into his overall anthropology to give a more 
detailed description of the ‘ecstatic’ response of humanity. Pannenberg takes 
the identification in Stoicism of the syneidesis with hegemonikon to mean that 
syneidesis is not the moral conscience narrowly, but a general self-awareness 
marked by tonos.
929
 Therefore, the ecstatic nature of life is taken to be the 
creation of human will and mind, which in the Stoicism of Chrysippus are 
necessarily free, despite being the incorporation of the logos into the self. If 
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we understand, then, the ‘corporeality’ of which the Stoics speak to be a 
reference to the non-material aspects of history—that is, ‘time’—then we may 
can compose a scheme in which the universe, and specifically humanity, 
might be understood as free, yet as the product of the corporeality of the logos. 
Following the Stoicism of Chrysippus, and amplified through our 
understanding of Pannenberg, we may say that time itself, and with it history, 
is the corporeality of the logos.  
This incorporation of the logos is marked by an inherent tension 
between the freedom of the logos and the potential freedom of the human will, 
itself an ecstatic response to the act of incorporation by the logos. Thus, the 
logos, creating history as a manifestation of himself, elicits an ecstatic 
response to history by human will that is characteristic of the tension between 
logos and human will that is a necessary part of the creation of the logos as 
syneidesis. Given that the logos is structured and purposed, it is easy to see the 
parallel between the Stoic pneuma as logos and the tension inherent in 
Pannenberg’s idea of history moving toward a defined goal, as the 
corporeality of creation is understood in historical terms, as described in the 
final sections of this chapter. Yet we must be careful to not too closely identify 
Pannenberg with the Stoics, of whom we know relatively little. Instead, we 
should examine this idea of tension and creative corporeality as it pertains to 
Schelling’s philosophy. 
 
4.2 Schelling and Pannenberg in Light of the Stoics 
For the Stoics, in contrast to Plato, the world we interact with is the 
real world and the only world that matters, not some other worldly concept of 
ideas or ‘Forms.’ While the Stoics admit the non-material nature of ideas, they 
claim ideas are grounded and connect to the physical world, via a medium. 
Thus Plato is not rejected in toto, only modified. Connected to this concept of 
‘corporeality’ are Schelling’s statements in the Freedom Essay and the Ages of 
the World, that because God serves as his own grounding, God is 
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‘corporeal.’930 Schelling’s method of understanding the history of the world is 
connected not only to the Stoic concept of tonos, but also includes the Stoic 
sense of ‘corporeal.’ Yet this corporeality, as mentioned, should not be 
understood to be physical, but historical or temporal.  
In the Ages of the World, Schelling begins to work out a philosophy of 
history. Schelling suggests that the past, present and future, the ages of the 
world, are all concurrent creations of God. While Schelling only deals directly 
with the past in Ages of the World, he argues that God has created the past 
from eternity as an eternal past.
931
 It is perhaps in this way that we can 
understand the source of the ‘temporal thickness’ that Robert John Russell 
notes is integral to Pannenberg’s description of eternity, wherein events retain 
their temporal relation to each other (e.g., I was born after my father, but 
before my son), while still being perceived as unfragmented.
932
 Indeed, 
Pannenberg’s discussion of eternity at the end of his systematic theology is 
telling. While our experience of past, present and future is fragmentary, in 




It is here that our adaptation of panentheism, above, becomes 
particularly relevant. We must, of course, maintain that humanity and God are 
distinct if we are to speak of the former being free and the latter being 
sovereign. Yet the two are also connected, via the tension described in the two 
prior sections, in such a way that they interpenetrate each other, while still 
remaining distinct. God is his history, which is to say God is all of time 
because God has chosen to manifest himself, through his spirit, as history. Yet 
humanity is also historical in the sense that we commit acts of volition within 
time. Still, there is a very real sense in which our history is not always 
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identical with the history of God, after all, we do sin, which, at least according 
to orthodoxy, requires that these not be the actions of God’s history. However, 
by creating us as part of his history, God has brought us into that same history. 
Again, there is a distinct tension, one that is only resolved via the incarnation. 
It is not that God exists outside of time only, but by becoming a human 
person, God has taken all of history unto himself. As Pannenberg interprets 
the historical impact of the incarnation, ‘Jesus Christ’ becomes ‘the centre of 
time.’934 Understood in light of his view of the eschatological nature of the 
resurrection, Pannenberg declares that ‘The eschatological event of the 
appearance of Christ is the summation of the universe…[for] only from the 
perspective of the Christ event as eschatological event is human history to be 
understood as a unity,’ with all of history, which is divine.935 While Schelling 
does not make the explicit connection between the whole of history with God 
and the Christ event, though he does refer to it as the ‘climax of history’ as 
discussed in the second chapter, the connection of God to time is explicitly 
stated by Schelling.  
God is not outside of time, for Schelling, but inextricably tied to our 
history of his own volition, releasing himself fully from its bounds only at the 
eschatological consummation of history. It is from this that we might amplify 
Pannenberg’s theology of history, informed as it is by Schelling’s 
Spätphilosophie, in order to provide clarity to his theology, explain his use of 
‘field’ more fully than he does, and relate his theology of history to the tension 
between divine sovereignty and human freedom. At the incarnation, God takes 
on our history, so that at the cross our history is made one with the history of 
God, and at the resurrection he affirms that the histories of each share in a 
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 So Pannenberg’s statement, that in creation ‘God has made himself 
dependent upon the world,’ can be clarified by stating that God has made 
himself dependent by creating history as a manifestation of himself. Yet, as 
discussed in chapter four, history must be understood in light of the proleptic 
appearance of the eschaton. To grasp the meaning of revelation, then, one 
must be able to relate this future unity of history to the present experience of 
history. Again viewing Pannenberg in light of Schelling’s work will prove 
instructive. 
In Philosophie der Kunst, an earlier work by Schelling, he notes that 
the concept of truth conveyed through ancient Greek mythologies is connected 
to the same truth of the modern day, but the medium of mythology is no 
longer particularly relevant.
937
 While Schelling would eventually extend his 
discussion of truth in mythology in Philosophie die Mythologie, it is important 
to take into account the connection he makes in his earlier work. Even at this 
early point, Schelling argues for a progression from mythology to revelation, 
claiming the locus of truth in the modern era is to be found in the Church.
938
 
This means that while the earlier mythological truth was conveyed primarily 
through the form of Greek drama, Schelling argues that the analogous place in 
the modern era is not the theatre nor opera, but is in the liturgy of the church 
as a kind of ‘sacred play.’939 Here is where we find the connection to 
Pannenberg. 
As noted in the above discussion of an ecstatic response of creation, 
the first arena of ecstatic response is the individual to God as found in the 
church. This ecstatic response is important to understanding how God relates 
to humanity through the medium of history, particularly if we are to give an 
account of the present experience of the proleptic occurrence of the eschaton 
at the historical event of the resurrection. Pannenberg elaborates on the 
ecstatic response by noting that ‘the Christian liturgy is still a sacred play at 
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the centre of which is the supper that sums up the ministry and destiny of 
Jesus and links the created reality of human beings and their social life with 
their eschatological destiny.’940 Pannenberg continues by noting that it is the 
experience of this ‘play’ that elicits the ecstatic response by turning us from 
individuals concerned with their own identity toward ‘the life-world which 
individuals [all] share.’ It is in this way that ‘ecstasy’ is ‘characteristic of 
[sacred] play.’941 Thus history is presented imaginatively to the Christian in 
the experience of the Eucharist. This concept, clearly presented in Pannenberg, 
is rooted in Schelling’s discussion of truth, which was presented in ancient 
Greek drama as it has been replaced, positively, by the Eucharist,
942
 and brings 
together the tension of experiencing these points of time (past, present, future) 
simultaneously in one ecstatic experience occurring within history, though in 
incomplete form.  
Given that the Eucharist is a representation of the dying of the one who 
would be revealed to have been the Christ at the resurrection, to borrow the 
language indicative of Pannenberg’s Jesus—God and Man, we might argue 
that we are presented with the proleptic unification of history possible as a 
result of the resurrection. In the Eucharist we see that God in Christ makes 
himself low so that we might take Christ into ourselves. By taking Christ into 
ourselves we are reminded that we partake in his history, but also that he 
makes himself dependent upon our actions within time. The picture of mutual 
dependence is made explicit as we understand the past event of the upper 
room enacted by us presently made effective by the proleptic appearance of 
the future in the resurrection. Whether we can, in good faith, make such an 
extension of Pannenberg’s thought, particularly as pertains to the role of the 
Spirit in the act of creatio continua, depends in large part upon whether we 
                                                 
940
 ATP, 337-338. 
 
941
 ATP, 338. 
 
942
 See Schelling, Philosophy of Art, 230ff. Here Schelling argues that truth used to be 
expressed in Greek dramas, but in his day this same dramatic depiction of otherwise 
indescribable truth was not found ‘in the Opera, but in the Sacrament.’ 
 
Sovereignty and Freedom: 262 
 
 
might utilise Pannenberg’s claims concerning the spirit in such a way that it 
makes a substantive claim about the nature of God.  
By making an appeal to the Stoics, and in turn to Schelling, we have 
set the stage for Pannenberg’s own radical treatment of history. While 
Pannenberg is not explicit on the particular details, nevertheless, given his 
reliance upon Stoicism with respect to the nature of the dynamic field and 
Schelling as concerns the relation of the incarnation and human freedom, we 
can mitigate some of the shortcomings from Pannenberg’s explanation of field 
theory to gain a clearer understanding of the relationship between field and 
history. The tension inherent in the nature of God manifesting himself as 
history, analogous to the tonos described by Stoics, can be addressed through 
Pannenberg’s unique application of field, as described in the next section. In 
this way, we may see the fuller potential given by Pannenberg’s approach to 
the tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom. 
 
5 Approaching the Tension through Interpreting Pannenberg’s Theology 
as One of History 
5.1 Reinterpreting Pannenberg’s Use of Field 
Although he initially rejects the use of ‘field’ as metaphor in relation to 
the Spirit, toward the end of his public life, Pannenberg reluctantly stated that 
his use of field amounts to an analogy. In doing so, however, much of the 
force of Pannenberg’s claims with respect to field would seem to be forfeited. 
The prior constructive claims that Pannenberg had made in light of field, if it 
is to be understood as merely analogy, can no longer have the strong 
ontological weight they would have were Pannenberg saying that his 
identification of Spirit with field is something more than an analogy. This 
section will attempt to salvage and rework Pannenberg’s use of the concept of 
field, further demonstrating its theological application more broadly, and its 
connection to the issue of divine sovereignty and human freedom more 
directly. It is essential to understand Pannenberg’s use of field as making 
constitutive statements about God’s nature, particularly as it pertains to his 
work creating history and in light of the statements on tonos as God manifests 
himself to and for his creation, for us to make the stronger claims of the next 
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section that outline exactly how God manifests himself to create and sustain 
that creation. 
 In the foreword to a 2005 work about Pannenberg’s theology by 
Charles Gutenson, Pannenberg states that ‘I use the term “field” in an 
analogical sense’ claiming that this is nevertheless ‘not simply a metaphorical 
use.’943 Yet this concession to the ‘analogical sense’ is out of line with his 
position in the earlier paper ‘Geist als Feld – nur eine Metapher?’ that 
comprises a more complete explanation of his intended use of field vis a vis 
the question of metaphor or analogy. There Pannenberg claims that the 
‘analogical sense’ may best be understood as a satisfactory beginning point for 
understanding the way in which he employs field theory, but should not be 
considered a complete explanation of his use of the term. While this initial 
article was written prior to the publication of his forward in Gutenson’s book, 
in a later article published in 2006 in Zygon, Pannenberg points to his use, and 
that of Thomas Torrance, of the field concept as more than an analogy, 
arguing that God makes himself manifest in the world to create it.
944
 In 
Pannenberg’s article, it is clear that he means this manifestation of God to be 
taken in an ontological sense incompatible with the suggested application of 
field as only analogy, as suggested by Gutenson.  
Further, it becomes particularly unclear how Pannenberg can claim 
that his use amounts to an ‘analogy,’ as he does in Gutenson’s work, while 
also denying that it is a ‘metaphor,’ as he does on two separate occasions, as 
noted above. In no other paper or statement did Pannenberg reduce his use of 
field theory to the ‘analogical sense,’ nor has he written any further statements 
on field theory beyond this rather abrupt and concise reversal in the 
aforementioned forward to Gutenson’s analysis of Pannenberg. While 
metaphor and analogy are not completely interchangeable, they are similar 
enough, specifically as regards to what extent Pannenberg’s use of ‘field’ is 
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ontological, that they should both be rejected as the primary sense in which we 
understand Pannenberg’s use of field theory. It should be noted that this shift 
is very uncharacteristic of Pannenberg, who, in his published works, has 
maintained a remarkable level of consistency.
945
 It may be the case that 
Pannenberg utilises field as analogy in one sense, while moving beyond 
analogy in another because his use of field theory is not ‘mere’ analogy.  
In order to avoid the particular type of panentheism that, by ignoring 
the ecstatic response of creation, effectively removes the required distinctions 
between creator and created, it is a fairly safe assumption that Pannenberg’s 
use of field is not a literal description of the creation of the material world, or 
at least not a direct one-to-one correspondence between the field of physics 
and the work of the Holy Spirit in creation. What remains to be shown, then, is 
in what way field is more than a metaphor or analogy. Pannenberg’s use of 
field is only sensible if the field is understood to be a temporal one instead of a 
material one. In this way, and only in this way, may we not only understand 
Pannenberg’s theology as one of history, but also describe the way in which 
describing his theology as such allows us to satisfyingly resolve the tension 
between divine sovereignty and human freedom. As has been demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, the question of human freedom in relation to divine 
sovereignty is fundamentally a question of history in the broader sense as 
defined in chapter three. In order to address this broader sense of history, and 
present a resolution to our driving problem, the focus must shift away from a 
static ontology and toward the dynamic interaction between persons, humanity 
and God, that is only sensible in the context of time and history.  
 
5.2 God’s Action as Temporal Field 
A lot is at stake for Pannenberg’s theology with reference to field 
theory. Gutenson, in whose work Pannenberg’s seeming reversal appears as a 
foreword, correctly summarises the goal of Pannenberg’s appeal field theory 
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as an attempt to provide an account for ‘nonembodied intentional causality.’946 
The assumption, to this point, has been that Pannenberg is describing field 
theory in theology as best understood via analogy. However, this is not a 
purely theological issue, since scientific theories and models have ‘some level 
of philosophical reflection’ of which they are only approximate.947 It is 
equally true that the terminology of ‘field,’ and indeed any descriptive model, 
is analogical in scientific descriptions. For Pannenberg, not only do ‘field 
theories of science,’ constitute ‘approximations,’948 but the vast majority of 
scientific models should be considered approximations that do not give an 
exact representation of reality, though still conveying significant truth 
concerning that same reality.
949
 We can say, then, that the concept of field 
theory is as directly applicable to the Spirit as it is to the physical universe. 
They are equally analogous, but are analogies of different kinds. 
To help understand this, consider the Standard Model from physics. 
While it has been the primary method for understanding quantum and particle 
physics since its widespread adoption in the 1960s and 1970s, it is known not 
to account entirely for the pull of gravity upon particles, nor does it allow 
neutrinos to oscillate, which would indicate that they have mass and be in 
violation of the Standard Model. However, the oscillation of neutrinos, and 
thus their mass, has been directly observed as part of the OPERA project.
950
 
This is not to say that the Standard Model is without merit, especially since it 
has successfully predicted the existence of many particles prior to their 
confirmed discovery, most famously in recent memory the Higgs-Boson, but, 
we can clearly see an example of how scientific modelling works. The 
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Standard Model is a best approximation, not an exact representation, of the 
physical universe. When Pannenberg states that the Spirit functions as ‘field’ 
in an analogical sense, we do well to consider this in the same analogical sense 
that current descriptions of field approximate physical reality. Both ‘field 
theory’ and the understanding of Spirit as ‘field’ are approximations that can 
continue to be useful and constructive for our dialogue, with the understanding 
that they may continue to be improved and neither are particularly dogmatic. 
While this may preclude critics from alleging that Pannenberg engages 
in field theory as only metaphor, it does not yet solve our more pressing issue: 
how is Pannenberg utilising field theory, and in what ways does this address 
the issue of divine causation? While I have indicated that Pannenberg’s use of 
field should be considered in light of the Stoic concept of pneuma and viewed 
through the lens of Schelling (and Scotus),
951
 this could still be sharpened. 
Pannenberg provides some of the language for this: 
 
I do not contend that the divine spirit is sending 
forth waves that can be counted and measured. But 
neither is the word field as applied to God, who is 
spirit, just a vague analogy or a poetic expression. It 
is certainly a metaphor, like the field concept of 
physics itself is…. But it is not a vague analogy, 
either in science or in theology. It has a clear and 
conceptual meaning in its connection with the 
concepts of space and time. If that were not the 
case, the use of the field concept would indeed 
become vague. It is because of its connection with 
the concepts of space and time that a sufficiently 
precise theological use of the field concept is 
possible that is clearly distinct from its use in 




The first part of this quote from Pannenberg has been addressed above: the 
spirit as field is analogical, but only insofar as the term ‘field’ is analogical in 
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physics. What remains to be elucidated is the manner in which the concept of 
field is connected to ‘space and time’ yet remains distinct from its use in 
physics. Somewhat helpfully, Pannenberg makes clear that this relation of 
space and time is in connection with the ‘eternal’ nature of God.953 
Given that Pannenberg readily refers to the ‘dynamic’ character of 
field, the connection of field to historical or temporal event should not be 
ignored.
954
 For Pannenberg, the issue to be avoided is any thought that 
pneuma manifests as the material universe, as Origen’s misinterpretation of 
the Stoic pneuma would suggest. Field theory avoids the ‘problem of bodily 
existence,’ while still allowing interaction through the ‘dynamic movement of 
force, together with spatial extension.’955 Given his comments regarding 
Faraday’s use of field, and his emphasis on the movement and motion of God, 
we are left to conclude that, for Pannenberg, the primary point of consonance 
between theology and physics is not found in replacing the Spirit with the 
concept of field, but by applying the type of causal interaction that occurs with 
field in relation to the material universe in a different manner. The Spirit does 
not manifest himself as physical material substances, when acting as field, but 
is manifest in a manner that, nevertheless, connects the Spirit to the field 
concept. We find this connection, in Pannenberg’s theology, via the temporal 
idea. By examining Pannenberg’s theology we will find that, for Pannenberg, 
the Spirit is not manifest as matter, but as the source of time (and, with it, 
history).  
In the same way that non-material fields can produce material 
substance by their interaction, and in so doing become so inextricably tied 
with matter that, while remaining distinct from matter (the fields can be 
measured via material means, but remain immaterial) so also the eternal God 
can create temporal singularities, and in so doing binds himself to time, while 
still remaining distinct from finite time, (and yet is known through history 
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itself, via his own historical revelation). As Pannenberg states, ‘The presence 
of God’s Spirit in his creation can be described as a field of creative presence, 
a comprehensive field of force that releases event after event into finite 
existence.’956 And phrased differently elsewhere: ‘We may imagine, then, the 
reality of God in terms of the comprehensive field of eternity, comprising 
space and time and dynamically producing the temporal existence of creatures 
in space through its futurity in relation to all potential events.’957 
God does not, then, manifest himself as the physical universe, but 
manifests himself as the grounding of temporal events with which the physical 
universe interacts, moves, and operates. If we consider that the universe is 
comprised of three or four spatial dimensions and one or two temporal 
dimension, God embodies himself as the grounding for that/those temporal 
dimension(s) which remains distinct from, yet inextricably linked to the 
spatial. The spatial/material objects of creation, including human persons, 
‘live and move and have [their] being’958 in the manifestation of God as the 
grounding of time. The historical act of creation occurs from the unifying 
eternity of God, from which all of creation emanates and toward which it is 
returning via its ecstatic response to that same eternity. The direction of 
history, then, is toward the Christ event, which demonstrates the ultimate end 
of history. All historical events, which is to say time itself, is connected to the 
manifestation of God as the source of history. 
To finish drawing the parallel between the dynamic life of the Spirit 
and the way field from physics brings about the material world, we should 
briefly describe the latter in more precise terms. The generally accepted view 
from modern physics is that the universe began as a singularity. At the time of 
said singularity the laws of physics, as universally accepted among those who 
adopt the singularity, do not apply, nor, considering the amount of gravitation 
exerted by the singularity, can they apply. As the ‘Big Bang’ occurred, the 
                                                 
956
 IST, 49; emphasis added. 
 
957
 Pannenberg, ‘Theology and Science,’ 307. 
 
958
 Acts 17:28, The Holy Bible,King James Version, p.d. 
 
Sovereignty and Freedom: 269 
 
 
intense concentration of the universe in connection with the gravitational field, 
also a result of the ‘infinitely dense’ singularity, interacts with the space-time 
and energy to produce objects of mass, or matter, that change and adapt 
through regular interaction with these fields, to yield the physical universe as 
we know it.
959
 While some have gone to the extreme of suggesting that this 
initial singularity simply is God,
960
 Pannenberg takes great strides to maintain 
a distinction between Creator and created. However, as has been stated above, 
we are concerned with types of causal interaction between the field of physics 
and the physical universe, not a one-to-one correspondence. In the realm of 
physics, then, there is an overarching, all-pervasive field that manifests as a 
singularity. Once the singularity begins to expand in to the universe the 
interaction between matter, the field and the singularity, which in turn 
produces additional gravitational fields, all interact to produce the physical 
universe. The singularity is distinct from the field, but is nevertheless tied to it, 
produced from it, and influenced by it. 
In the same way, the Spirit, acting as a dynamic field, manifests as a 
temporal singularity. This temporal singularity interacts with the world as it is 
initially created and the continuing existence of creation through the field of 
the Spirit as it continually manifests as new temporal singularities with which 
creation interacts. Thus the interaction between the temporal singularities of 
the Spirit and the created world, through the dynamic field of the Spirit result 
in history. History can only be fully and properly understood from God’s 
perspective, as noted in chapter three, then, because only God, as Spirit, is the 
unifying causal force for all of history while it is co-created with various finite 
aspects of creation. 
This has profound implications for our discussion up to this point. By 
stating that God is involved in creation through acting as the grounding for 
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each present event from the final future event Pannenberg is treading close to 
the view of many ‘open theists,’ while also distinguishing himself from them, 
and avoiding the pitfalls with respect to divine sovereignty inherent in their 
claims. Open theism was developed as a theodicy in light of the doctrine of 
divine omniscience. Briefly, the problem was that if God knows at the present 
time that a future horrific event will occur, is this distinguishable from his 
causing it? The open theist would suggest, instead, that the future is not caused 
by God and is not known to God because the future has not yet occurred, and 
thus is not a ‘thing’ that can be known.961  
The idea of future choices being genuine alternative possibilities is 
important here. Without using the term ‘contingency,’ most work in open 
theism readily employs the concept as defined in the first chapter. While many 
state that the freedom this affords is a sort of ‘limited freedom,’ there is not a 
clearly outlined structure for how they can be assured that God’s purposes are 
eventually accomplished, though this claim is frequently made.
962
 Open theists 
seem content to argue that God will secure certain aspects of the end as 
determined.
963
 In contrast Pannenberg makes a much stronger claim regarding 
the sovereignty of God in his statement that not only has the end of history 
already been declared, it has already occurred and was witnessed, 
proleptically, in the midst of history. Further, open theism seems to speak of 
God working within history presently, pushing it forward in cooperation with 
humanity, but Pannenberg describes God as existing in that end of history 
already, pulling and enticing all of creation toward that end, without 
overwhelming it. These are key distinctions from the open theist. 
For Pannenberg, God is not a subject of temporal forces that he may 
choose to overwhelm at will, but is the creator of those forces. The only future 
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event that already exists, is the one that constitutes the end of history. All 
other future events are continuously brought into being by the God of the 
future in cooperation with his already existing creation. God, as Spirit, 
manifests himself as temporal contingencies to bring about the continuance of 
creation vis a vis history. For Pannenberg, his use of field is distinguished 
from that of its use in physics in that he is primarily concerned with God’s 
manifestation of himself as the primary source of history from the end of 
history, while physics is concerned with the manifestation of field as matter 
within space. The field of God is also different from other fields in the sense 
that, unlike fields of energy or mass, the field of God includes ‘divine 
purpose’ which is ‘legitimate only with regard to the fact that the divine act of 
creation relates to the universe as a whole and therefore includes its final 
future as well as its beginning.’964  
This sense of purpose is vital for maintaining the doctrine of divine 
sovereignty as will be discussed below. It is not that God has fully defined 
every aspect for all events, since this would eliminate contingency, but that 
God acts as the grounding upon which events come into being through his 
continuous creation until the end of history is achieved. The end of history is 
defined, and God continues to bring creation toward that end, but the number 
of events between now and that end remains entirely contingent.  
Here I should note a subtle clarification I have made to Pannenberg’s 
point. While Pannenberg is content, though on rare occasion, to refer to God 
as manifesting as temporal events, I suggest, as a way to more clearly enforce 
the creator-creation distinction, that we instead refer to God as manifesting as 
the grounding for temporal events. This additional separation resounds more 
clearly with the Idealist tradition, particularly that of Schelling, and more 
clearly denotes the distinction between creator and created. If we allow that 
God has given up on his aseity to ‘make himself dependent,’ this does not 
mean, by any means, that we are not still dependent upon him. Indeed, this 
ensures a dependence of humanity upon his continued manifestation as a 
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temporal field, which acts as the grounding of our being, while simultaneously 
allowing us to better understand how our temporal/historical actions remain 
independent of God. In other words, it better preserves the independent-
dependent tension first identified at the end of chapter one. 
Turning back, now, to the ‘end of the world’ event, when Christ says 
that ‘not even the Son of Man knows the hour,’ it is because Christ, 
experiencing the world in non-eternal form, cannot know when the end will 
come as its timing is not yet determined; it could be in ten years or a thousand 
or a million or more. The end of history is always just beyond our horizon of 
observation, with new history being created between it and our present ‘now,’ 
until history finally results in that already defined end of history. The end does 
not occur until it arises organically out of the free choices of creation made in 
cooperation with the sovereign sustaining will of God. God, the Spirit as field, 
continues to act as the grounding for history from the future end until the 
temporal existence of the universe collides with that end, being absorbed into 
eternity. If we understand the field of Spirit to be a genuine field of time, 
continually allowing for the creation of history from its end, we will arrive at a 
workable solution for the perceived conflict between divine sovereignty and 
human freedom. This has profound implications for our broader understanding 
of other doctrines as well. 
As discussed in the second chapter, for Pannenberg, in line with 
Schelling, God is only God insofar as he is sovereign. Also for Pannenberg, in 
the act of creation God is made dependent upon history. God creates by 
manifesting himself as temporal field, yet is only sovereign if he is able to 
bring about his own purpose and end. Given the connection we are making 
between God’s action in history and God in his sovereignty, let us return to the 
connection made above regarding the economic and immanent Trinity. The 
economic Trinity is God’s activity among his creation, while the immanent 
Trinity is God existing in his sovereignty. By creating as the grounding of 
history, God has not merely inserted himself into an external history, but has 
made his sovereignty, which is to say his identity, dependent upon the course 
of history. God is not revealed to be, nor is he actually the immanent Trinity 
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apart from his sovereign existence. Yet, if he is manifest as the temporal field 
that produces history, via the Spirit, God cannot be sovereign except at the end 
of history, when history is presented in its fullness, and its goals and purposes 
have been achieved. Thus we must say that God does not exist, from our 
present finite existence, as sovereign, and only in this way ‘does not yet exist’ 
as God. 
 This later qualification Pannenberg gives, ‘from our finite perspective,’ 
is important in light of his depiction of eternity. For Pannenberg the ‘end of 
history,’ is the moment when our fragmentary picture of history is united with 
eternity, history as it truly exists. Eternity, as discussed in chapter four, 
consists of the simultaneity of time and a ‘temporal thickness’ to time. The 
whole of time is eternity, not time in atemporality, but in its completion, as 
opposed to fragmentary nature. History can have meaning because all of it, 
from beginning to end, can be understood in its connection and complexity, 
thus answering Gadamer’s critique of Dilthey, first mentioned in chapter 
three, in an unexpected manner. Only an infinite being can understand the 
entirety of the infinite series that comprises history, but this comprehension 
must also be done infinitely. Therefore we can say that God exists sovereignly 
from eternity, but from the perspective of our present finite existence does not 
yet exist, in this restricted sense. By yielding his sovereignty for the sake of 
our finite existence, God makes space within his history for ours. 
 This is not to say that God is in no way sovereign, though. Instead we 
can affirm sovereignty in the present from a different perspective. If divine 
sovereignty consists in God achieving his goals absolutely, then God 
demonstrates his sovereignty in the resurrection of Christ by bringing about 
this goal. At the same time, God maintains our present freedom by continually 
releasing the grounding of events from the future into our present. For each 
historical event to truly be contingent, its outcome must be undetermined, yet 
we argue that the final outcome of these events, the end of history, is already 
defined. In order to overcome this, we do not view history as a fixed timeline, 
but as one that is continually growing and expanding. God will continue to 
release the grounding of history until history contingently produces his goal. 
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The whole of time is the result of God’s manifestation beyond himself as 
temporal field, continually broadening and expanding this manifestation. 
It is here that the role of the economic Trinity, in particular the Son as 
incarnate and the Spirit as field, is brought again to the fore. First let us 
examine the role of the Son as incarnate. The role of the incarnate Son is 
important not only for the proleptic appearance of the end of history at the 
resurrection, but equally so in the redemptive work as the Son. To understand 
how this is so, it will be important first to consider a unique understanding of 
sin as it pertains to history. 
To give an account of sin within a theology of history, we must 
consider the ways in which human history may be distinct from divine history. 
While it was argued in chapter three that history is properly understood only 
from a divine perspective, given the necessity of maintaining a creator-
creature distinction we might consider the way in which humanity attempts to 
create distinct history. Humanity, it may be argued, works within the temporal 
field of the Spirit toward ends that are opposed to the nature of God. In so 
doing, humans create a distinct and separate history, but since humans are not 
entirely sovereign, it is a temporary, ephemeral and false history. This false 
history is what Pannenberg considers a key characteristic of humanity’s 
inability to bring about the fullness of the image of God,
965
 and so might be 
labelled ‘sin’ within the context of his theology of history. In particular, 
Pannenberg contrasts our ‘participation in the process of our own history,’ 
apart from God as sin, with the idea that ‘only God can cause the image of 
himself to shine within us,’ while still acknowledging that ‘our 
participation...is not excluded.’966 Pannenberg makes clear his view that ‘the 
moment we take our destiny of fellowship with God into our own hands, we 
are already sinners and have missed the mark.’967 
                                                 
965
 ST2, 227-228. 
 
966
 ST2, 228. 
 
967
 ST2, 228; It should be noted that the term translated ‘destiny’ in the English version of 
Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology is most frequently, as it is here, Die Bestimmung, which, 
especially in this context that speaks of independent and autonomous action, should be 
translated as ‘purpose’ or ‘intention’ rather than ‘determination’ or, as in the Bromiley 
Sovereignty and Freedom: 275 
 
 
The affirmation of Gregory Nazianzus’s claim, ‘what is not assumed is 
not healed,’ is instructive here. By becoming incarnate, God in Christ invites 
us to place our history, voluntarily, in line with his history to meet a common 
goal. While ‘at present the goal [seems] indistinct,’ this goal is revealed, 
proleptically, ‘at the resurrection.’968 So we find that in binding our history to 
that of Christ, and in his death, that Christ reshapes our history toward his 
own, and immediately upon his death, in which our old history has ended, we 
are brought to new life. As Pannenberg states it, ‘Jesus…does not come to this 
history as something external,’ but becomes part of it, and only in so doing 
transforms it.
969
 So our history is taken into his history directed toward the 
resurrection through our freely made decision to pursue his goal. 
We cannot find our identity, and thus our lasting existence, within the 
present. Instead, for Pannenberg, ‘the attempt of sinners to base their identity 
of totality of their own lives on the Now…is bound to fail because in the flux 
of time each Now is replaced by another Now.’970 According to Pannenberg, 
the internal drive for all living creatures is not merely the freedom of a fleeting 
now, as Schelling argues, but is ‘a desire for the totality of life that they do not 
yet fully possess.’971 This is obtained by ‘participation in the eternity if God,’ 
yet is inhibited by the ‘separation from God’ inherent in our finitude.972 
The task, then, is to overcome the gap between our finite existence and 
the future ‘end of history,’ that we cannot obtain due to that same finite 
existence. ‘Only in the history of Jesus of Nazareth did the eschatological 
future, and with it the eternity of God, really enter into the historical 
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present.’973 For Pannenberg, then, the entering of the eschaton into the present 
is the moment of redemption and it is predicated upon the incarnation of Jesus, 
though he is only revealed to have been the incarnate Christ at the 
resurrection, not his death only. We find the end of history, then, in the work 
of God from his eternity, the immanent Trinity, breaking into the course of 
history. ‘The inbreaking of the present of the coming kingdom is granted to 
others also insofar as they accept the message of Jesus and open themselves to 
his work.’974  
The infinite gap between the present course of history and the ‘end of 
history,’ which must remain, to some extent, distinct lest it overwhelm the 
freedom of creation can nevertheless be overcome by the action of the infinite 
God who brings about that same history. By opening ourselves to the message 
of Christ, and dying with Christ, we not only bind our history with his, and so 
experience new life with him, but also trust in the coming kingdom that 
reveals God’s infinite nature. That trust, through which we proleptically 
experience the infinite God opens us up not merely to a generic ‘work’ of 
God, but to our own ecstatic response to him. Redemption is life in that it 
elicits a more complete ecstasis within each of those who trust in God through 
Christ.  
Not only, then, does the redemption of Christ redeem our false history 
by transforming it to be part of his history, but it also ensures a more complete 
freedom as we respond ecstatically to his infinite nature revealed in the 
resurrection. The mutual dependence of God’s sovereignty upon our free 
actions and our freedom upon his completed goal, is characteristic of the flow 
of history as it is understood to be an extension of the creatio continua first 
highlighted in chapter one. For Pannenberg, in Jesus we see that, following his 
death, the end of history appeared proleptically at the resurrection as the 
consummation of his identity as Christ and further accomplishing the purposes 
of God. Pannenberg affirms even in the midst of our surrender, ‘our 
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participation…is not excluded,’ from bringing about the final end of history 
that has been achieved.
975
 The dichotomy of either surrender or participation is 
a false one. 
We act in our own autonomy, but we do so as part of a larger whole 
bringing about the actualization of the Kingdom of God, as we are encouraged 
toward his goal via our ecstatic response to God. In other words, the 
accomplishment of God’s purposes have depended, at least in part, on the free 
actions of those who are found to be bound to Christ, though Christ, acting 
freely as the man Jesus, has secured this end. The release of an undefined 
amount of temporal instants from Spirit is important in this for it leaves room 
for the freedom of humanity.
976
 Simply put, God as Spirit will continue to act 
as the grounding for history, and in so doing cooperate with creation, until 
history arrives, contingently, at the already observed end of history. Some of 
the tension within this view of time/history is resolved through the application 
of multidimensional time, a concept introduced, in this thesis, at the end of 
chapter four. If time exists as at least two dimensions, then the complete 
experience of time would necessarily include past, present and future 
simultaneously. If we also accept that time/history is contingent, but is also 
multidimensional, there is no reason to assume that the end of history could 
not itself be fixed, while other aspects of it remain contingent. In other words, 
the character and nature of that temporal event, seen proleptically at the 
resurrection and from which God acts, already exist, but its location within 
history is not yet fixed. Further, in the same way that four dimensional space 
may bend in upon itself in a way that is imperceptible to a three dimensional 
perspective of space, so also could multidimensional time exist. 
I should emphasize, again, as I did in chapter four, that this does not 
mean that God exists upon one dimension of time and humanity exists upon 
another. Rather, all of creation exists within the same multi-dimensional time, 
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as does God. Creation, from its finite perspective, however, cannot experience 
the fullness of time in all its complexity, while God, being infinite, can 
experience it in fullness while also acting as the grounding for its continued 
creation. This does still require a view of history that, as noted above, means 
all future events remain contingent, and thus unknown, even by God. It also 
continues to mean that the placement of the final ‘end of history’ is still 
unsettled. Finally, it continues to mean that, by becoming that grounding for 
history, ‘makes himself dependent,’ upon the actions of his creation. This is 
especially remarkable considering the limited perspective of creation, but 
perhaps gives more of an avenue for the understanding the manner in which 
God might act as a guide, without overwhelming the freedom of creation. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter extended the field discussion of the last chapter by first 
noting how non-material fields have been observed to connect to the material 
world: via singularities or manifestations of the field in contingent objects. In 
the same way, then, we must argue the Spirit manifests himself as a singularity 
to bring about creation. Yet the Spirit does not manifest himself as the 
material objects of creation. Rather, by manifesting himself, the Spirit elicits 
an ecstatic response within creation, which can be understood via Polanyi’s 
modification of Teilhard’s ‘Omega Point.’ Given the nature of ecstatic 
relation, however, there is a potential danger of eliminating the distinction 
between Creator and created. This can be resolved, while still maintaining that 
God manifests himself to foster creation, through the modification of 
panentheism offered by Philip Clayton, that overcomes the objections to 
panentheism made by Pannenberg. What remains, though, is a tension 
between the contingent and independent existence of both God and free 
creatures. Rather than problematic, however, one can see the connection of 
field to a creative tension stretching back to the Stoic concept of tonos in 
relation to the pneuma. Nevertheless, the Stoic model alone is inadequate to 
extend Pannenberg’s theology of history. Instead, it must be modified through 
Schelling’s view of history, in such a way that it connects the future end of 
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history to the present experience of that history, still held in tension, as is 
witnessed in the Eucharistic sacrament that Schelling parallels with the Greek 
drama. For our discussion, this essentially means that divine sovereignty is not 
in opposition to human freedom, despite the tension between the two, but that 
divine sovereignty will necessarily entail human freedom in the context of the 
creation of the world, since God, by creating out of himself, makes himself 
dependent upon that world, as claimed by Pannenberg
977
. 
The tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom, however, 
is approached in a new manner through careful elaboration of Pannenberg’s 
field concept in a few key areas. First, the application of field must be 
understood to be making an ontological claim concerning the nature of God 
and God’s creation. Second, the field must not be understood as a field that 
produces space or matter, but as the source or grounding of all time and 
history. By describing God as acting as the grounding for each new future 
event from history’s end, as Pannenberg does, we can then connect this with 
the broader theology of history to address the tension between divine 
sovereignty and human freedom, especially if it is considered within a 
multidimensional time structure. 
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At the outset of this thesis, I noted the two primary objectives, which, 
during the course of the thesis, hinge upon the completion of a third objective. 
The first objective was to demonstrate that Wolfhart Pannenberg’s theological 
corpus comprises a single, coherent theology of history, understood in terms 
of Scotus and Schelling, primarily. The second was to demonstrate that 
through a proper understanding of Pannenberg’s theology as one of history, a 
novel approach to the tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom 
could be obtained. The third objective, which emerged as critical to the 
primary two objectives, was reframing and reinterpreting Pannenberg’s appeal 
to field theory in such a way that could respond to both concerns, as well as 
give further clarity to Pannenberg’s other theological commitments. The result 
is a view of history that simultaneously affirms the sovereignty of God over 
history, but suggests God yields the exercise of that sovereignty in certain 
specific ways to allow the free choices of humanity to come about and be 
incorporated into his history whose end is defined. 
 
1 History, Methodology, and Freedom 
 1.1 Pannenberg’s Theology of History 
 The thesis began with two foundational chapters that established the 
groundwork pursuing thesis’ objectives as reiterated just above. The initial 
chapter argued in new ways for the decisive influence that John Duns Scotus’s 
concept of contingency has upon Pannenberg’s formulation of a theology of 
history. This influence was shown to have two facets for our purposes. First, it 
establishes a contingency of the future and the present, but not the past. Once 
an event moves out of the future and through the present, it is determined such 




not shift in its content. This stands in stark contrasts to both Aristotle, who did 
not allow for a contingency of the present, and Leibniz, who required that the 
past remain contingent, as discussed in the first two sections of chapter one. 
The vital facet of Scotist contingency is that it establishes a particular sort of 
contingency. It is not mere indeterminism, which leads to a stochastic 
understanding of the universe, but is contingency that allows for purpose. 
While, for Leibniz, events are contingent because they rely upon the goodness 
of God to actualize them out of many options, for Scotus, an event can be 
contingent because it relies upon the causal effect of human decisions that are 
free to some meaningful degree. To be sure, Leibniz allows for freedom as 
well, but this is entirely due to God’s sustained impartation of freedom, rather 
than a trait now inherent within humans, as in Scotus.
978
 In the context of 
chapter one, this understanding of contingency opened the discourse to a 
broader one of time and history as it connects to creation. Through the 
concepts of creatio ex nihilo and creatio continua, the tension between divine 
and human independence, which is connected to the second driving question 
of the thesis (divine sovereignty and human freedom) was also introduced. 
This led to the second foundational issue. 
 The second chapter introduced the concept of a theology of history 
through the lens of Friedrich W. J. Schelling, by which Pannenberg would 
operate. The influence of Schelling upon Pannenberg cannot be understated. 
Schelling’s insistence on the freedom of humanity, first explicitly stated in his 
‘Essay on Human Freedom,’ is adapted by Pannenberg to mean that revelation 
must occur indirectly. As detailed in the second chapter, a direct sort of 
revelation, with which Barth and Bultmann are concerned, would overwhelm 
the freedom of human persons given the nature of the sovereignty of God. 
Instead revelation must understood as an indirect communication, one that is 
interpreted not directly from a text or sermon or ‘event’ or ‘encounter,’ but 
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through examination of revelatory acts within history. Of course, this was also 
met with the problem of forms of revelation that do seem to be direct, but 
these might be allowed, in Pannenberg’s application, by arguing that these are 
limited, temporary, limitations of God’s sovereignty for the purpose of direct 
encounter. Schelling’s call, toward the end of his Spätphilosophie, to expand 
his ‘philosophy of history’ through an appeal to the philosophy of science 
must likewise be understood as bearing importantly on the emphasis upon 
God’s historic action in Pannenberg’s theology.  
Chapter three continued this discussion by expanding the scope of 
history toward a universal or natural history. The expansion of the scope of 
history to include cosmic, or natural, history helps us to see Pannenberg’s 
theology as unified around the centre of history, and gives rise to 
Pannenberg’s statements regarding natural and scientific law as an expression 
of the ‘faithfulness of God’ to creation.979 In light of Dilthey’s hermeneutic of 
history, in particular, coupled with the reframing of history in cosmic terms, 
‘history’ must be understood to be temporal activity understood from a divine 
perspective, a theme to which we will return below. By reading Pannenberg in 
this manner, we see the shortcomings of systematic interpretations of 
Pannenberg that seek to characterise his theology as one that is founded, 
primarily, upon science or philosophy of science.
980
 As already mentioned, 
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this reliance upon Schelling, coupled with Pannenberg’s use of the Scotist 
concept of contingency, also mean that his theology, as a theology of history, 
approaches doctrines methodologically almost exclusively from a ‘bottom up’ 
perspective, setting it apart from most other doctrinal frameworks which to a 
greater or lesser degree prioritise also the ‘top down’ perspective.  
 
1.2 A New Methodology for Theology 
Pannenberg gives voice to this methodology in his first major work 
following Revelation as History, which is Jesus—God and Man, wherein he 
begins from the historical person of Jesus and goes on to argue that at the 
resurrection he was revealed to have been the Son of God. This contrasts with 
many traditional Christologies, which assume Christ’s divinity first and then 
seek to explain, through a speculative approach, how God became man. 
Contrary to Barth’s early assessment of Pannenberg, this ‘bottom up’ 
approach was not an isolated experimental methodology, but one that would 
inform his exploration of other doctrines as well.
981
 For instance, even though 
Pannenberg does not specifically use the language of ‘from below’ to describe 
his trinitarian theology, given the decisive ‘epistemic priority’ he gives to the 
economic Trinity, as discussed at the end of chapter five, it is difficult to read 
it as anything other than a trinitarian theology ‘from below.’ This also means 
that interpretations of Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology that frame it along 
trinitarian lines that occur in the classical ‘top down’ fashion miss something 
important and decisive in Pannenberg’s overall outlook. The doctrine of the 
Trinity, rather than a guiding a priori framework, is the interpretive product of 
a particular underlying historical principle.
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Pannenberg develops his understanding of the Trinity by focusing on 
the actions of the Trinity in history (i.e. the economic Trinity) to develop a 
doctrine of the Trinity, rather than assuming anything about God or the nature 
of God or, once determined to be a Trinity, the relation between the persons of 
the Trinity to each other. To be sure, one must keep in mind our earlier 
critique regarding the nature of direct or indirect revelation, and perhaps take 
some of Jesus’s historical statements, as well as the experience of Christ at 
baptism as direct revelation. Once this is done, though, the doctrine of the 
Trinity can be fully developed from the historical interaction of God with 
humanity, rather than appealing to some outside divine revelation that is 
removed from history, or that fails to take into full account the historical 
element. To be clear, as noted in the postscript to the fifth German edition of 
Grundzüge der Christologie, Pannenberg argues that the ‘bottom up’ approach 
is not exclusively bottom-up. Rather, it acts as a starting point and primary 
grounding point that leads us to utilize history to approach the top-down from 
a bottom-up perspective first. In other words, the aspects of the doctrine of the 
Trinity that develop from a ‘top-down’ approach may still be utilized, but only 
if the doctrine is approached, and the suitability of a top-down dynamic is 
established, from a bottom-up (that is to say historical) methodology first. 
This modified ‘bottom up’ methodology continues in Pannenberg’s 
understanding of eschatology. Failure to keep this in mind would allow 
Pannenberg’s theology to lapse into essentially deterministic directions, 
wherein God, from the future, pulls our present toward that future, acting as 
the ‘all-determining’ force for the present.983 Indeed, the perceived 
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deterministic pull that an ‘all-determining power from the future’ exerts upon 
the present is the reason for the rejection by several interpreters of various 
aspects of Pannenberg’s theology, or its labelling as contradictory. This 
perceived determinism is only exacerbated by Pannenberg’s insistence that not 
only is the end of history already defined, but has been observed historically 
as prolepsis in the resurrection of Jesus. Yet, this prolepsis cannot be simply 
excised without undermining the foundation of Pannenberg’s eschatology, as 
Kurt Koch attempts to do.
984
 For Pannenberg, the prior historical encounter 
with the end of history is necessary if he is to build a ‘bottom-up’ eschatology, 
since our understanding of eschatology must arise, initially, out of historical 
experience. 
 
1.3 Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom 
The nature of the end of history is particularly important for the second 
driving question of this thesis. Given the nature of contingency in Scotus, we 
must affirm, as Pannenberg does, that the future is contingent. The defined 
nature of the end of history does not require us to dispense with its 
contingency; rather, it compels us to re-interpret how contingency, within the 
context of history, fits into this model. Pannenberg’s own description of God 
as the ‘all-determining’ reality from the future should be understood in the 
context of his later qualification that ‘this all-determining power is determined 
only by itself and not subject to determination by anything else, unless it 
determines that it should be determined by something else.’985 While such a 
statement may initially appear either circular or contradictory, once interpreted 
in light of Schelling, it can be shown to be neither. Recall from chapter two 
that, in Schelling’s identity philosophy, although God serves as the grounding 
for all things including himself, when Schelling revisits the concept in his 
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Spätphilosophie, he adds the caveat (from his ‘Freedom Essay’ onward) that 
God’s self-grounding can be partially986 yielded to the free choices of 
humanity.  
As explored in chapters five and six of this thesis, Schelling’s later 
revival of his identity philosophy serves as the grounding for Pannenberg’s 
theology of history in which God’s sovereignty depends, in part, upon the free 
actions of human beings. Yet, if one does not read Pannenberg’s theology 
through the lens of a theology of history informed by Schelling in this way, 
one could misinterpret Pannenberg’s claim, presented in his Systematic 
Theology and addressed at length in chapters five and six that ‘God has made 
himself dependent’ upon the created world. The statement of God’s 
dependence on the world is Pannenberg’s effort to offer a consistent theology 
of history that affirms the freedom of humanity and the sovereignty of God, 
and comes about in the following way. 
First, as argued in chapter three and briefly referenced above, 
Pannenberg makes an appeal to the historical hermeneutic of Dilthey in order 
to connect his discussion of revelation as history itself with a broader theology 
of history and to demonstrate that such a perspective is viable. However, in 
order for historical action to be revelatory—to be comprehensible as 
knowledge—according to Dilthey’s scheme, Pannenberg must respond to the 
critique of Gadamer. In addition to expanding the scope of history to a cosmic 
level, this also means that the end of history must be known by God so that its 
connection with the rest of history may be conveyed meaningfully to 
humanity. Further, for Pannenberg, this also means that the height of 
revelation requires the revealing of this already defined end of history, which 
Pannenberg locates in the resurrection of Jesus, as discussed in chapter four. 
In order for history to be understood as not pre-determined, then, the rest of 
                                                 
986
 In the ‘Freedom Essay’ per se it is not partial, but as noted in chapter two, by the time of 










Second, the fullness of God’s sovereignty as an infinitely sovereign 
being would overwhelm any independent, freely performed action on the part 
of his creation. At its root, sovereignty depends upon the ultimate and final 
rule of God; it means the achievement of divine ends and goals in absolute 
terms at the end of history. The promise of a defined end of history that has 
also been observed in the past historical event of the resurrection (where the 
flow of time was interrupted) is thus a declaration of the ultimate sovereignty 
of God. However, in order to allow for free actions of humans, God 
provisionally self-restricts his sovereignty, thus making his sovereignty, and 
his entire identity as God, dependent upon the course of history that includes 
human actions, as initially suggested by Schelling. From a human perspective, 
God is ‘not yet’ sovereign until humanity’s actions bring about that defined 
end of history in free and wilful cooperation with him. That is to say that 
God’s sovereignty, while defined at the end of history, is by no means 
guaranteed. Rather, God yields his sovereignty, in its absolute form, and relies 
upon us to cooperate with his own activity—the nature of which was 
discussed in chapters five and six and will be revisited below—to bring about 
the end of history where God is the sovereign King and time is no longer 
experienced in its current, fragmented state.  
We can amplify and clarify this relation of free human creatures to a 
sovereign God by drawing analogously on the picture of the intra-trinitarian 
relationship between the Son and the Father with the Holy Spirit as the 
intermediary. In the same way that the Father gives authority to the Son, as 
discussed, in chapters five and six, thereby making himself dependent upon 
the Son, and the Son gives that authority back to the Father, so we can 
analogously also understand our relation with God. God makes himself 
dependent upon the course of history, and, in so doing, gives authority to 
humans. Humans are then presented with the choice to return that authority 
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back to God, thus bringing about the eschatological Kingdom of God. As 
discussed in chapter six, this redemption is accomplished by the yielding of 
our history to the history of Christ, through binding our death with his in order 
to participate in the eschatological Kingdom. In other words, we confess that 
‘Jesus is Lord’ and, in so doing, acknowledge that we are not fully sovereign, 
actively seeking to submit our will to his desired end in order to bring about 
his reign on earth, which means that we have given up our life so that our 
death is bound up with Christ’s death. The unification of our history with his, 
by the act of humble submission, means that, as God was revealed wholly 
sovereign over the fate of Jesus in the resurrection, so he will be revealed as 
sovereign over our fate, uniting us with the resurrection. For Pannenberg 
redemption is given to ‘individuals… [who wilfully] subject themselves to the 
sovereignty of God.’988 
The history over which God is the observer, then, is at least partially 
the work of human persons. God makes himself dependent upon the outcomes 
of the free and independent human creatures, but he does not then become a 
passive observer. Rather, he remains actively involved. The theology of 
history requires that, for the end of history to be meaningful and to hold any 
connection to the rest of history, which is necessary if we are to accept 
Dilthey’s thesis regarding the intelligibility of historical events as discussed in 
chapter three, there must be some unifying factor between each historical 
event. For our second claim, that such a theology of history presents a new 
approach to the problem of divine sovereignty and human freedom, taken in 
light of the commitment made in chapter four that the end of history is so 
defined as to have been observed, we must show not only that God is 
sovereign at the end of history, but also that God works together with 
humanity such that individual human actions work within the framework of 
God to bring about an end to history where God is fully sovereign.  
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2 Field Theory Reframed 
 As we have seen in chapters five and six, Pannenberg initially 
introduces the concept of field theory to provide an account of causation by 
the immaterial God but quickly finds that the scientific application yields too 
direct a causal connection between creator and created. Pannenberg therefore 
suggests that the philosophical understanding of field theory, grounded in 
Stoicism, is a more apt application for his purposes.  
Complicating Pannenberg’s usage of field theory is his later move, as 
we have seen, to backtrack his earlier comments that field theory is being used 
as ‘more’ than ‘mere metaphor,’ by declaring field theory functions 
metaphorically. In order resolve this inconsistency, I propose the focus on 
field be in relation to the way causality works between matter and the field, 
yet connect it via temporality rather than through spatial or material concerns. 
In other words, I argue that God exerts a causal influence upon the world in 
the same manner that field exerts a causal influence upon the world, but God 
is neither identical with field, nor is the focus on material divine causation, 
only temporal manifestation, as elucidated below. 
 At its core, Pannenberg’s theology needs a form of causation that 
allows there to be a defined end to history, but does not lapse into a sort of 
deterministic final causation as implied by Teilhard’s Omega Point. 
Pannenberg adapts Teilhard’s radial energy through an appeal to Polanyi, who 
likewise is opposed to a mechanistic view of natural causation, through field 
theory. The goal of such a view is to describe divine causation ‘from below’ or 
as part of the universal structure of the cosmos, rather than ‘from above,’ 
which would be too deterministic.  
 Simply understood, in order for Pannenberg to avoid the top-down 
causality (or ‘pulling’ toward a future) that a macro-theory such as field 
theory, or Teilhard’s Omega Point, would normally entail, he must give an 
account where God does not stand outside of history, but enters into that 
history, and acts as the ground for his creation to reach that goal. As 




is understood to be the manifestation of himself in terms of the grounding of 
temporality. 
 The idea that the Spirit manifests as the grounding of temporality fits 
well within the broader context of a theology of history as outlined above, 
properly understood through the application of Scotist and Schelling’s ideas. 
The application of the Scotist concept of causation shifts the framework for 
understanding field theory from a macro-theory to one that is concerned with 
individual causal events. This means that we are less concerned with the 
broader series being contingent, but with each interaction with God’s Spirit as 
contingent temporal grounding, meaning that each individual decision is 
contingent, a necessary condition for freedom. This in turn means that God, as 
Spirit, is constantly ‘evaluating’ and ‘deciding’ how to manifest himself as the 
grounding for history, even as past events become defined (passing the 
nunc).
989
 The present reality, then, consists solely of our shared history, the 
current moment, and a shared (and already defined) end from which God 
creates the grounding for each new present. There is no sense of an already 
defined path toward that end, as this would negate the contingency of each 
present event. In order to fit this within the broader theology of history 
described, we must again turn back to Schelling. 
For Pannenberg, as explored in chapter four, ‘the future at issue in the 
dynamic of the Spirit is the entry into time of the eternity of God.’990 This 
eternity that enters into time, the event he describes as the ‘end of history,’ is 
the end of a ‘fragmentary vision of time, with past, present, and future 
experienced in three distinct manners, and history instead being understood as 
the undivided present of life in its totality.’991 Similarly, Schelling argues that 
the flow of history, via each present moment, is aiming toward the end of 
history as the fullness of the presence of God. However, due to the defined 
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nature of this end, Schelling removes it from the actual flow of history.
992
 
Given the connection of God’s identity to the fullness of his sovereignty, the 
removal of the fullness of the presence of God from the flow of our history, 
which it is nevertheless aiming toward, leads Schelling to declare that ‘God 
never is.’993 Here we can clearly see that Pannenberg echoes Schelling’s line, 
but modifies it in an important way, as discussed in chapter four, by claiming 
instead that ‘God does not yet exist.’994 The inclusion of ‘yet’ proves to be the 
key distinction that requires something beyond Schelling provided by 
Pannenberg. While for Schelling the relationship between the present flow of 
history and the eternity of God ‘cannot be explained or justified, only 
narrated,’995 Pannenberg’s theology of history seeks to explain the mechanism 
for that connection via field, but, in order for this to work, we must adjust the 
account of field, which will also include an adjustment to the common 
understanding of time. 
 
2.1 Materiality and Embracing a Muted Panentheism 
Field theory, as it operates in contemporary quantum field physics, 
posits a field interacting with particles to bring about mass, and thus 
materiality, to those particles. A physical particle passes through the Higgs 
field, which produces a sort of ‘drag’ upon the particle, and so, through this 
interaction of the field upon the particle and the particle upon the field, these 
particles attain mass and become material. Other particles, such as photons, do 
not interact with the field and thus have no mass. The other primary function 
of field is in connection with the singularity at the beginning of the universe. 
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The field produced a gravitational force upon the infinitely dense singularity 
to bring about the ‘Big Bang’ and the entire universe. As explained in chapter 
five, a number of issues arise by applying this field theologically. As many 
early critiques of Pannenberg noted, too close an identification of the Spirit 
with this field leads either to deterministic pantheism or to an assessment of 
field theory as superfluous, as discussed in chapter five.  
In particular, for Pannenberg, the identification of the material field 
with the divine Spirit is to be rejected entirely. Pannenberg outright rejects any 
hint of panentheism. Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter six, the 
panentheism Philip Clayton defines, positing merely no distance between God 
and creation, allows one to maintain a creator/creature distinction, important 
for both divine sovereignty and human freedom, while still considering that 
God occupies all space that freely acting autonomous creatures do not. As 
such, we act within God, as it was discussed, while still remaining distinct 
from God. It is important to note that this does not compromise any other 
aspect of Pannenberg’s theological system other than his stated objection to 
panentheism prima facie. Accepting some sort of panentheism is, however, 
vitally important for a few different reasons. 
In order for us to engage seriously with field theory, we must consider 
the all-encompassing nature of the field. Even in the reframed field theory of 
this thesis, field-based causation is only possible because the field permeates 
all of space without itself being either space or matter. Of the most importance 
is this: if we are to speak of God as manifesting himself as the ground of 
history, a concept introduced at the end of chapter six, all of our activity must 
take place within God. Otherwise there is some time outside of God’s 
presence over which he holds no sovereignty, which would call into question 
the very nature of both God’s sovereignty and the contingent nature of that 
time since its sustained existence is not dependent upon God’s faithfulness, as 





2.2 The Dynamic Field of Temporality and the Spirit of God 
As introduced in chapter six, and extended here, it is important for our 
purposes that we understand God’s function as the dynamic field of Spirit to 
be in terms of the grounding of time. To be clear, the claim here is not that 
time is God; rather, it is that history exists as a result of the interaction of 
creation with the Spirit of God manifest as the grounding field for time.  
The physical field functions by acting as a gravitational force upon 
matter and potential matter. The ‘big bang’ of the universe was potential 
matter within the singularity interacting with the dynamic field to expand into 
that field, itself part of the singularity, and so to stretch out while 
simultaneously gaining mass and, through other fields of force interacting with 
each other and the newly formed matter, expand away from other massive 
particles. If we are to describe field in terms of temporality, but preserve the 
same form of causation, we should revisit the discussion of ecstasis from 
section two of chapter six. 
There, the discussion was put in modified Heideggerian terms. While 
Heidegger suggests that conscious existence is understood in terms of ‘Sein-
zum-Tode,’ in chapter four, we modified this as our response to the ‘end of 
history,’ which extends beyond individual finite existence (and death).996 
Pannenberg understands the ecstatic response of creation specifically to be a 
response to the presence of the ‘prolepsis of the future’ where we are 
confronted with the ‘actual arrival’ of the future, by which Pannenberg also 
understands the whole of history to relate, ecstatically, to the individual via the 
supernatural.
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 To better build upon the discussion there, let us examine the 
connection between the ‘end of history’ and the way field theory works in 
contemporary physics. 
For physics, the existence of material objects and the way they interact 
is dependent upon the various force fields that guide such an interaction, the 
one discussed most extensively in this thesis being gravitational fields, but 
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also electro-magnetic, strong nuclear, weak nuclear, etc. For example, the 
gravitational field, also known as the Higgs field, interacts with already-
existing particles such that these particles, when in the presence of such a 
field, exhibit signs of mass. The field exists in all parts of the universe, which 
is possible in large part because it is not material (e.g., having mass), though it 
is physical (can be measured).  
We may extend this sort of language to time, recognizing, though, that 
time cannot be visualised exactly, as discussed in chapter four. Still, by 
appealing to Scotus, we may be able to conceive of temporal extension 
independent of spatial extension. Recall from chapter one that Scotus 
discussed potentiality in terms of modes of being. Each mode of being entailed 
the temporal extension of an identified contingent thing or action, without 
requiring its spatial extension. It had a time when it potentially occurred, and 
potentially did not occur, though only one was actualized. While material 
objects might be said to have potential spatial dimensions, actions, in this 
context, are not so extended. They have a potential ‘when,’ but, especially in 
speaking of an extension throughout the universe as in divine actions, they do 
not necessarily have a potential ‘where.’ Thus we can speak of the temporal as 
distinct from the spatial, allowing that God continually acts as the grounding 
for the temporal via field, while allowing the spatial/material to exist 
independent of him following the initial creative act. 
For our purposes, we note that the existence of a defined end to history 
would interact with the already-existing universe to act as a grounding for 
temporal occurrences that move toward that end. As Pannenberg states in 
Anthropology in Theological Perspective, the future of God is both the goal of 
history and the movement of history toward that goal.
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 The movement 
between each ‘now’ and this goal is contingent because, up until it comes into 
being, it does not yet exist. However, it is oriented toward a goal, and thus is 
still directed, though self-directed. We cannot use the concept of a temporal 
field to explain creatio ex nihilo, since the temporal field concerns an already-
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extant universe; still it can aid in discussing creatio continua. The expansion 
of the universe includes the expansion of time as well as space. 
Returning to the discussion of temporal field, our conversation is only 
sensible going forward if we agree, with Pannenberg, that the end of history is 
defined. While Pannenberg makes it clear that the resurrection gives evidence 
of this definite nature, it is Schelling’s use of the ‘end of history,’ discussed in 
chapter two, that is particularly relevant. The end of history did not occur at 
the resurrection; instead the resurrection was the clearest revelation of that 
end, an end which, according to Schelling, was present in the Logos at the 
creation of the world. The physical universe, then, in response to the defined 
end that reveals God as sovereign and all history as an unfragmented unity, 
begins to make history toward that end. In the same way that matter will 
respond to a vacuum by filling it, so history will respond to the gap between 
its present and the future by filling it. Thus history has that defined end as a 
cause arising from within it. 
To be sure, if God had not created the world, he would have been 
sovereign without history or time. His act of creation, then, caused a 
fragmentation in the unity of history that, by the same act, caused him either to 
determine the outcome of history by determining every historical instant or to 
allow the history of the created world to come about contingently, thus making 
his sovereignty and identity contingent upon that outcome. If we allow that 
certain events were not explicitly determined by God (e.g. the acts of sin by 
his creation), then, via the transitive properties of causation discussed in 
chapter one, all of history is contingent at the time of its initial occurrence. In 
his act of creation, then, God puts himself at risk, dependent upon the 
continued action of the created universe to work toward that defined end. The 
act of creation itself, then, must be motivated out of love for his uncreated 
creation and nothing else. 
Moving back to the proleptic appearance of the end of history at the 
resurrection, we must also ask why this appearance should occur. If we accept 
that God loves his creatures, then we should expect God’s desire for us to be 




actions within history for the sake of inviting our willing participation in that 
end. As Schelling puts it, God as the playwright enters into the play of history 
itself, occasionally intervening directly, to aid us bringing about his defined 
end.
999
 However, Schelling suggests that the goal of history is one toward 
which our actions are contingently directed, in order to preserve human 
freedom, but we do not actually attain it.
1000
 In contrast to Schelling’s position, 
Pannenberg affirms that the end is attained, or else our actions are meaningless 
since they do not contribute to a lasting end. Still the connection between our 
present activity and a defined future remains in tension.  
Rather than an actual infinite flow of time from now until that future 
the length of time between now and the ‘end of history’ is contingent, with 
God continually being present to us from the eternal end of history, and 
providing the temporal space into which our actions flow. Thus there is a 
potential infinite amount of time between now and the end of history, but not 
an actual one, since this end has already been observed at the resurrection. 
God’s faithfulness to creation is found in his continual provision of temporal 
grounding into which we are given the choice to acknowledge God as 
sovereign, working toward that end, or reject this, building our own false 
history that does not lead toward this end.
1001
 Thus history, and reality as an 
extension, is the result of a co-creation between God and the rest of creation. 
The prolepsis of the end of history allows us to transcend mere contingent 
action and move toward free action. We are given the option to choose to yield 
our self-determining actions to God’s final sovereignty, the latter of which 
invites us into God’s history. 
Taking into account the idea of multidimensional time introduced in 
chapters four and five, we may draw one further connection between the 
functionality of space to the functionality of time. It is generally accepted that 
the universe is spatially expanding. This spatial expansion, though, is not into 
                                                 
999
 Schelling, ‘System der Praktlichen Philosophie,’ I:3, 602. 
 
1000
 Ibid., 603. 
 
1001





new, previously unknown, space, but every point in space is expanding out 
from every other point in space.
1002
 This is usually illustrated through 
something like a balloon. If a two-dimensional being lived on the surface of 
the balloon-like structure, and the structure were ‘inflated’ as it were, then that 
being would notice that each point on the surface expanded out from every 
other point, and the character and nature of the surface of that balloon 
continued to change. The expansion, however, wasn’t due to a change in the 
two-dimensional structure of the surface upon which the being resides, but due 
to an expansion into three-dimensional space. In the same way, our universe’s 
spatial expansion is generally accepted as to be expanding into some higher 
dimension beyond our three spatial dimensions. 
Given that space and time are so inextricably linked, as discussed in 
chapters five and six, we have every reason to think that time expands in a 
similar manner. Now, clearly, the analogy of the balloon is not without its 
problems, considering one could argue about the relation between a surface 
and the interior, and the expansion of the universe is not understood in exactly 
the same manner, but it does give us a way of discussing the expansion. The 
spatial universe is known, according to contemporary physics, to be expanding 
at every point, while those points themselves are already extant. In the same 
way, we can argue that temporal points that have not yet occurred are 
expanding. In universal expansion, this allows for new spatial distances into 
which other objects could move, so temporally does the expansion ‘make 
space’ for events that have not yet occurred to expand.  
Because of how history works, in that past events become fixed (if 
they did not, as discussed since chapter one, scientific enquiry is impossible) 
according to the Scotist sense of contingency, thus the expansion of historical 
events into the grounding of temporal field is not uniform throughout history. 
In the same way that our two-dimensional being, in the example above, were 
he to be traveling across the surface of the spherical balloon, would not have 
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to back up and traverse the distance behind him again, even as it expanded 
into a third dimension, so the time that has lapsed may remain fixed, even as it 
expands into a second dimension. Rather, the experience of expanding time is 
future concentrated. It is in this way that the flow of history stems from the 
fixed end into the horizon just beyond the present.  
This is also gives a broader sense to the ‘temporal thickness’ of 
eternity. Rather than experience time along a single dimension, as now, the 
‘thickness’ with which God experiences time, and which all humanity will at 
the eschaton, allows each to observe the fullness of temporal existence, thus 
perceiving past, present and future, in their relation, without them losing their 
contingency, as well as the possibility for other, as yet unnamed, dimensions 
of temporal experience should time prove to have more than two dimensions. 
To be sure, much of this is speculative in nature. Nevertheless, the idea 
that time does exist as more than a single dimension is one of the least 
speculative claims of the thesis. Given the way that Pannenberg seeks to apply 
field theory to divine-human interaction, along with the various caveats I have 
expressed for interpreting that, to apply a temporal field theory along a 
multidimensional time, rather than a single dimensional time, is perhaps a 
small leap that resolves many of the tensions within Pannenberg’s theology. It 
is entirely possible that Pannenberg envisioned something of this sort, yet 
lacked the language to fully express it beyond that of ‘analogy.’ The use of 
Pannenberg’s prolepsis has one further advantage for our purposes. 
 
2.3 From Contingency to Freedom and Divine Sovereignty 
 The introduction of a proleptic appearance of the end and an invitation 
to participate in history in a particular sort of way shifts the discussion from 
pure contingency to one of freedom by introducing the idea of intention. Here 
is where the use of Scotus and Schelling becomes particularly important. As 
noted above, Schelling’s clear indication that the end of history is present with 




flow of history in the same manner as Pannenberg,
1003
 but it is Schelling’s 
discussion of dependency and freedom in the context of divine sovereignty 
that is of particular interest for us. 
 As has been stated throughout this thesis, Scotus’s discussion of 
contingency is particularly unique in that it grants not only indeterminism, but 
allows for the possibility of purpose to be a noncontrary aspect of contingent 
actions. It is not the case only that God generally presents himself in the 
fullness of his sovereignty as the end of all history, but, by applying Scotist 
contingency to Schelling and Pannenberg, we may argue that it is the case that 
God presents his end to all of creation at every particular instant of existence, 
irrespective of the degree to which creation is aware of this end, revealing a 
purpose toward which or away from which we may freely direct our actions. 
This allows temporal space for creation to contingently respond while 
allowing time to continue to flow for all of creation. 
 For Schelling, the idealist notion of freedom, at least at the writing of 
his Freiheitsschrift, as a formal framework, is inadequate. For Schelling, ‘the 
real and vital concept is that freedom is the capacity for good and evil.’1004 Not 
only this, though, freedom also ‘unmistakably is’ derived from God.1005 Thus, 
if we are to ground our understanding of freedom in Schelling, which 
Pannenberg does, we must speak of freedom in these terms. 
 In connection with the end of history and field, we can connect this to 
the prior discussion, at the start of this conclusion and at the very end of 
chapter six, of God’s end in relation to redemption. God, having made the 
fullness of his sovereignty dependent on the actions of his creatures, presents 
those creatures capable of exercising freedom with a choice: we can follow the 
example of Christ in returning that freedom back to God by declaring him 
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Lord—which is to say sovereign, or we can reject that path and make our own 
history. To do the latter is to choose evil, since it rejects the Lordship of a God 
who demonstrates his love by yielding his sovereignty to us. The proleptic 
appearance of the end of history as the fullness of God’s sovereignty was 
presented as an appeal to our decision-making faculties. We can choose to 
accept this end, whose reality has been observed historically, or we can reject 
it and thus make our history into a false one that does not have God as its end. 
To do the latter is to remain in sin; to do the former is to have our history 
redeemed. This choice is presented continually again and again, at each new 
instant. In continuing to present this choice, to allow humanity the capacity to 
choose good and to choose evil, God grants our freedom, simultaneously 
presenting to us his sovereignty at the end of history, and limiting that 
sovereignty for the sake of our free choices.  
To be sure, as discussed throughout this thesis, the motivation for 
God’s action is love. In chapter one it was noted, in the context of Scotus, that 
‘creation is only an expression of God’s love,’ which it must be, ‘so far as it is 
free.’1006 This freedom of both God and creation must be motivated out of love 
according to Scotus, and also Schelling’s theology, as introduced in chapter 
two. It is not enough for God to love himself, even himself as Trinity. A 
perfect love must extend outside of himself, reasoned Schelling, toward a 
being who can choose whether or not to return the love.
1007
 Pannenberg 
synthesises these in the context of the God who works from the future to note 
that love grants existence, but it does so only contingently.
1008
 At its root, love 
is an invitation to the other to exocentric, or ecstatic relationship. From the 
future, ‘God relates to the present by lovingly intending the future of presently 
contingent events’ but still yielding the fullness of his existence as God (his 
sovereignty) to our free choice.
1009
 The intent of our contingency, which we 
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may label freedom given that it has intent, comes at the invitation of God. The 
same way that God creates by inviting us toward his already/not-yet future, so 
he invites us into exocentric/ecstatic relation with him. By leaving the choice 
of fulfilled existence or abandonment of a future hope to each individual, he 
ensures our freedom, while still guaranteeing his eventual sovereignty. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 This thesis has demonstrated that Pannenberg’s theology is best 
understood as a theology of history, influenced by Scotus and Schelling, and 
that such a theology amplified by a modified application of field theory, can 
provide a novel response to the problem of divine sovereignty and human 
freedom. This is possible when, in order to create free and independent 
creatures, we understand God to have yielded the fullness of his sovereignty 
until the end of history, which has already been observed, while still operating 
with limited sovereignty in the midst of that history, primarily by manifesting 
himself as temporal grounding field throughout the cosmos from the future 
into the present, with time understood in a multidimensional context.  
By extending Pannenberg’s method of theology as comprehensively 
‘bottom up’ in the context of other doctrines, such as the Trinity, I have 
presented a new methodology for doctrinal theology.
1010
 Further, the 
application of Scotist theology and Schelling’s Spätphilosophie, with a 
contemporary philosophy of science applied to Pannenberg’s theology, not 
only yields a novel approach to the perennial issue of divine sovereignty and 
human freedom in such a way that does justice to Pannenberg’s thought, but it 
also advances his theology in other key areas, such as soteriology and a more 
robust theology of history, that have not previously been examined in this 
manner, particularly in a religious context. The result is a presentation of 
Pannenberg’s theology as a comprehensive theology of history that affirms 
both the present reality and future confirmation of God’s sovereignty with the 
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result that it means God invites humanity to freely participate in the 
eschatological Kingdom of God as a transformative and redemptive act. God, 
by the act of creation, denies his sovereignty for the sake of love, so that, 
through transforming our history in cooperation with him, his sovereignty 
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